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ABSTRACT 
ASEAN is a good representative example of regional economic cooperation and 
integration as well as among developing countries in general. ASEAN was established in 
1967 and originally consisted of five members. However, this organization has subsequently 
achieved deeper and wider political and economic cooperation and expansion to 10 member 
countries.  
Due to changes in the world economy, international economic interdependence and 
crises, ASEAN members initiated the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) from December 
2015, due to be completed by 2020, with the aim of transforming ASEAN into “a stable, 
prosperous, and highly competitive region with equitable economic development, and reduced 
poverty and socio-economic disparities” (ASEAN 2008). The attainment of the AEC in 2020 
will represent a major landmark in terms of regional economic integration of ASEAN 
countries and for East Asia as a whole. The AEC has four objectives; achieving a single 
market and production base; becoming a highly competitive economic region; attaining 
equitable economic development; and becoming fully integrated into the world economy. 
Achieving high trade openness and more integration to the global economy, however, 
makes ASEAN economies more vulnerable to external shocks. This may have negative 
impacts on economic stability and growth which then affect the income gap between and 
within ASEAN countries. This is because ASEAN member countries may respond differently 
to common external shocks. As a result, ASEAN may fail to achieve one of its stated pillars 
for success - equitable economic development in which not only the within-country but also 
between-countries income gap is narrowed. 
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 In the literature the exchange rate regime is seen as an instrument that can minimise the 
negative effects of shocks on the stability of macroeconomic variables such as real output, the 
price level and the real exchange rate. Due to the impacts that these variables have on within-
country and between-countries income gaps, the exchange rate regime may also play an 
important role in limiting the effects of these shocks on these income gaps. Yet this is a 
relationship that has not been investigated in the literature. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects and contribution of various types 
of shocks, namely a negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and 
a positive foreign real interest rate shock on key macroeconomic variables, namely real GDP, 
consumer price index (CPI), real exchange rate, within-country income and between-countries 
income gap under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes for the ten ASEAN countries. By 
doing so, we can find out which exchange rate regime is better in dealing with the negative 
impacts of external shocks for ASEAN countries. In addition, this study aims to compare 
between the effects of external shocks on variables under each exchange rate regime to find 
out which type of shock affects and contributes most to the variables according to each 
exchange rate regime. Finally, this study attempts to recommend policies for ASEAN 
countries so that the negative impacts of external shocks on macroeconomic variables and the 
income gaps can be dealt with. This contributes to the attainments of the AEC. 
To do so this study will construct a model for between-countries income gap which 
deals with the relationship between external shocks, real output, price level, real exchange 
rate and between-countries income gap. We also develop another model called the within-
country income gap model, in order to investigate the relationship between external shocks, 
real output, price level, real exchange rate and the within-country income gap. To estimate 
these models, we employ annual data for ASEAN countries covering the period from 1999 to 
2014 and the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach. 
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In terms of the stabilities, we find that countries with a flexible exchange rate regime 
suffer more from external shocks than countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
particular, in general, real output, real exchange rate and price level fluctuate more to external 
shocks under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, external shocks 
have more long-lasting effects on these variables under a flexible rather than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Moreover, external shocks have insignificant effects on variables in the 
long-run. The results of accumulated responses show more between-countries and within-
country income equality under a flexible rather than under a fixed exchange rate regime exists 
in the case of a foreign demand shock.  However, fixed regime is better than the flexible 
exchange rate regime in minimising the within-country and between-countries income 
inequality when a country is beset by a world real oil price shock. 
In terms of accumulated effects, a flexible exchange rate regime is superior to a fixed 
exchange rate regime in absorbing a negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock because it generates higher economic growth and lower inflation. 
Nonetheless, a fixed exchange rate regime outweighs flexible exchange rate regime in coping 
with a positive world real oil price shock. This is because countries with a flexible exchange 
rate regime suffer more from a positive world real oil price shock with lower economic 
growth and higher inflation.  
In general, we find that a foreign demand shock and a foreign real interest rate shock are 
main drivers of the volatility of economic growth. Additionally, a world real oil price shock 
plays the most important role in explaining the fluctuation of the price level and income gap 
under both exchange rate regimes. In addition, in terms of accumulated value, an increase in 
the world real oil price has negative impacts on ASEAN countries because it causes an output 
contraction, inflation, greater between-countries and within-country income gap.  
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This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, this is the first study 
considering between-countries and within-country income inequality in evaluating the 
superiority of the exchange rate regime with the presence of external shocks. Second, this is 
the first time that the de facto exchange rate regime classification by the IMF has been applied 
in investigating the effects and contributions of external shocks on the economy across 
exchange rate regimes. Third, this is the first time that a comparison has been attempted to 
explain the effects and contributions between external shocks under each exchange rate 
regime for ASEAN countries. Fourth, it is the first study to cover all ten ASEAN countries in 
investigating exchange rate regime superiority. Fifth, and finally, this study proposes policies 
that can best deal with external shocks to obtains the targets of the AEC such as 
macroeconomic growth, narrowing between-countries and within-country income gap. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
There are various types of income inequality such as income inequality between 
countries and within a country which is in the form of inequality between states, cities, 
provinces and groups of people. Income inequality has received widespread scholarly 
attention. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) indicate that within-country income disparity is a 
major concern because it affects economic growth and stability. They also show that it can 
result in under-investment in education by lower income households. This affects certain 
growth drivers such as physical and human capital that lower labour productivity. 
Additionally, they point out that it can cause economic, financial and political instability 
which discourages investment and hence economic growth. 
Institutions such as the World Bank increasingly emphasise income inequality, in 
that the attainment of sustainable economic growth relies fundamentally on equitable 
growth. Income inequality and especially the goal of addressing it within and between 
countries, is a key measure. It has also been of significant concern to the ASEAN 
economic community (AEC) which was established in 2015 with the aim of establishing 
closer regional economic integration. The AEC seeks to sustain economic growth, regional 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and for the region to be fully integrated into the 
regional and world economy. The need for inclusive growth is also highlighted, where the 
aim is to achieve equitable economic development. This means narrowing the development 
and income gap that exists both within and between the countries in ASEAN (Mordecai 
2017).  
Piotrowska (2008) indicates that regional economic integration and globalisation 
increase elements of growth such as the volume of international trade and foreign 
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investment from the rich countries to poor countries. This implies that the integration that 
the AEC is pursuing can play a key role in reducing the income gap between lower income 
countries and higher income countries in ASEAN. Nonetheless, ASEAN countries are high 
in trade openness which makes them highly vulnerable to external shocks potentially 
causing economic instability
1
. It has been widely regarded by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and highlighted in the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) that external shocks impinge negatively on the economic 
growth of developing countries and cause macroeconomic instability (Raddatz 2007).  
More importantly, external shocks can lead to wider income gaps amongst ASEAN 
countries as well as the income gap within an ASEAN country, thus posing a serious threat 
to the success of the AEC in attaining one of its critical pillars for success - equitable 
economic development. A good example of this is where an external shock such as a 
decrease in foreign demand hits one ASEAN country, which then results in output 
volatility via its impact on the fluctuation of the real exchange rate. Consequently, output 
volatility affects economic growth, which then exerts an influence on the income gap 
within and between ASEAN countries
2
. 
As indicated in the World Economic and Social Survey of United Nations in 2006, 
the long-term growth performance of an economy is strongly affected by its 
macroeconomic stability. Therefore, while external shocks are considered as short-run 
macroeconomic shocks, they can destabilise economies, affect long-run growth rates and 
the within-country and between-countries income gaps via their impacts on 
macroeconomic instability. 
                                                          
1
 See Loayza and Raddatz (2007). 
2
 Masron and Yusop (2008) find that with the existence of external shocks, ASEAN countries can have a 
larger income gap between them. In addition, the literature review in Chaper 3 shows that macroeconomic 
instability and economic growth have impacts on the within-country income gap. 
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There are several ways to reduce the within-income inequality such as a more 
equitable welfare program, redistribution of prosperity from the rich to the poor or tax 
policy. The income gap between the higher income and the lower income countries can 
also be reduced by policies that stimulate transferring money for migrant workers, 
favourable conditions for exports to higher income countries and foreign aid such as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, these solutions do not always work 
well. A good example of this is the scenario where income redistribution or tax policy may 
lead to a reduction in the desire to work or even discourage the rich and entrepreneurs from 
working.  
Therefore, in this study, we try to investigate another way via the choice of exchange 
rate regime, in order to minimise the negative impacts of external shocks on income 
inequality by achieving greater macroeconomic stability and economic growth. In theory, 
and in practice, the exchange rate regime is a channel to transmit the effects of shocks to 
macroeconomic variables which in turn impact on the between-countries and within-
country income gap. This implies there is a possible link between shocks and the income 
gap via the exchange rate regime channel. However, this relationship has not been 
investigated in the literature. Therefore, this study aims to shed light on the possible links 
between external shocks and variables such as real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate, income 
gap within and between ASEAN countries under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate 
regime.  
Specifically, this study expands the literature on the choice of the exchange rate 
regime by focusing on countries which are a part of an economic zone, specifically a free 
trade area. Unlike Chia et al. (2012) who include all ten ASEAN countries in a sample of 
33 small open Asian countries, this study seeks to minimise the heterogeneity of the 
sample by focusing on only these ten nations which share a common objective in achieving 
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economic integration in the context of ASEAN and its policy priorities.  
In addition, our study of the ten ASEAN countries casts light on issues of integration 
and policy coordination to attain the AEC’s objectives, namely narrowing the income gap 
within and between ASEAN member countries and ensuring macroeconomic stability. 
This contributes to the success of ASEAN in the context of economic integration. Finally, 
this study makes a contribution to the issue of which exchange rate system is superior in 
not just limiting output, inflation and real exchange rate volatility to external shocks, but 
also presents a new dimension of their impact on income inequality.  
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The objective of this study is to investigate the optimal exchange rate regime, fixed 
or flexible, to minimise the negative effects of external shocks. In particular, this refers to 
the effects and contribution of a negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil 
price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock, on macroeconomic stability and 
the income gap (between-countries and within-country) for ASEAN countries under fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, this study will highlight the shocks that 
have the greatest effect and contribution on key macroeconomic variables under each 
exchange rate regime. Finally, the last objective of this study is suggesting policy 
implications for the success of the AEC, namely dealing with external shocks, ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and reducing between-countries and within-country income gap. 
To obtain these objectives, this study answers the following research questions: 
1. What are differences in responses of real output, the price level and real 
exchange rate to external shocks (including a negative foreign demand shock, a positive 
world real oil price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock) between a fixed 
and a flexible exchange rate regime? 
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2. What impacts do external shocks make on the between-countries income 
gap and within-country income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime? 
3. What are the similarities and differences between the effects of external 
shocks under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime?  
4. Which exchange rate regime is superior in minimising the negative effects 
of external shocks? 
5. Which is the dominant external source of the volatility of real output, the 
price level, real exchange rate, between-countries income gap and within-country income 
gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime?  
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
To achieve this study’s research objectives, some analytical approaches are 
employed. Firstly, we use descriptive statistics to understand and to compare the 
fluctuations of variables, namely real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate, between-countries 
income gap and within-country income gap and external shocks, namely foreign demand 
shock, world real oil price shock and foreign real interest rate shock under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes. Secondly, we review the literature to further understand the 
responses of macroeconomic variables to the shocks under different exchange rate regimes. 
We also review the relationship between variables to recognise the possible links between 
shocks, real output, price level, real exchange rate, between-countries and within-country 
income gap under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Thirdly, and finally, this study 
uses a quantitative analytical approach, namely a structural model which is expressed as a 
panel vector autoregressive model (panel VAR), to conduct an empirical estimation and 
robustness test for model for between-countries income gap and model for within-country 
income gap, for ASEAN countries. The structure of panel VARs is the same as for the 
VAR model in which all variables are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent. 
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However, a cross sectional dimension has been added. 
1.4. RESEARCH SCOPE  
 This study focuses on investigating and comparing the effects and the contribution 
of external shocks on the economies of ASEAN countries from 1999 to 2014. Although 
ASEAN was formed in 1967 the extension of ASEAN to include 10 member countries was 
completed by 1999. This is the year in which the IMF began to release its de facto 
exchange rate regime classification, which we adopt in this study. Accordingly, our sample 
period starts from 1999 and ends in 2014 as at the time we collected data, some data for 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar and Vietnam are not 
available after this period. Variables for empirical analysis include shocks (foreign 
demand, world real oil price and foreign real interest rate), real GDP, CPI, real exchange 
rate, exchange rate regime, between-countries income gap and within-country income gap. 
These variables are collected from reliable sources, namely the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World 
Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
1.5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 This thesis contains eight chapters. This chapter provides the research background, 
motivation, research objectives, methodology and scope of the study.  
Chapter 2 is concerned with the background of the ASEAN economy and its 
individual member countries. It also describes the process of global and regional 
cooperation and integration of the ASEAN grouping. Described here is the overall 
economic performance of ASEAN, including output, economic growth, consumer price 
index and real exchange rate. Moreover, this chapter provides information on the trade and 
financial linkages, income gaps between ASEAN countries and within each ASEAN 
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country. This chapter points out some challenges that ASEAN needs to address in order to 
achieve the targets of the AEC. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the importance of external shocks on ASEAN 
economies. This chapter also reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the choice 
of the exchange rate regime which is based on a comparison of the impact of shocks on 
key macroeconomic variables under a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime. Moreover, 
this chapter reviews the optimal currency area literature which focuses on the suitability of 
fixing the nominal exchange rate between member countries participating in closer 
economic integration. The relationship between macroeconomic variables and the income 
gap (both between and within-country) is also reviewed in this chapter. Finally, from the 
literature review, this chapter highlights some research gaps. 
Chapter 4 discusses two empirical models for the ASEAN countries. The first model-
model for between-countries income gap considers the relationship between shocks, real 
output, the real exchange rate, the price level and between-countries income gap. The 
second model for within-country income gap focuses on the relationship between shocks, 
real output, the real exchange rate, the price level and the within-country income gap. To 
understand the nature of the data set this chapter reviews the data set employed in this 
study. Moreover, stability and co-integration tests are conducted in this chapter. In 
addition, this chapter presents the SVAR model and designs the contemporaneous matrix. 
This helps to determine the appropriate SVAR model for structural shocks identification 
through a recursive or non-recursive, and short-run versus long-run restrictions for the 
model for between-countries income gap and model of within-country income gap for 
ASEAN countries.  
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, using SVAR and EVIEWS software, we conduct the 
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empirical analysis for the between-countries income gap and within-country income gap 
models, respectively. These chapters provide results for the impulse response function and 
variance decomposition under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. To ensure the 
robustness of the results we consider the change in the order of the variables in the 
contemporaneous matrix. 
Based on the empirical findings discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 outlines the 
recommendations on exchange rate policy and cooperation for the ASEAN countries. The 
goals are to achieve macroeconomic stability and narrow the between-countries and 
within-country income gap. Chapter 8 presents a summary, policy implication and 
recommendation, contribution and significance of the research. In addition, limitations of 
the thesis and some suggestions for future studies are presented in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2: ASEAN ECONOMY AND INTEGRATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
ASEAN was formed in 1967 with five members, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand with the aim of promoting regional political stability. 
However, this association only began to concentrate on economic targets and closer 
integration in the mid-1970s when concerns over regional political and security issues 
relating to the Cold War and combating the rise of Communism had been allayed. ASEAN 
subsequently became a more closely and expanded integrated region with a membership of 
10 countries by the late 1990s. The 1990s marked the decade when the first efforts were 
made to establish agreements leading to regional economic integration. These agreements 
were as follows: ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs), the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (PTA), the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), the ASEAN 
Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs), Brand to Brand Complementation (BBC), ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA), and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). Today, 
ASEAN is considered to be one of the most successful intergovernmental organisations in 
the developing world, and provides a template for other developing countries wishing to 
engage in closer economic integration. 
The ASEAN countries, especially the ASEAN6, were severely affected by the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998
3
. In the aftermath of the AFC, ASEAN realised that 
having a larger regional market would play an important role in attracting investors and in 
constructing more resilience to macro-financial stability (ASEAN & World Bank 2013). 
The first idea of forming AEC, with the aim of creating a “single market and production 
base”, providing a sharp focus on regional and global economic and financial integration, 
was raised by Singapore’s Prime Minister at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, in 
                                                          
3
 The ASEAN6 consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and Thailand. 
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2002. Subsequently, the AEC was officially established in December, 2015 with the aim of 
creating a “single market and production base”, and focusing on regional and global 
economic and financial integration.  
The purpose of integration is to deepen the intra-ASEAN socio-economic 
relationship. In December 1997, ASEAN members agreed on a vision for ASEAN in 2020 
that involved ASEAN becoming a “stable, prosperous, and highly competitive region with 
equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities”. 
ASEAN countries signed the first AEC Blueprint with the aim of achieving an AEC with 
deeper economic integration, economic growth and development (ASEAN & World Bank 
2013). These characteristics of an AEC are still targets of ASEAN Blueprint 2025. In 
addition, by launching the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), ASEAN sought to 
narrow the development gap between ASEAN member countries and between ASEAN and 
the world with the objective of achieve an equitable economic community. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the context and background of ASEAN 
economies in the regional integration process. It also presents some challenges that may be 
obstacles to the success of the AEC. This chapter is divided into four sections: section 2.2 
describes the process of global and regional cooperation and integration of ASEAN; and 
section 2.3 analyses ASEAN’s recent macroeconomic performance. ASEAN’s trade and 
financial linkages are reviewed in section 2.4. Key challenges facing ASEAN are discussed 
in section 2.5. Finally, major conclusions from this chapter are presented in section 2.6. 
2.2. THE PROCESS OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION AND 
INTEGRATION OF ASEAN 
The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961, and included 
Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines with the aim of regional cooperation in economics, 
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societal, cultural, scientific and administrative fields
4
. This cooperation was short-lived due 
to a serious breakdown in bilateral relations between two of the key players, Malaysia and 
the Philippines (Caballero-Anthony 2005). There was also political and economic conflict 
between Malaysia and Singapore earlier in 1965. Singapore acrimoniously separated from 
Malaysia in August 1965. In 1966 Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines normalised 
their relationships. As a consequence, ASA initiated discussions to include more members 
and in May 1967, plans to enlarge ASA were replaced by a proposal to form a new 
grouping based on ASA’s framework and be called ASEAN. The new grouping consisted 
of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. ASEAN was further 
expanded with the inclusion of Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar 
(1997) and Cambodia (1999).  
In the ASEAN Declaration in 1967, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, 
ASEAN declared that it promoted economic progress and social and cultural development. 
At the beginning, plans were also put in place to liberalise trade among members in a bid 
to improve intraregional trade. However, it was not given a high priority and little progress 
was made for a long time because ASEAN mainly focused on political and security aims 
due to the rising influence of Communism in places such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.  
The leaders of the original five member countries conducted the first ASEAN 
Summit on the island of Bali in February 1976. The outcome was the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord (or Bali Concord), with the stated aim of establishing a regional 
association of states as an anti-Communist block. This concord considered political 
cooperation as an important component. Although economic integration was also an initial 
driver for the cooperation of the primary five countries, it was ignored due to political 
instability at the time.  
                                                          
4
 ASA was the precursor of ASEAN. 
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 When political tensions in the region began to ease during the mid-1970s, member 
countries began to turn their attention to closer and long-term cooperation (Chatterjee 
1990). There were many initiatives for industrial and trade cooperation such as ASEAN 
Industrial Projects (AIPs) in 1976, the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (APTA) 
in 1977, which was an early effort to enhance intra-ASEAN trade via institutional 
integration and regional trade preferences (Chirathivat et al. 2015). Nonetheless, the 
achievements of these cooperation programs was limited because they lacked adequate 
preparation, commitment by member countries, financial and technical support and 
private-sector involvement, undeveloped mutual regional policy and slow administration 
(Areethamsirikul 2008; McGillivray & Carpenter 2013). Cuyvers et al. (2005) indicated 
that ASEAN nations in the 1970s were reluctant to open up their economies because of the 
development gap between them.  
Moreover, the high economic growth achieved by ASEAN countries made them feel 
that it was not necessary to make efforts to liberalise trade any further. In particular, a 
number of the ASEAN economies (Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) were later 
described as the East Asian miracle economies meaning that they grew very rapidly 
according to the World Bank in a 1993 report. A key reason for this was their engagement 
in international trade. However, this trade was mainly with the US, Europe, Japan, etc., but 
not with each other. The rise in intra-regional trade from the 1990s, which was associated 
with the rise in regional production networks, changed this to focus more on stimulating 
trade and investment flow in the region. ASEAN was the very hub for growth in the 
region’s production network. 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, ASEAN further expanded its membership to include 
Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). 
Therefore, ASEAN now includes ten fast-growing countries that are at various stages of 
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economic and financial development (Almekinders et al. 2015). Than and Gates (2001) 
indicate some reasons for the enlargement of ASEAN. First, the original members of 
ASEAN recognised that such an expansion to include the whole of Southeast Asia would 
increase the diplomatic and economic weight of the association in the international 
community. Second, the enlargement of ASEAN would enable it to deal with regional 
issues more effectively. Third, the expansion would increase its population and market size 
by around 38 percent making it attractive to invest and sell its products in. Fourth, an 
expanded ASEAN would make it attractive to multinationals as a production base for 
participation in rapidly developing production networks in the region.  
Naya and Plummer (1997) point out other reasons for the expansion of ASEAN. 
They indicate that the economic shocks experienced in the mid-1980s such as the collapse 
of oil prices pushed ASEAN countries to become outward-oriented, instead of inward-
looking economies. Moreover, other developments then occurring in the world, such as 
more European integration, the competitiveness of developing countries such as China and 
the threat of protectionism of Western markets, the context of globalisation and the 
removal of economic barriers by most countries in the world, forced ASEAN to re-
consider its role in easing trade openness and economic integration.  
In 1992, ASEAN countries formed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the 
Fourth ASEAN Summit. The purpose of AFTA was to enhance the competitiveness and 
economic efficiency of production of member countries (Kabir & Salim 2014). Economic 
cooperation was also conducted on trade in services. In 1995, the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services (AFAS) was signed with the aim of removing all barriers on trade 
in services and liberalising trade in services according to the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) (McGillivray & Carpenter 2013). Attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has also been a strategy of outward-looking development of ASEAN. Hence, the 
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ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme was created in 1996 to offer more tariff 
and non-tariff incentives; the aim of AICO was to promote the inflow of investment into 
technology-based industries.  
In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997/1998, which hit 
ASEAN’s economy severely, ASEAN expanded financial cooperation and integration with 
the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) through  the 
Chiang Mai Initiative and its Multilateralization (CMIM), the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic 
Research Office (AMRO) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) (ADBI 2016). 
This cooperation aimed to build up a network of currency swap and repurchase 
agreements, to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability through carrying out 
macroeconomic surveillance and supporting the implementation of a regional financial 
arrangement and to stimulate the development of a regional bond market. 
At the Second ASEAN informal Summit, which was held in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 1997, ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the Bangkok Declaration 
on 8
th
 August 1967, with the aim of motivating regional cooperation. At this Summit with 
a focus on the creation of the AEC, ASEAN leaders set out its “Vision 2020” in which 
ASEAN will be transformed into a stable, wealthy and competitive area with equitable 
economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities (ASEAN 
2017c).  
At the Ninth Bali Summit which was held in October 2003, ASEAN leaders signed 
the ASEAN Declaration (Bali Concord II) with the aim of establishing an ASEAN 
Community by 2020 with three pillars, namely the ASEAN Security community, the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community and AEC. A few years later, at the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers Meeting, which took place in August 2006 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and at the 
12th ASEAN, Cebu, Philippines Summit in January 2007, ASEAN leaders signed the AEC 
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Blueprint and agreed to accelerate the establishment of the AEC by 2015 instead of 2020. 
According to ASEAN (2008), the AEC aimed to transform ASEAN into a region with 
“free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour and a freer flow of capital”. 
The AEC Blueprint (2008-2015) in 2007 outlined a range of action measures and 
schedules for the attainment of the AEC (Chia 2013). Efforts to establish an AEC were 
also outlined in the Roadmap for AEC (2009-2015) which was agreed by ASEAN 
countries in Thailand in 2009
5
.  
The creation and acceleration of the AEC arose due to the following factors: 
(1) The vulnerability of ASEAN countries to the AFC shocks in 1997 resulting 
from insufficient cooperation in dealing with global imbalances (Plummer & Chia 2009). 
(2) ASEAN had many free trade agreements with dialog partners before or by 
2015 and, hence, there was a need to create a comprehensive post-AFTA agenda (Guerrero 
2008).  
(3) Changes in the world economy required closer regional economic 
integration in ASEAN and, hence, such cooperation would assist ASEAN in keeping pace 
in terms of growth, development, competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign investors to 
locate their production in the region given the emergence of countries such as China, India, 
the Republic of Korea and others (Ravenhill 2008; Chia 2013; Chirathivat et al. 2015; 
ADBI 2016).  
(4) ASEAN realised the importance of regional integration to attain political 
and social stability and sustainable growth (Plummer & Chia 2009) as well as to offset the 
growing regional political and economic influence of China. 
ASEAN (2008) has pointed out four pillars that AEC aims to achieve. The details of 
these pillars are summarised below. 
                                                          
5
 See Table A1 in Appendix A for a summary of regional cooperation. 
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i. Single market. 
The AEC aims to transform ASEAN into a single market and production base with 
major elements such as the free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labour and 
freer capital movement. ASEAN firms will also benefit from economies of scale and 
efficiency in production networks due to the single market and production base. In 
addition, intra-regional trade and investment flows will increase due to the integrated 
market and production base (Chia 2013). 
ii. Competitive economic region 
 ASEAN aims to become a competitive economic region with common policies on 
competition, consumer protection, intellectual properties right and the development of 
infrastructure. Becoming a competitive economic region is an important part of the AEC 
because it is fundamental to the achievement of the other targeted characteristics of the 
AEC. In particular, it helps ASEAN attain equitable economic development and to fully 
integrate with the world economy. Economic competitiveness and global economic 
integration require member countries to be globally competitive. The aim of competition 
policy is to promote fair competition among all businesses, large and small, state and 
privately owned, domestic and foreign owned. Hence, competition plays a key role in 
distributing fairly the benefits from regional integration among member countries as well 
as between consumers and manufacturers.  
iii. Equitable development 
The discrepancies in development that are evident within and between the ASEAN 
countries is one of the biggest challenges in forming the AEC. With this in mind, ASEAN 
set up a third pillar known as equitable economic development, in which ASEAN countries 
affirm that the poverty and development gap between member countries will be reduced by 
mutual support and cooperation (ASEAN 2012). Equitable economic development 
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includes two core elements: firstly, the development of small and medium enterprises 
(Imran Sharif et al.); and, secondly, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) (Chia 
2013). In terms of the IAI, the entry of new members during the 1990s raised concerns 
about the development gap between the old and new members. This development gap 
includes not only the difference in the average per capita income but also differences in 
human resources, infrastructure, institutional capacity and level of competitiveness. To 
address this concern a program aimed at narrowing the development gap among ASEAN 
members and between ASEAN and the rest of the world, called the Initiative for ASEAN 
integration, was adopted by ASEAN countries.  
 To deal with the development gap and promote the economic integration of less 
developed countries in ASEAN, the deepening and broadening of integration in ASEAN 
countries was to be accompanied by cooperation in technology and development. As a 
result the benefits of economic integration were to be shared by every member country. At 
present, some priority fields are considered in the IAI, including infrastructure, human-
resource development, energy, tourism, poverty reduction, life quality improvement. To 
cope with the challenges of AEC such as closing the development gap or catching up with 
the higher income countries such as the ASEAN6, lower income ASEAN countries such as 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) should develop policies to boost 
economic growth, and enhance economic competitiveness, and increase domestic and 
foreign investment. 
iv.  Integration into the global economy 
To be fully integrated into the world economy, ASEAN aims to strengthen the trade 
and investment relationship it has with the rest of the world and become a more dynamic 
and stronger part of the global supply chain. ASEAN will also create opportunities for 
investors to access ASEAN markets and other ASEAN trade partners (USA, China, Japan 
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and India) and Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) partners (South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand).  
2.3. OVERVIEW OF THE ASEAN ECONOMY 
2.3.1. Output and economic growth 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of ASEAN's GDP 
Source: UNCTAD and ASEAN (2017b) 
ASEAN’s economy has achieved remarkable development in terms of output and 
economic growth. In fact the ASEAN economy has increased more than 100-fold since 
1967, reaching a nominal GDP of about US$0.3 trillion in 2018. The total GDP of ASEAN 
in 2016 was the 6
th
 and 3
rd
 largest in the world and Asia, respectively. Additionally, the 
contribution of ASEAN’s GDP to world GDP on a PPP basis has nearly 17 times from 
0.2% in 1967 to 3.5% in 2018 (see Figure 2.2). ASEAN has generally experienced stable 
and positive economic growth, except in 1998 when it was -7.82% due to the damaging 
outcomes of the AFC (see Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: ASEAN Economic growth and its share of world nominal GDP 
Source: Author’s calculation; UNCTAD for share of ASEAN in the world GDP; Worldbank for GDP 
growth rate 
Table 2.1 illustrates real GDP growth in ASEAN. It can be seen that the poorer 
member countries have faster real GDP growth than the more developed member 
countries. In particular, the CLMV countries have had annual real GDP growth at about 6-
7% whereas that of Brunei and Singapore is just 2-3% for the period 2016-2017. 
Table 2.1: Real GDP growth in ASEAN countries (annual percentage change) 
 1999-2015 
(Average) 
2016 2017 
ASEAN 6 
Indonesia 5.14 5.03 5.07 
Malaysia 5.15 4.22 5.90 
Philippines 4.99 6.88 6.68 
Thailand 4.08 3.47 4.09 
Brunei 1.14 -2.47 1.33 
Singapore 5.63 2.40 3.62 
CLMV 
Cambodia 8.07 6.95 6.85 
Lao PDR 7.12 7.02 6.89 
Myanmar 9.68 5.89 6.84 
Vietnam 6.43 6.21 6.81 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of IFS, IMF (http://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-B6BA-49ED-
8AB9-52B0C1A0179B&sId=1390030341854) 
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fixed exchange rate regime. The crisis had a severe contagion effect on the currencies of 
some other ASEAN member countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Singapore. Ito and Sato (2008) state that in comparison to other ASEAN countries, the 
Indonesian economy, in particular, suffered most from the AFC and required more time to 
recover. 
 Figure 2.3 shows the annual average real GDP growth rate of the ASEAN6 and the 
CLMV. It can be seen from this figure that the AFC exerted the most severe impact on the 
economic growth of the ASEAN6. The economic performance of the CLMV was also 
impacted by external shocks originating from the region because these countries depended 
on the regional export market, but this impact was much less than that for the ASEAN6. 
Therefore, trade and foreign direct investment with the Asian crisis-afflicted countries 
were the two major channels through which the AFC affected the CLMV. However, the 
CLMV countries were still not well integrated with the ASEAN6 at this time and, 
consequently the impacts were quite small. Cambodia not only suffered from the external 
shocks but was also affected by domestic political uncertainty arising from the overthrow 
of the First Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Rannaridh (Okonjo-Iweala et al. 1999). 
 
Figure 2.3: Annual GDP growth, 1994-2017 
Source: Author’s calculation from Wold Development Indicators_World Bank (https://databank. 
worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=) 
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reasons, such as the CLMV had non-convertible currencies, limited dependence on the 
world economy, the absence of stock market and portfolio investment, a weak reliance of 
domestic enterprises on the banking system and a protected capital account. Therefore, 
investment and growth had fewer risks coming from potential capital outflows. Hence, the 
influence of the crisis on the CLMV mainly resulted from the export and FDI channels. In 
addition, these countries were not fully integrated into the world economy, and so they 
were less affected by external shocks. 
The ASEAN6 economy recovered quickly post-AFC because of the escalation in 
global demand for their exports that came from the dramatic currency depreciations and 
the robustness of global external demand. In addition, the rebound in exports resulted from 
more flexible exchange rate regimes post-AFC which improved export competitiveness. 
In 2001, the global economic downturn became unfavourable for ASEAN. Hew 
(2002) highlighted that the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 
affected consumers’ confidence and this resulted in the contraction of the U.S. economy. In 
addition, economic recessions in Japan and the EU, which were come from the dot-com 
bubble crash, deteriorated the global demand for ASEAN’s exports which then dampened 
their economic growth
6
. The economic growth of the ASEAN6 declined from about 6% in 
2000 to just 2% in 2001. There was also a mild decline in the economic growth of the 
CLMV countries (see Figure 2.3). Hew (2002) also indicates that the global downturn had 
the worst effects on Singapore and Malaysia because these countries are small open and 
export-intensive economies, particularly of semiconductors and electronics. Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand were also negatively affected by the economic slowdown. The 
low level of dependence on external trade meant that the CLMV was actually less affected 
                                                          
6
 This period was described as the dot-com bubble crash where a major decline in the price of 
semiconductors led to a decline and then crash of high tech companies. A number of ASEAN countries were 
major producers of semi-conductors. 
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by the disadvantageous global economic environment. However, the decline in intra-
regional trade and investment did affect their economies. 
In 2008 the effects of the global financial crisis, which originated in developed 
economies, endangered the growth of ASEAN countries. The severe recession led to a 
steep decline in global trade. This reduced the demand for ASEAN’s goods and services, 
resulting in a collapse in exports and an economic downturn because exports are a main 
driver of growth for member countries. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand were again the 
most affected because their industries are sensitive to the global business cycle, and their 
exports are mainly electrical machinery and automobiles (OECD 2010) with major markets 
in the United States of America (US) and European Union (EU).  
ASEAN’s economy recovered quickly in the years following the crisis. A good 
example is that the real GDP growth rate of ASEAN increased sharply from about 2% in 
2009 to nearly 8% in 2010 (see Figure 2.3). The resilience of the ASEAN economy arises 
from the growth and resilience of domestic markets and effective monetary and fiscal 
policy responses, such as fiscal and monetary stimulus packages, to GFC shocks (Jeasakul 
et al. 2014) . In addition, limited financial integration and capital flow restrictions in place 
in ASEAN capital markets meant that is was less affected and exposed to the financial 
meltdowns in the US, EU and other major financial markets. Consequently, the GDP 
growth of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand recovered noticeably. The Philippines, 
Indonesia and the CLMV economies also exhibited resilience in 2010. The recovery of 
these economies was due to growth in domestic and foreign demand, a surge in remittances 
and an improvement in business and consumer confidence.  
Compared to the AFC, ASEAN’s economy was less damaged by the GFC and 
recovered quicker. The reason is that in the post-AFC period the establishment and further 
development of regional trade networks made the intra-ASEAN international trade 
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relationship become more closely knitted and robust. As a result, this has made ASEAN 
become more resilient to shocks. 
2.3.2. Inflation 
The AFC had a severe impact on the inflation rate in some ASEAN member 
countries such as Indonesia, Lao PDR and Myanmar with a 58%, 90% and 49% annual 
inflation rate in 1998, respectively. In 1999, Lao PDR’s inflation was 128%7. Ito and Sato 
(2008) showed that the sharp depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah led to high inflation so 
that the change in the real exchange rate was not enough to promote exports. The inflation 
rate for Lao PDR was the most vulnerable to the external shocks coming from the AFC. 
Thayer (2000) explains that Laos’s trade was heavily dependent on that with Thailand, and 
that this bilateral trade was mainly valued in US dollars or Thai Baht. Therefore, the Lao 
Kip lost its value to the USD when the Baht depreciated because the latter was the main 
element of the Lao money supply. Hence, the increased price of imported goods caused 
hyperinflation in Lao PDR in 1999. 
After the AFC, inflation has been managed better. To deal with high inflation, 
policy-makers applied many treatments such as interest rate hikes (Thailand, Indonesia and 
Philippines) as well as credit tightening (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam) (Rillo 2009). 
Moreover, inflation targeting and adopting more floating exchange rate regimes were 
applied. Consequently, interest rate and inflation fluctuations decreased (Dungey & Vehbi 
2015).  
Figures 2.4 illustrates the inflation rates of the ten AEAN countries between 2005 
and 2017. In general, the inflation rates of the ASEAN countries prior to the GFC were 
moderate. However, the inflation rate of the ASEAN6 increased sharply during the crisis. 
                                                          
7
 See Table A2 in Appendix A 
24 
 
This was mainly due to the rise in the prices of oil and other commodity prices (OECD 
2010). Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia experienced much more serious inflation  during 
the GFC. For example, the inflation rates of Vietnam and Cambodia were 23% and 25% in 
2008, respectively. Additionally, Myanmar had an inflation rate of 31% in 2006
8
. The 
rapid increase in the inflation rate of all these countries resulted from prior accelerated 
credit expansion (OECD 2010). 
a. ASEAN6 countries  
 
b. CLMV countries 
 
Figure 2.4: CPI inflation, 2005-2017 
Source: World Economic Outlook (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index 
.aspx) 
                                                          
8
 See Table A2 in Appendix A 
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2.3.3. Interest rate 
According to ASEAN (2019), the prospects of the Japanese economy in early May 
1997 resulted in a dramatic increase in JPY and Japanese short-term interest rate. As a 
consequence, investors withdrew their funds from ASEAN countries to invest in Japan to 
get higher profits from higher interest rates in Japan. This affected the foreign reserves and 
led to vulnerability of the Thai baht. Some ASEAN countries raised interest rates to 
support their domestic currencies and to prevent capital outflows. A good example is that 
the discount rate of Indonesia hit 70 percent in July, 1998 while the policy interest rate in 
Thailand hit double digits in 1998 (Goldstein & Xie 2009). However, the Bank of Thailand 
could not prevent the baht from devaluing because of losing all foreign reserves. 
Consequently, Thailand had to float its currency on 2 July 1997 and this caused the 
contagion effect on other countries such as Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
It can be seen that a fixed exchange rate regime with domestic interest rate which 
was higher than the international interest rate led to the inflow of long-term and short-term 
investments. This caused risks on short-term foreign indebtedness if there was a capital 
withdrawal. Furthermore, higher interest rates resulted in difficulties for companies in 
attaining funds for investment and trade financing, which limited activities in the 
manufacturing industry. 
Unlike the AFC, monetary and financial systems of ASEAN countries were more 
resilient in the global financial crisis in 2008. The GFC affected ASEAN countries via 
certain channels such as the drying up of trade credit and the inflow of capital, the 
withdrawal of global banks, heightened risk aversion and a sharp decrease in asset values. 
However, there was no severe impact on financial markets; in particular, interest rates 
stayed stable in most countries. There were some reasons that contributed to the resilience 
of ASEAN to the GFC, including the absence of credit excesses and currency mismatches 
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and strong balance sheets of households and corporations which played a role in sustaining 
confidence. In addition, the appropriate responses of monetary policy such as cutting 
interest rate in the recession, monetary stimulus such as interest rate subsidies and decisive 
macroeconomic policy played a role in restoring the confidence, accelerating bank credit 
growth, supporting domestic demand and preventing layoff in the labour market (Keat 
2009). 
2.3.4. The exchange rate and exchange rate regime 
Achsani et al. (2010) show that exchange rate regime plays a crucial role in 
minimising the risks coming from volatility of exchange rate by which the economy is 
affected. They example that although ASEAN experienced high economic growth before 
the AFC, the decision to float the Thai Baht in mid-1997 caused a sharp depreciation of the 
currency and brought about contagion effects to other ASEAN country currencies in 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia
9
. The fixed exchange rate regimes in 
these countries set an unrealistically high value of the domestic exchange rate relative to 
the USD and made them vulnerable to the AFC, because foreign reserves were not large 
enough to cope with the currency speculation and meet the repayment of interest on short-
term foreign debt mostly denominated in USD.  
Caporale et al. (2018) show that in the past, most ASEAN member countries’ 
currencies were tightly linked to the US dollar. Even in the period 1999-2003 after the 
AFC, although the exchange rate regime of many Asian countries has become more 
flexible, the US dollar remained the dominant anchoring currency. Nonetheless, Caporale 
et al. (2018) point out that the role of the US dollar as an anchoring currency becomes less 
important due to the importance of China’s currency. They explain that this is caused by 
                                                          
9
 The decision to float the Baht was made because Thailand had a lack of foreign exchange reserves to 
maintain the pegged exchange rate regime to the US dollar. 
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the greater trade and investment relationship between China and ASEAN.
10
 In addition, the 
importance of China’s currency to ASEAN has resulted from the devaluation of China’s 
currency which creates competitiveness for China in exporting to Western countries and in 
attracting FDI. 
The exchange rate regimes of ASEAN countries have changed remarkably since the 
AFC. Before the AFC these countries fixed their exchange rates to the US dollar with the 
aim of keeping inflation low and stimulating export competitiveness and capital inflows, 
particularly for the cases of Thailand and Indonesia. However, after the AFC and collapse 
of the fixed exchange rate regimes, most Asian countries adopted relatively flexible 
exchange rate regimes (Wiboonchutikula et al. 2015). A more flexible exchange rate 
regime played an important role in reducing pressure on the exchange rate adjustment 
during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Park et al. 2013)
11
. In addition, the movement to 
a more flexible exchange rate regime played an important role in increasing the autonomy 
of monetary policy for ASEAN countries and keeping inflation low. However, these 
exchange rates were in reality less flexible than official announcements (OECD 2010). 
The IMF (2016) reported changes in the exchange rate regime of the ASEAN5 which 
are summarised in Table 2.2
12
. 
  
                                                          
10 
The ASEAN-China FTA was signed in November 2002 and trade has grown rapidly since then, reaching 
about US$350 billion in 2015. More recently this has included FDI flows from China to ASEAN (mainly to 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). 
 
11
 This was because ASEAN countries did not need to use their foreign exchange reserves to maintain a fixed 
regime. 
12 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. 
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Table 2.2: Evolution of the exchange rate regimes of the ASEAN5 countries 
Countries Changes in exchange rate regime 
Indonesia Before the AFC, Indonesia applied a crawling pegged exchange rate regime and an 
open capital account. However, since the AFC the exchange rate regime of Indonesia has 
become more flexible and, hence, monetary policy is more independent. 
Philippines The Philippines applied a managed exchange rate and a relatively closed capital 
account. After the AFC the Philippines continued to apply a pegged exchange rate regime 
but freer capital account and a less independent monetary policy. Since the GFC, it has a 
more flexible exchange rate regime and a more independent monetary policy. 
Malaysia A managed exchange rate regime and an open capital account were applied before 
the AFC. However, in the aftermath of the AFC Malaysia adopted a fixed exchange rate 
regime but a more closed capital account (or capital controls). During and after the GFC a 
more flexible exchange rate regime with a liberalised capital account and more 
independence monetary policy has been implemented in Malaysia. 
Thailand A managed exchange rate, open capital account and dependent monetary policy 
had been applied in Thailand before the AFC. However, after the AFC, Thailand has 
moved to a more flexible exchange rate regime with a closed capital account and interest 
rate autonomy. Since the GFC the exchange rate regime of Thailand is now more flexible 
and the country has adopted a more independent monetary policy. 
Singapore There has been no change in policies. It still has an open capital account, a managed 
floating exchange rate regime and market determined interest rate
13
. 
Source: IMF (2016) 
                                                          
13
 A managed floating regime allowed the Singapore dollar to vary within an undisclosed band and this 
helped to reduce currency speculation (Li 2012) 
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Vietnam has also experienced reform of its exchange rate regime. After 1991 
Vietnam applied a fixed regime with a horizontal band aimed at managing inflation and 
stabilising the economy
14
. During the AFC the Vietnamese Dong lost its value, being 
indirectly affected via a decline in exports and FDI inflow. The state bank of Vietnam 
widened the trading band from 1 to 10 percent in October 1997 (Phuc & Duc-Tho 2009). 
During the GFC Vietnam was faced with an economic downturn with a high inflation rate 
and a depreciation of the currency. Since then, Vietnam has adopted a more flexible 
exchange rate regime to ease the pressure of devaluation of the Vietnam Dong (Hung & 
An 2011). 
According to Menon (2013), Cambodia has the highest level of dollarization, 
followed by Lao PDR and Vietnam whilst a multiple currency system is implemented in 
Myanmar
15
. Further, the nominal exchange rates of the CLMV did not respond quickly to 
shocks emanating from the AFC because of dollarization and a multiple currency system 
and, hence, changes in the real exchange rate were mainly caused by changes in the price 
level rather than from fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate. Okonjo-Iweala et al. 
(1999) contend that compared to other ASEAN countries, the Cambodian Riel lost its 
value less dramatically due to extensive dollarization. However, volatility of the Lao Kip 
was more vulnerable to the exchange rate shocks during the AFC because of the very close 
link to the Thai Baht
16
.  
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 present the annual changes in nominal exchange rate of 
ASEAN countries (except Myanmar). In general, the movements of exchange rate of 
ASEAN countries display similar patterns. In particular, in 2001, the exchange rate 
                                                          
14
 See Table C2 in Appendix C for the definition of a fixed exchange rate regime with a horizontal band. 
15
 Dollarization is the use of a foreign currency as a medium for transactions and as a store of value (Menon 
2007).  
16
 Both the US dollar and Thai baht are used widely in Lao PDR. 
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depreciated due to September 11 attacks. In 2007, most currencies of ASEAN countries 
appreciated because of concerns for a recession in the U.S., stemming from the weakness 
in US housing price, unemployment as well as fears on US banks’ and fund’s exposures to 
the sub-prime mortgage market. In 2009, ASEAN countries’s currencies depreciated due to 
the influence of global financial turmoil. However, ASEAN countries’ currencies 
appreciated the following year because of the resilience of the domestic economy and the 
acceleration of capital inflows which came from the stronger economic growth in emerging 
market countries relative to that of developed countries. Furthermore, investors’ optimistic 
view on the recovery of the U.S economy, the tension within Korean peninsula, the tight 
monetary policy of China and the public debt problem in Ireland all contributed to an 
appreciation in the ASEAN currencies (Pilipinas 2007; Pilipinas 2009; Thailand 2010). 
 
Figure 2.5: Annual changes in nominal exchange rate of ASEAN6 
Source: Author’s calculation from nominal exchange rates data of IFS, IMF 
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Figure 2.6: Annual changes in nominal exchange rate of CLV 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of IFS, IMF 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates the annual change in nominal exchange rate of Myanmar. The 
currency of Myanmar was fixed with foreign currencies before the managed float exchange 
rate regime in April, 2012. Prior to this exchange rate regime, multiple exchange rates 
were applied in Myanmar; there was the official rate which was for the public sector, the 
trade rate which was for international trade and the unofficial rate which was for the 
private sector. Myanmar’s currency was 40%  overvalued relative to U.S dollar and the 
market rate stood at high rate with 800-1000 Kyats per U.S. dollar before the unification of 
exchange rate on 1
st
, April 2012 (Min & Khoon 2014).  
Table 2.3: Annual changes in nominal exchange rate of Myanmar (%) 
Year Percentage Year Percentage 
2000 +4% 2011 -3% 
2001 +4% 2012 +11,680% 
2002 -2% 2013 +46% 
2003 -8% 2014 +5% 
2004 -6% 2015 +18% 
2005 0% 2016 +6% 
2006 0% 2017 +10% 
2007 -4%   
2008 -3%   
2009 +3%   
2010 +1%   
Source: Author’s calculation from data of IFS, IMF 
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2.3.5. Development gap 
As indicated in Section 2.2, reducing the development gap between ASEAN 
countries is the major concern. Therefore, this section aims to shed light on the 
development gap between ASEAN countries as well as between the old (ASEAN6) and the 
new members (CLMV) on three perspectives: the income gap, human development gap 
and digital gap. 
2.3.5.1. Income per capita and the income gap  
Figure 2.7 illustrates the average income per capita of ASEAN over the period 1967 
to 2016. It can be seen that the movement of GDP per capita followed the trend in the 
growth of GDP. ASEAN’s GDP per capita rose strongly from just US$274 in 1967 to 
US$12,968 in 2018. However, income per capita decreased sharply during the 1997-98 
AFC but only slightly during the 2008 GFC. The ASEAN countries fared better and were 
more resilient during the GFC because they quickly implemented fiscal and monetary 
stimuli. The financial and structural reforms after the AFC resulted in fewer financial and 
external vulnerabilities, and the movement to a more flexible exchange rate regime served 
as ‘shock absorbers’ and encouraged and maintained closer international trade (Jeasakul et 
al. 2014; Beng et al. 2015). 
 
Figure 2.7: GDP and GDP per capita of ASEAN at current price 
Note: The numbers in blue are measured on the left axis while the numbers in orange are measured on 
the right axis. 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Development Indication, World bank (https://databank. 
worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators) 
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Figure 2.8 demonstrates the average income per capita, PPP of ASEAN. It can be 
seen that ASEAN countries have significantly improved in terms of per capita income. 
However, the income gap between them becomes greater. The income per capita of 
Singapore and Brunei are the most significant, followed by Malaysia and Thailand. 
Singapore and Brunei are in the world’s top five countries with the highest GDP per capita. 
The World Bank has classified countries into four income groups according to GNI per 
capita: namely, low-income countries (those with $995 or less), lower-middle income 
countries (those with $996 to $3895), upper-middle income countries (those with $3896 to 
$12055) and high income countries (those with $12056 or more). According to this 
classification, ASEAN lower-middle income countries include Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. Thailand and Malaysia are classified as 
upper-middle income countries. Brunei and Singapore are listed as high-income countries 
(Worldbank 2018, September 18). 
Higher income per capita helps some ASEAN countries attain higher income status. 
For example, Cambodia was reclassified from a low-income country to a lower-middle 
income country in 2015. Moreover, Lao PDR and Myanmar were also re-classified as low 
middle-income countries in 2011 and 2015, respectively. Furthermore, Thailand and 
Malaysia have been upgraded to upper-middle income countries since 2011 and 2017, 
respectively.  
There are two types of income inequality throughout ASEAN. The first type is 
income disparity between member countries, which reflects the gap in the level of 
economic development. It can be measured by the difference in per capita income. The 
second type is income inequality within the individual member country, which is measured 
by the Gini coefficient. In terms of the first type, although all ASEAN countries have 
improved per capita income, the income gap between them remains relatively large. For 
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example, in 2016 Singapore had five times the income per capita compared to Malaysia 
whereas Malaysia’s is four times the income per capita of the Philippines. The latter 
country’s income per capita is more than double that of the CLMV. The income gap also 
occurs between countries in each group of the high-income countries, the lower-middle 
income countries, upper-middle income countries, ASEAN6 and CLMV.  
 
Figure 2.8: Average GDP per capita, PPP of ASEAN countries and standard 
deviation (1999-2018)
17
 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of World Bank (https://databank.worldbank.org/ reports. 
aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD&country=)  
 
In addition, Figure 2.9 shows the income gap between the old member countries 
group (ASEAN6) and the new member countries group (CLMV). 
18
. This income gap was 
already quite large in absolute terms in 1999 and widened further by 2016. In relative 
terms there has been an improvement in income per capita for CLMV countries. In 
particular, average CLMV income per capita was one-fifth that of the ASEAN6 in 1999 
declining to one-third in 2018. 
 
                                                          
17
 The standard deviation shows the dispersion in GDP per capita between the members and the mean value. 
18
 ASEAN6 includes Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.  
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Figure 2.9: CLMV and ASEAN6 GDP per capita, USD, 1999-2018 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of World Bank (https://databank.worldbank.org/ reports.  
aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=#)   
 
Hence, the process of “catching-up” seems to be occurring throughout ASEAN in 
relative terms. The catch-up effect theory shows that the income gap between a rich and a 
poor country will narrow if the lower income country can catch up with a higher income 
country in terms of economic growth. In 2005, the average per capita income of the 
ASEAN6 (US$2,104) was about four times the average of the CLMV (US$518), while it 
declined to approximately 3.5 times in 2010 (ASEAN6 with US$4,132 and CLMV with 
US$1,155) and declined further to about 2.6 times in 2018 (ASEAN6 with US$5,432 and 
CLMV with US$2,080) (see Table 2.4).  
Although CLMV started from a much lower base, the CLMV had a faster growth in 
per capita income than that of the ASEAN6. In particular, Figure 2.10 shows that annual 
GDP per capita income growth during the period 1999-2017 of individual countries in the 
CLMV grew by between 5-9% while it was about 3-4% in individual countries in 
ASEAN6. Brunei was the exception with growth of -0.6%. The higher growth rate in per 
capita income as well as in economic growth will contribute to income convergence 
between the CLMV and ASEAN6 in the future, assuming that current growth trends 
continue.  
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Table 2.4: Ratio of income per capita (USD) between ASEAN-6 and CLMV 
Year ASEAN6 CLMV Ratio of income per capita 
1999 1389 236 5.87 
2000 1495 316 4.74 
2001 1413 308 4.59 
2002 1559 325 4.80 
2003 1726 381 4.53 
2004 1909 424 4.51 
2005 2104 518 4.06 
2006 2491 598 4.17 
2007 2934 714 4.11 
2008 3326 940 3.54 
2009 3241 1010 3.21 
2010 4132 1155 3.58 
2011 4710 1351 3.49 
2012 4894 1477 3.31 
2013 4963 1576 3.15 
2014 4899 1697 2.89 
2015 4668 1702 2.74 
2016 4832 1798 2.69 
2017 5144 1928 2.67 
2018 5423 2080 2.61 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of World Bank (https://databank.worldbank.org/reports. 
aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=#)   
 
 
Figure 2.10: Average annual GDP per capita growth (1999-2017) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on annual GDP per capita growth collected from the World Bank 
website (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?view=chart) 
 
Significant efforts have been made to reduce the development gap among ASEAN 
countries and to decrease poverty and socio-economic disparities relating to the new 
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Integration (IAI), Declaration of ASEAN Community and Declaration of Sixth ASEAN 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
V
ie
tn
am
L
ao
 P
D
R
C
am
b
o
d
ia
M
y
an
m
ar
T
h
ai
la
n
d
S
in
g
ap
o
re
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
M
al
ay
si
a
In
d
o
n
es
ia
B
ru
n
ei
D
ar
u
ss
al
am
P
er
ce
n
t 
37 
 
Summit in Hanoi in December 1998 (Alavi & Ramadan 2008). It is also one of the key 
targets that ASEAN needs to narrow the income gap of its member countries as part of the 
process to become an equitable and inclusive economic development area to achieve an 
AEC (OECD 2013). Otherwise the AEC is unlikely to be successful with some of its 
members withdrawing on the grounds that they see no benefit to them if more integration 
takes place. The income gap became a focus of the 2013 Southeast Asian Economic 
Outlook, conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and ASEAN Secretariat (Bock 2014).  
Regarding the within-country income gap, Menon (2013) indicates that the 
improvement and benefits from high economic growth rates in ASEAN has been 
distributed unequally and, hence, income inequality has increased. Figure 2.11 indicates 
income inequality in ASEAN
19
. It can be seen that within-country income inequality of the 
lower income countries (CLMV) has grown fastest. The income inequality of the middle-
income countries seems more stable. It can also be seen from this figure that the wealthier 
the country is, then the higher will be its income inequality. Specifically, the CLMV has 
the lowest Gini coefficient while the wealthiest and middle income countries have higher 
Gini coefficients.  
 
Figure 2.11: Income inequality of ASEAN, 1990-2017 
Note: Wealthiest countries: Singapore and Brunei; Middle income countries: Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines; CLV: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. 
Source: Author’s calculation from UNDP 
                                                          
19
 A higher Gini coefficient means higher income inequality. 
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OECD (2018) indicates that the within-country income inequality in CLMV has 
mainly stemmed from the process of industrialisation. Industrialisation is also 
accompanied by the concentration of entrepreneurs in urban areas, where entrepreneurs 
normally receive and can generate higher income. This is because labour productivity in 
cities due to industrialisation is higher while labour productivity in the rural areas is 
weaker. It results in a wider income gap between rural and urban areas. For growth to be 
sustainable it is important that all economic agents benefit from the growth process and by 
location (province and rural) and demography (males, females, young and old). This is 
because if income equitability is concentrated in the hands of the few, then this cannot 
sustain both higher overall demand and higher production and growth levels. 
In addition, Okonjo-Iweala et al. (1999) showed that external shocks coming from 
the AFC had a negative impact on the income inequality of the poorer ASEAN countries 
such as Cambodia and Lao PDR. In particular, inflation in Cambodia which arose from the 
AFC distressed the rural communities and the poor. The devaluation of the Riel impacted 
badly on workers who had fixed incomes in Riel whereas it benefited workers paid in 
USD. In the case of Lao PDR, they state that the triple-digit annual inflation eroded real 
income and purchasing power. While the favourable Baht-Kip exchange rate and higher 
agricultural prices brought prosperity to wealthy farmers, the flipside was that poorer 
farmers and those with insufficient access to the markets had their real incomes eroded. It 
is evident that the exchange rate plays a role in driving within-country income inequality. 
Therefore, the critical issue is as follows: which exchange rate regime for ASEAN 
countries best enables the attainment of the AEC?   
2.3.5.2. Human development gap 
The UNDP has introduced the Human development index (HDI) to measure the 
socio-development since 1990s (Alavi & Ramadan 2008). This index has three dimensions, 
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namely life expectancy, education and a decent standard of living
20
.  
Table 2.5: Human development index of 10 ASEAN countries from 1999 to 2017 
 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
1999 0.818 0.407 0.598 0.462 0.716 0.421 0.62 0.809 0.64 0.567 
2000 0.819 0.42 0.606 0.466 0.725 0.431 0.624 0.819 0.649 0.579 
2001 0.82 0.434 0.612 0.472 0.723 0.44 0.628 0.822 0.657 0.587 
2002 0.823 0.453 0.618 0.48 0.725 0.449 0.633 0.83 0.666 0.595 
2003 0.828 0.466 0.624 0.489 0.731 0.459 0.637 0.838 0.674 0.603 
2004 0.834 0.478 0.629 0.497 0.734 0.468 0.647 0.845 0.683 0.612 
2005 0.838 0.49 0.632 0.506 0.731 0.477 0.65 0.868 0.693 0.616 
2006 0.84 0.502 0.641 0.512 0.737 0.487 0.651 0.871 0.699 0.624 
2007 0.84 0.513 0.642 0.521 0.75 0.498 0.657 0.878 0.71 0.632 
2008 0.84 0.521 0.646 0.529 0.761 0.509 0.661 0.883 0.714 0.64 
2009 0.842 0.521 0.656 0.539 0.765 0.519 0.659 0.884 0.718 0.656 
2010 0.842 0.537 0.661 0.546 0.772 0.53 0.665 0.909 0.724 0.654 
2011 0.846 0.546 0.669 0.558 0.778 0.54 0.67 0.914 0.727 0.664 
2012 0.852 0.553 0.675 0.569 0.781 0.549 0.677 0.92 0.731 0.67 
2013 0.853 0.56 0.681 0.579 0.785 0.558 0.685 0.923 0.728 0.675 
2014 0.853 0.566 0.683 0.586 0.79 0.564 0.689 0.928 0.735 0.678 
2015 0.852 0.571 0.686 0.593 0.795 0.569 0.693 0.929 0.741 0.684 
2016 0.852 0.576 0.691 0.598 0.799 0.574 0.696 0.93 0.748 0.689 
2017 0.853 0.582 0.694 0.601 0.802 0.578 0.699 0.932 0.755 0.694 
Source: UNDP; http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/understanding 
It can be seen from Table 2.5 that there are improvements in HDI for all 10 ASEAN 
countries. The decline in HDI’s standard deviation indicates that the HDI gap between 
ASEAN countries has decreased over the period 1999-2017 (see Figure 2.12).  Following 
Alavi and Ramadan (2008), HDI is divided into 4 groups, namely low human development 
level (HDI is lower than 0.6), lower medium human development level (HDI is between 
0.6 and 0.7), upper medium high human development level (HDI is between 0.7 to 0.8) and 
high human development level (HDI is higher than 0.8). Therefore, from Table 2.5, it can 
be seen that Brunei and Singapore have high human development while Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar have low human development. Indonesia (with the exception of 1999), 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand have lower medium human development. Vietnam has 
                                                          
20 Life expectancy at birth is an indicator of life expectancy. According to OECD, “Life expectancy is 
defined as how long, on average, a newborn can expect to live, if current death rates do not change”. 
Expected years of schooling and mean year of schooling are indicators for education dimension. GNI per 
capita, PPP is an indicator for a decent standard of living dimension. 
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climbed from low human development level to low medium human development level 
since 2003. 
 
Figure 2.12: Average human development and standard deviation of ASEAN from 
1999 to 2017 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/understanding) 
 
Table 2.6: Life expectancy at birth for 10 ASEAN countries from 1999 to 2017  
 
Brunei  Cambodia Indonesia Laos  Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
1999 74.99 57.60 66.09 58.36 72.62 61.80 67.02 77.55 70.46 73.03 
2000 75.20 58.43 66.29 58.92 72.80 62.13 67.17 77.95 70.62 73.27 
2001 75.43 59.34 66.47 59.49 72.97 62.45 67.31 78.25 70.84 73.49 
2002 75.65 60.28 66.64 60.07 73.11 62.76 67.43 78.55 71.11 73.70 
2003 75.88 61.24 66.82 60.65 73.24 63.05 67.56 79.04 71.42 73.89 
2004 76.09 62.19 67.00 61.22 73.36 63.32 67.67 79.49 71.78 74.08 
2005 76.29 63.09 67.19 61.79 73.46 63.60 67.78 79.99 72.15 74.26 
2006 76.46 63.93 67.39 62.35 73.58 63.88 67.89 80.14 72.53 74.44 
2007 76.58 64.70 67.58 62.89 73.70 64.18 68.00 80.44 72.92 74.61 
2008 76.66 65.39 67.78 63.40 73.85 64.50 68.11 80.79 73.28 74.78 
2009 76.70 66.01 67.96 63.89 74.02 64.84 68.21 81.24 73.62 74.95 
2010 76.72 66.56 68.15 64.36 74.21 65.18 68.32 81.54 73.92 75.12 
2011 76.73 67.03 68.33 64.80 74.41 65.51 68.43 81.74 74.20 75.29 
2012 76.76 67.47 68.51 65.21 74.61 65.81 68.55 82.00 74.45 75.48 
2013 76.82 67.87 68.68 65.60 74.80 66.07 68.68 82.25 74.68 75.66 
2014 76.92 68.25 68.86 65.98 74.98 66.29 68.81 82.50 74.90 75.86 
2015 77.05 68.62 69.03 66.34 75.14 66.46 68.95 82.74 75.10 76.05 
2016 77.20 68.98 69.19 66.68 75.30 66.61 69.09 82.85 75.30 76.25 
2017 77.37 69.33 69.36 67.02 75.45 66.74 69.24 82.90 75.50 76.45 
 
Source: World Bank; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in 
 
Table 2.6 presents the life expectancy at birth for 10 ASEAN countries from 1999 to 
2017. It can be seen from the Table 2.6 that ASEAN countries have a longer life span. In 
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addition, the higher income countries have a longer life span than the lower income 
countries. Furthermore, Figure 2.13 indicates that there is a significant gap in the average 
life expectancy at birth between ASEAN6 and CLMV. However, this gap has been 
reduced. 
 
Figure 2.13: The gap in life expectancy at birth between ASEAN6 and CLMV from 
1999 to 2017 
Source: Author’s calculation from data of World Bank ( https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in) 
 
Table 2.7 indicates the data on the mean year of schooling of 10 ASEAN countries 
whereas the average expectancy years of schooling of ASEAN6 and CLMV is presented in 
Figure 2.14. According to UNESCO, the mean year of schooling is “the average number of 
completed years of education of a country’s population aged 25 years and older” and 
expected years of schooling is “the number of years of schooling that a child of school 
entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates 
persist throughout the child's life”. It can be seen that the non-income development gap 
between ASEAN6 and CLMV is large. Table 2.7 shows that the richest countries such as 
Singapore and Brunei have on average about 8-11 years of schooling while CLV countries 
have the lowest average years of schooling (only about 3-5 years of schooling).  
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Table 2.7: The mean years of schooling of 10 ASEAN countries 
 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
1999 8.2 3.2 6.2 3.8 8.4 3 7.5 8.6 5.9 5.3 
2000 8.3 3.2 6.7 3.9 8.6 3.1 7.6 8.9 6.1 5.4 
2001 8.3 3.3 6.9 4 8.4 3.2 7.7 9.2 6.3 5.6 
2002 8.4 3.3 7 4 8.2 3.3 7.9 9.5 6.5 5.8 
2003 8.4 3.4 7.2 4.1 8 3.4 8 9.8 6.7 6 
2004 8.4 3.5 7.3 4.2 7.8 3.5 8.6 10.2 6.8 6.2 
2005 8.5 3.5 7.4 4.2 7.6 3.5 8.7 10.5 7 6.4 
2006 8.5 3.6 7.9 4.3 8.2 3.7 8.8 10.1 7 6.6 
2007 8.6 3.7 7.1 4.4 8.8 3.8 8.9 10.2 7.1 6.8 
2008 8.7 3.9 7.1 4.4 9.4 3.9 9 10.5 7.3 7 
2009 8.7 3.7 7.4 4.5 9.6 4 9 10.5 7.5 8 
2010 8.8 4.4 7.4 4.6 9.8 4.1 8.9 11.2 7.7 7.5 
2011 8.8 4.4 7.6 4.8 10.1 4.3 9 11.2 7.5 7.6 
2012 8.9 4.5 7.6 5 10.1 4.5 9.1 11.3 7.7 7.8 
2013 8.9 4.6 7.8 5.1 10.1 4.7 9.1 11.4 7.5 7.9 
2014 9 4.7 7.8 5 10.1 4.8 9.2 11.4 7.6 7.8 
2015 9 4.7 7.9 5.1 10.2 4.9 9.3 11.5 7.6 8 
2016 9.1 4.7 8 5.2 10.2 4.9 9.3 11.5 7.6 8.1 
2017 9.1 4.8 8 5.2 10.2 4.9 9.3 11.5 7.6 8.2 
 
Source:UNDP ( http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#) 
Figure 2.14 shows that there is an improvement in the expected years of schooling on 
both ASEAN6 and CLMV countries. However, the gap in expectancy years of schooling 
between ASEAN6 and CLMV is wide and persistent. 
 
Figure 2.14: The average expectancy years of schooling of ASEAN6 and CLMV 
Source:Author’s calculation from UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#) 
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2.4. TRADE AND INVESTMENT FLOWS OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES 
As mentioned earlier the economies of ASEAN were greatly affected by shocks in 
the form of the AFC and GFC. Disturbances from international trade and investment, 
which derived from external difficulties such as the global financial crisis and severe 
economic downturn in the developed economies, caused volatility in economic growth, 
output and inflation for the ASEAN countries. Yang (2013) argues that external shocks 
have a greater impact on the business cycles and macroeconomic policy of Asian countries 
since the AFC because they have become more integrated into the world economy.  
2.4.1. Trade linkages 
ASEAN countries have close trade linkages to the rest of the world, as expressed by 
high trade openness, a high trade share in GDP and dependence on trade for employment. 
In particular, the value of trade between ASEAN to the rest of the world has risen 
dramatically from US$9.7 billion in 1967 to US$2.2 trillion in 2016. ASEAN’s trade 
accounted for 7% of total global trade and in 2016 it was the world’s 4th largest exporting 
region. In addition, the contribution of ASEAN to world exports has increased gradually 
by about 6-7% annually since Myanmar, the last member country, joined ASEAN in 1999 
(see Figure 2.15). 
 
Figure 2.15: ASEAN's share of world exports (%), 1967-2017 
Source: UNCTAD website (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx) 
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From Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17, it can be seen that both imports and exports of 
goods and services moved in tandem. Exports and imports of goods rose moderately from 
1967 to 1984, followed by rapid increases in trade in the following years. However, they 
both experienced sharp decreases during the AFC and GFC due to the fall in global 
demand. Furthermore, exports and imports of services grew gradually with an annual 
growth rate of about 9-10% from 1999 to 2016. They were also negatively affected by the 
GFC with a significant dip in 2009. 
 
Figure 2.16: Exports and imports of goods by ASEAN 
Source:UNCTADstat (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx) 
   
 
Figure 2.17: Exports and imports of services by ASEAN, USD million 
Source:UNCTADstat (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx)   
 
ASEAN member countries are becoming more internationalised with high trade 
openness which is measured by total exports and imports to GDP (see Figure 2.18). 
Remarkably, the average openness of ASEAN is much higher than that of the world (see 
Figure 2.19). In 2016, Singapore had the highest trade openness, followed by Vietnam of 
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the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN transitional economies (Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar and Vietnam) especially have experienced impressive internationalisation when 
moving from relatively closed to open economies. A good example is Vietnam, which has 
experienced an increase in trade openness from 66% in 1993 to 184.7% in 2016. Cambodia 
has also experienced a significant change in trade openness with a rise from 49% in 1993 
to 127% in 2016. Remarkably, the trade openness of Myanmar jumped from just 1% in 
2000 to 39% in 2016. 
 
Figure 2.18: Trade openness of ASEAN countries, trade/GDP ratio, 2016 
Source: World Bank website (https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx? source=2&series= 
NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS&country=) 
 
 
Figure 2.19: Trade openness of ASEAN and the world, trade/gdp ratio, 1980-2016
* 
*
 Data from 1980 to 2013 are from the Balance of Payments Manual 5 (BPM5) and data from 2014-
2016 are from Balance of Payments Manual 6 (BPM6).
 
Source: UNCTAD website (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx? ReportId 
=24397) 
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Figure 2.20 indicates the trade composition of ASEAN. It can be seen that about 75-
80% of ASEAN trade is with countries that are not members of ASEAN
21
. This suggests 
that regional economic integration in ASEAN still has a long way to go. However, the 
development of production networks, which is one of the goals of the AEC, may assist in 
the further regional economic integration of ASEAN. 
 
 
Figure 2.20: The composition of ASEAN trade 
Source: UNCTAD website (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView. aspx? 
ReportId=24397) 
 
Figure 2.21 illustrates the average annual growth rate of trade volumes for ASEAN. 
It can be seen that both export and import volumes have achieved high growth rates. 
Nonetheless they experienced sharp declines during the AFC, Dot.com bubble crash and 
GFC.  
                                                          
21
 The main trading partners of ASEAN in 2015 were the United States, Japan, EU, China, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Australia. 
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Figure 2.21: The average annual growth rate of export and import volumes for 
ASEAN, 1990-2017
* 
*
 Excluding Cambodia and Myanmar
 
Source: Author's calculation from the World Economic Outlook 2018-IMF website 
2.4.2. Investment flows 
According to Almekinders et al. (2015), FDI flows have been the main channel for 
the global financial integration of ASEAN. A major objective of ASEAN is to provide a 
competitive production base for multinational enterprises and to attract FDI inflows. 
However, it also pays attention to regional financial integration, which requires the 
openness of financial services and capital flow liberalisation. According to Yang (2013), 
financial openness is measured by the ratio of capital inflows and capital outflows to GDP. 
Capital flows (total short and long run capital) include foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment and other investment. ASEAN is embracing greater capital account 
liberalisation with the aim of higher capital account openness but with sound financial 
stability.  
Attracting FDI from outside and inside ASEAN is one of the main objectives of 
economic cooperation and integration of the ASEAN countries. Figure 2.22 shows the net 
FDI inflows to ASEAN, measured by share of total world FDI. It includes flows from 
intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN sources. It is evident that despite ASEAN’s share of 
world FDI inflows declining during the AFC and the GFC, it has recovered to levels during 
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the period before the AFC. The share of FDI inflow to the world total declined from 2014-
2016 because of the general decline in FDI inflow to developing countries. Further to this, 
the fall in FDI inflows in 2016 resulted from certain factors such as divestment, large 
repayment of intracompany loans, and the acquisition of foreign assets by ASEAN 
companies in their home countries (ASEAN 2017a). 
A number of factors have increased the attractiveness of ASEAN as a destination for 
FDI, including lower labour costs in manufacturing compared to that in China, geopolitical 
considerations and reductions in trade and investment barriers as part of the commitment to 
achieving the AEC. Nonetheless, World Bank (2014) indicated that restraints on foreign 
ownership, mainly in the services sector, should be eased to attract more FDI  
(Almekinders et al. 2015). In addition, infrastructural improvement as well as access to 
more skilled labour is necessary to enable ASEAN to attract more FDI.  
 
Figure 2.22: Net FDI inflows to ASEAN as a percentage of total world net FDI (1970-
2016) 
Source: UNCTAD website 
 
 Menon and Chongvilaivan (2011) point out that after the GFC the level of foreign 
capital inflows (including both FDI and short-term capital) recovered rapidly because of 
the recovery of confidence by foreign investors in the ASEAN economy. Nonetheless, the 
large increase in capital inflows, especially private short-term capital inflows, raised a 
number of issues. First, it can lead to the possibility of a similar capital reversal as 
experienced in the 1997 AFC. Second, it can result in difficulty in managing risks coming 
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from the dramatic surge of short-term capital inflows. The speedy surge in short-term 
capital inflows may result in domestic currency appreciation which in turn results in 
extreme losses in terms of output (Menon & Chongvilaivan 2011). Finally, the large 
capital inflow may lead to real exchange rate appreciation which then reduces 
competitiveness.  
2.5. CHALLENGES FACING ASEAN IN THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 
In spite of rapid development and progressive integration, ASEAN’s member 
economies are faced with diversity and income disparity. Due to changes in the global 
environment, ASEAN countries have to cope with common risks originating from the 
world economy and hence they should identify strategies to stimulate development in the 
region. 
2.5.1. Macroeconomic and financial stability  
More regional and global integration has enabled ASEAN countries to establish 
strong interconnections with their region and the rest of the world. However, this makes 
ASEAN countries more dependent on the world economy. Hence, ASEAN countries may 
be more vulnerable to shocks coming from international markets (Chirathivat et al. 2015; 
ADBI 2016). 
Export-driven growth has made ASEAN become more dependent on global growth 
and demand as a result, with volatility of global demand making the region become more 
sensitive to such changes (Rillo 2009). A salient feature of the ASEAN countries is their 
high level of trade openness. This makes ASEAN economies highly vulnerable to external 
shocks which potentially can trigger economic instability.
22
 Raddatz (2007) points out 
                                                          
22
 A high degree of openness makes small open economies in particular more vulnerable to external shocks. 
See Loayza and Raddatz (2007). 
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external shocks impinge negatively on the economic growth of developing countries and 
cause macroeconomic instability. Moreover, as indicated by Masron and Yusop (2008), 
many developing countries had sunk into deeper recessions coming from external shocks 
such as oil price shocks. 
It is evident that greater integration and interdependence increases the risk of 
contagion from a crisis, because shocks coming from one country can affect other 
economies in a region or free trade area (Chirathivat et al. 2015; ADBI 2016). As a result 
these risks may affect the macroeconomic and financial stability of ASEAN countries. 
Therefore, ASEAN may not achieve the aims of the AEC and, hence, it may lead to the 
latter failing (Chirathivat et al. 2015). ADBI (2016) highlights that the crucial target of a 
nation is to maintain the stability of its macro-economy and finance sector when faced with 
external shocks. 
2.5.2. The income gap 
From Section 2.3, it can be seen that ASEAN countries have attained an 
improvement in their economic growth and income per capita. However, the income gap 
across and within countries, between urban and rural and between income groups within 
countries has increased (ADBI 2016). One of the pillars for the AEC is equitable economic 
development in which ASEAN countries are pledged to ensure that the development gap, 
in particular the income gap, between member countries is reduced (McGillivray & 
Carpenter 2013). However, macroeconomic volatilities arising from external shocks can 
lead to wider income gaps amongst ASEAN countries, thus posing a serious threat to the 
success of the AEC in attaining one of its critical pillars for success - equitable economic 
development. 
 Moreover, in terms of the income gap within countries, as emphasised by ADBI 
(2016), on average the rich seem to get more benefits from growth than the poor and, 
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hence, ASEAN cannot attain sustainable prosperity if there inequality is on the rise. It also 
points out that a failure to reduce inequality creates a society where individuals face an 
imbalance in opportunities. Any increase in income disparity is politically unacceptable, 
dangerous and unsustainable and hence it damages the idea of ASEAN as a family of 
nations. It concludes that if a large income gap is maintained it makes achieving consensus 
among ASEAN members on common development agenda more difficult. 
Plummer and Chia (2009) argue that greater income inequality within a country can 
cause a serious problem such as blaming the establishment of the AEC for this 
development, which then erodes the political will to implement policies inherent in the 
AEC. They also believe that income inequality can harm economic growth. Hence, they 
conclude that addressing within-country income inequality, as well as across ASEAN 
members, are essential for the success of ASEAN from both political and economic 
perspectives. 
2.5.3. The exchange rate regime as an instrument to overcome challenges  
The AEC promotes greater integration amongst ASEAN member countries and as 
such external shocks are transmitted between countries at greater speed. Accordingly, the 
macroeconomic policy of individual ASEAN countries should be designed in such a way 
as to ensure that their economy is resilient to domestic and external shocks and volatilities 
(ADBI 2016). Furthermore, according to the joint statement made by the Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors of ASEAN countries at the 2
nd
 Meeting in Vientiane, Lao 
PDR on 4
th
 April 2016, in dealing with external challenges, ASEAN is committed to 
conducting suitable monetary, fiscal and macro-prudential policies to enhance 
macroeconomic and financial stability as well as to achieve sustainable economic growth
23
.  
In the literature, the exchange rate regime serves as an instrument to reduce the 
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 Macro-prudential policy aims to ensure financial stability and address risks and volatilities 
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volatility of macroeconomic variables such as output, the real exchange rate and price level 
from external shocks. It may be used as a tool to reduce the income gap for ASEAN 
countries for the following reasons: first, the exchange rate is an important channel through 
which the effects of fluctuations of external variables on domestic macroeconomic 
variables such as output and price are transmitted (Tng & Kwek 2015); second, exchange 
rate policy plays a role in ensuring macroeconomic stability and economic growth 
(Mühlich 2014). This in turn may affect the income gap between and within ASEAN 
countries. Moreover, Masron and Yusop (2008) show that external shocks are considered 
as a factor leading to a greater income gap for ASEAN countries. It can be explained that 
the responses of the economy to shocks can vary due to different exchange rate regimes 
adopted. Therefore, exchange rate policy can play a role in minimising the income gap 
through absorbing external shocks. However, this issue has been missing in the policy 
discussion as well as in the literature and, hence, this line of enquiry is the focus of this 
thesis. 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
ASEAN, which is made up of ten economically diverse countries, namely Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam, established the AEC in 2015 with the aim of closer regional economic 
integration by 2020. The pillars underpinning the AEC are to: attain a single market, make 
the region a competitive production base, to achieve equitable economic development and 
full integration into the world economy. With reference to the pillar of equitable economic 
development, the AEC wants to ensure that the benefits of regional integration are 
distributed as equally as possible to member countries.  
Although the AEC brings obvious opportunities it also carries with it challenges and 
risks to ASEAN countries. A good example is that economic integration makes ASEAN 
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countries more interdependent and, hence, susceptible to external shocks coming from 
regional and global economies. These external shocks can lead to contagion because 
shocks coming from one country may affect another country. In particular, these shocks 
impact on member countries in different ways, which may exacerbate existing member 
countries’ income gap. Thus, this poses serious threats to the success of the AEC in 
attaining one of its critical pillars for success - equitable economic development. 
Additionally, despite the positive economic growth and increases in per capita income in 
recent times, ASEAN countries are currently facing within-country income inequality. This 
can also harm the sustainability of future economic growth. 
  In theory, and in practice, the exchange rate regime is an important instrument for 
insulating an economy from external shocks and, therefore, exchange rate policy is 
considered to have an important role to play in dealing with challenges on the progress of 
the AEC such as macroeconomic instability, unsustainable economic growth and income 
gap issues. It may play a role in reducing income inequality within a country through its 
impacts on macroeconomic variables. Nonetheless, the role of the exchange rate policy in 
terms of its impact on the between and within countries income gap has not been 
investigated before in the literature. It is here that the thesis makes an important 
contribution to the literature and to policy decisions in ASEAN and its member countries. 
This study aims to investigate which exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) can 
minimise the adverse effects of various external shocks on key macroeconomic variables 
such as output, price level and real exchange rate, and reduce the income gap between and 
within ASEAN countries and to attain the AEC objectives. For this reason, it is necessary 
to discuss and better understand the role of the exchange rate regime in buffering external 
shocks and maintaining economic stability, which will be presented in the next chapter - 
the literature review.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of the AEC in 2015 represented a major landmark in regional 
economic integration in ASEAN. As discussed in Chapter 2, high trade openness, export-
orientated growth and more regional and global integration may make the ASEAN 
economies more vulnerable to external shocks from the world economy such as foreign 
demand and world real oil price shocks. This may affect the success of the AEC in 
reducing the income gap between and within ASEAN members, maintaining regional 
macroeconomic stability and for the region to become fully integrated into the global 
economy.  
In the literature, the exchange rate regime can be an instrument to cope with 
external shocks. Hence, exchange rate policy, specifically the exchange rate regime 
adopted, could be an important policy instrument for individual ASEAN countries in 
dealing with external shocks to ensure the stability of macroeconomic variables such as 
output, the real exchange rate and price level.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The importance of external shocks on ASEAN 
economies will be presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 will shed light on relevant 
literature relating to the role of exchange rate regimes in transmitting the effects of shocks 
to key macroeconomic variables. To review the choice of exchange rate regime in the 
case of regional integration, Section 3.4 discusses the issue of an optimal currency area. 
The link between macroeconomic variables and the income gap within and between 
countries will be illustrated in Section 3.5. Based on the literature review, research gaps 
will be identified in Section 3.6. Finally, concluding remarks for this chapter will be 
provided in Section 3.7. 
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3.2. EXTERNAL SHOCKS MAY BE A PROBLEM FOR ASEAN 
COUNTRIES 
External shocks play an important role in ASEAN countries and can even be more 
important than domestic shocks. Zaidi et al. (2013) investigated the importance of 
domestic and foreign shocks coming from the US and Japan, namely a commodity price 
shock, interest rate shock and GDP shock on key macroeconomic variables (real output, 
inflation, interest rate and the real effective exchange rate) for three ASEAN economies, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. They found that their fluctuation (especially in the 
medium and long-run) is mainly explained by foreign factors such as commodity prices, 
foreign interest rates and foreign GDP shocks. In particular, the outputs of Malaysia and 
Thailand were more affected by foreign interest rate shocks than domestic interest rate 
shocks. Also, they discovered that the impact of foreign monetary policy shocks on 
Malaysia’s inflation rate is more immediate compared to domestic monetary policy 
shocks. For Thailand and Indonesia, they concluded that foreign monetary policy shocks 
have similar effects to that of domestic monetary policy shocks on the volatility of 
inflation. 
This study made some important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it used non-
recursive SVAR where restrictions are based on the theory of the relationship between 
variables. In addition, it was assumed here that exogeneity of foreign shocks are used to 
avoid impacts of domestic variables on foreign shocks. However, this study did not 
conduct any test for this assumption such as the Granger causality test. In addition, the 
sample (from February1982 to February 2008) did not include the GFC which affected 
these economies. Finally, these countries are highly integrated into the world economy in 
terms of trade and, hence, their economies are affected by more types of shocks such as a 
foreign demand shock. However, this type of shock was not considered in this study.  
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Similarly, by conducting a structural VAR model for 8 emerging countries 
including some ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the 
Philippines during the period from January 1986 to December 2000, Maćkowiak (2007) 
discovered that external shocks are important factors impacting on macroeconomic 
volatility (short-term interest, exchange rate, real aggregate output and aggregate price 
level). In particular, about 50% of the fluctuation of the exchange rate and price level is 
explained by external shocks such as the Federal Funds rate, world commodity prices, 
U.S. money stock, U.S. real aggregate output and U.S. aggregate price level. 
Furthermore, external shocks are responsible for about 40% and 33% of the variation of 
real output and the short-term interest rate of emerging countries, respectively. The 
positive point of this study is that it covered various types of external shocks coming from 
sources such as the commodity market, money market and financial market. Nevertheless, 
while exchange rate regime plays an important role in transmitting the effects of shocks 
on domestic variables, this study did not investigate the contribution of shocks to the 
volatility of domestic variables under different exchange rate regimes. 
Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015) found that world real oil price shocks do not wield a 
long-run impact or significantly contribute to the variables, namely real GDP, inflation 
and real exchange rate of the ASEAN5
24
. However, this study did not conduct any test for 
the exogeneity of the world oil price. In addition, this paper did not consider the role of 
the exchange rate regime in transmitting the impact of world real oil price shocks on the 
ASEAN5 economy. A good example is that a rise in the world oil price leads to an 
increase in demand for foreign currency. This may or may not cause changes in the 
nominal exchange rate depending on which exchange rate regime that a country is 
applying. If a fixed exchange rate regime is applied then there is no change in the nominal 
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 Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia 
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exchange rate. Nonetheless, the nominal value of the domestic currency decreases under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. As a result the real exchange rate changes differently under 
different exchange rate regime. 
The importance of external shocks has changed over time. A good example is found 
by investigating the contribution of external shocks to the volatility of domestic variables, 
including real GDP, the producer price index and the nominal exchange rate of East 
Asian economies, which include some ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines from 1990Q1 to 2012Q2. Allegret et al. (2012) 
found that real oil price shocks, trade shocks, external financial shocks and monetary 
shocks have increased since the mid-1990s because of increased trade liberalisation by 
East Asian countries
25
. The positive point of this study is that it included different types 
of shocks from different sources such as real shocks, financial shocks and monetary 
shocks. However, like previous studies the role of the exchange rate was not considered 
in this analysis. 
Recently, efforts have been made to discover the importance of external shocks on 
the ASEAN countries, because of their increasing high degree of trade openness and 
efforts at closer regional integration and cooperation. Hence, investigating the effects of 
external shocks on this region can make an important contribution to identifying effective 
policies for their integration and cooperation. Nonetheless, as indicated by Zaidi et al. 
(2013), studies on this issue remain limited. Previous studies have been mainly 
constrained in their focus to only a subset of the 10 ASEAN member economies such as 
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Moreover, although 
financial linkages represent a key channel in transmitting external shocks to ASEAN 
countries (Majuca 2013; Sethapramote 2015), but the role of the exchange rate regime in 
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 The monetary shock and financial shock are proxied by U.S short-term interest rate and MSCI World 
Index (Morgan Stanley Capital International), respectively. 
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transmitting the effects of external shocks to the macroeconomic variables of all ten 
ASEAN countries has not been investigated as yet. For these reasons, it is necessary to 
evaluate in more detail these impacts, as well as the importance of external shocks, on 
ASEAN countries through the exchange rate regime.  
3.3. THE ROLE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME ON 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
3.3.1. Traditional theory 
The idea that a flexible exchange rate regime is an efficient real shock absorber was 
initiated by Meade (1951) and Friedman (1953). They showed that with imperfect goods 
markets (i.e., price and wage stickiness) the adjustment speed of relative prices between 
domestic and foreign goods to real shocks depends on the exchange rate regime. In 
particular, under a flexible exchange rate regime relative prices will adjust immediately 
through adjustment of the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the large adjustment of 
relative prices changes the domestic price of export goods which in turn makes the 
movement of real output smoother. As a result, the negative effect of real shocks on output 
will be partly offset under a flexible exchange rate regime.  
However, under a relatively fixed exchange rate regime the adjustment of relative 
prices is much slower because it can only change at a limited speed based on the 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and prices. This can only occur with a decline in 
output relative to full employment which then puts downward pressure on wages and 
prices which tend to be sticky and adjust only slowly. Output will have to decline and more 
time will be needed to achieve lower domestic prices. Hence, the decline of output under a 
fixed exchange rate can be anticipated to be larger and more long-lasting in comparison a 
flexible exchange rate. However, these studies only mentioned general real shocks, not a 
specific real shock such as a terms of trade shock (TOT), foreign demand shock and real 
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interest rate shock. Also, they did not consider the degree of capital mobility and trade 
openness which affect adjustment of the nominal and real exchange rate via changes in 
tradable goods and capital flows. These studies only considered the fluctuation of output, 
not the stability of real exchange rate and price level, as a criterion for the superiority of 
the exchange rate regime. 
The perspective concerning the choice of exchange rate regime provided by Meade 
(1951) and Friedman (1953) has been extended by other studies. Fleming (1962) and 
Mundell (1963) found that the superiority of a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime 
depends on the type of shock and mobility of capital. They pointed out that in a small open 
economy with a high degree of capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate regime is a better 
absorber of nominal shocks, such as changes in money demand or supply, whereas a 
flexible exchange rate regime is superior in buffering real shocks. However, these studies 
did not point out a specific real shock or nominal shock, nor did they consider the source of 
shock such as external or domestic and the degree of openness. This is because the last 
point affects trade flows which in turn causes changes in the real exchange rate under 
different exchange rate regimes. 
Moreover, Moosa (2005) concluded that both types of exchange rate regime can be a 
shock absorber. The choice of a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime depends on 
whether the shocks are domestic or external. In particular, a flexible exchange rate regime 
is better in dealing with external real shocks, external nominal shocks and internal real 
shocks, while a fixed exchange rate regime is superior in dealing with domestic nominal 
shocks. Nonetheless, the author did not indicate certain criteria for his conclusion on the 
superiority of the exchange rate regime on the stability of output, the real exchange rate, 
price level and economic growth. 
Poole (1970) and Turnovsky (1976) who allowed for capital mobility found that the 
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stability of output depends on the type of shocks and a country’s chracteristics. In 
particular, output is more stable under a flexible regime if the shocks come from foreign 
trade or foreign prices. However, a fixed regime attains greater output stability if the shock 
arises from the domestic monetary sector. Additionally, they showed that the superiority of 
the exchange rate regime to deal with other shocks such as a domestic demand shock, 
domestic price shock and capital flow shock depends on the degree of capital mobility or 
intervention. A good example is that a fixed exchange rate regime is better at minimising 
the fluctuation of output to domestic demand shocks if a country has a low integrated 
capital market. Nonetheless, a flexible exchange rate regime can create greater output 
stability where a higher degree of capital mobility exists. These studies, however, simply 
focused on the stability of output, not other variables to decide the superiority of an 
exchange rate regime. 
Krugman and Taylor (1978), however, showed that a flexible exchange rate regime 
might not be superior to a fixed exchange rate regime in all circumstances. By assuming 
the existence of a trade deficit, they indicated that depreciation under a flexible rate regime 
can cause a contraction of national output because the import cost is greater than export 
revenue in terms of domestic currency
26
. Similarly, devaluation under a fixed exchange 
rate regime also has a contractionary impact on output. Therefore, it can be seen that under 
a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime, both a depreciation and devaluation can lead to 
output contraction. Therefore, a flexible exchange rate regime may not be better than a 
fixed regime in insulating the negative effect of a shock on output. Similar to previous 
studies, this study only considered the fluctuation of output to decide which exchange rate 
regime is better.  
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 Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2002) explain the reason why a depreciation could have a contractionary effect 
on output. A depreciation leads to a higher price of intermediate imported goods, which then reduces output 
supply and increases inflation. The increase in inflation offsets the gain in competitiveness from the exchange 
rate depreciation. They illustrated that although export-oriented Asian economies had experienced 
depreciation during the AFC, domestic production decreased and inflation increased. 
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In addition, Mundell (1961) pointed out that a fixed exchange rate regime is the best 
for small open economies, which are affected by asymmetric real shocks, in reducing the 
fluctuation of the real exchange rate and then output volatility. McKinnon (1963) also 
indicated that more open economies prefer a fixed exchange rate regime than a flexible one 
because the former plays a role in reducing output volatility. For an example of this view, 
Kunroo (2015) showed that a negative TOT shock causes domestic currency depreciation 
which leads to an increase in the price of tradable goods. Therefore, if the authorities aim 
to stabilise the general price level then domestic demand is required to reduce the price of 
non-tradeable goods. The more open an economy is, then the greater contraction that is 
required and this leads to smaller GDP. Although these studies covered the degree of 
openness in the choice of exchange rate regime, the criteria for their conclusion was 
restricted to the volatility of output. 
Some studies change the underlying assumptions and criteria when comparing the 
effects of shocks between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. A good example is 
that by changing the assumption, namely capital immobility and the criterion of 
consumption stability, Fischer (1977) and Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) found contrary 
results; in particular, a flexible exchange rate regime is better in dealing with a nominal 
shock and a fixed regime in dealing with buffering a real shock. Flood (1979), Joshua 
(1983) and Melvin (1985), who focused on minimising domestic price instability, 
concluded that a fixed exchange rate regime is prefererable for insulating domestic prices 
from a nominal shock. Nevertheless, these studies did not separate a particular type of real 
or nominal shock nor did they differentiate the source of shock, i.e. whether foreign or 
domestic.  
Devereux and Engel (2003) showed that the merit of a fixed or flexible exchange rate 
regime in coping with shocks depends on the currency used to set the price of goods. In 
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particular, if the imported goods are priced in domestic currency (local currency pricing - 
LCP) then the price is not affected by changes in the exchange rate. Therefore, a flexible 
exchange rate is less powerful in varying relative prices. This limits the superiority of a 
flexible exchange rate regime in insulating monetary shocks. In contrast, if the price of 
imported goods is set in foreign currency (Producer currency pricing - PCP) then the 
impact of changes in the exchange rate on consumer prices is immediate. As a result, the 
flexible exchange rate regime outweighs a fixed exchange rate regime in buffering 
monetary shocks. 
Some studies considered wage indexation and price flexibility in examining the 
superiority of a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime. Marston (1981) concluded that the 
difference in output fluctuation from shocks (internal and external monetary and aggregate 
demand shocks) between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime is affected by the 
degree of wage indexation. In particular, there is less difference in output volatility 
between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime if a country has a higher degree of 
wage indexation. Moreover, a flexible exchange rate regime helps a country cushion 
against foreign shocks better if foreign countries have a perfect or higher degree of wage 
indexation than the home country.  Furthermore, by assuming the existence of purchasing 
power parity, Aizenman (1985) pointed out that a higher degree of wage indexation leads 
to the superior ability of the flexible exchange rate regime to deal with aggregate supply 
shocks and monetary shocks. Despite looking at the characteristics of an economy while 
investigating the effects of shock across exchange rate regimes, these studies only 
considered the stability of output for their choice. 
By noting the presence of foreign currency debt, Cook (2004) emphasised that 
emerging countries having a high foreign currency debt prefer a fixed exchange rate 
regime to a flexible exchange rate regime. This is because under the latter, a depreciation 
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arising from world real interest rate shock and foreign demand shock makes foreign-
currency borrowing increase in terms of domestic currency, which then increases the cost 
of capital and reduces domestic firms’ profit. This leads to investment and output 
contraction. Similar to other studies, the analysis only considered the response of output to 
the shocks when considering the impact of degree of foreign currency debt on the 
superiority of exchange rate regime. 
By applying a small open economy model to examine the stability of output and the 
price level in responding to money demand, aggregate demand and supply shocks between 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, Pilbeam (2004) found that the ranking of the 
exchange rate regime (fixed versus flexible) depends on the weighting that the authorities 
put on output and price stability, wage indexation, the type of shocks hitting the economy, 
structural parameters such as income elasticity of demand, the degree of openness and the 
elasticity of aggregate demand to fluctuations in the real exchange rate and real interest 
rate. A good example is that in the case of no wage indexation, a fixed exchange rate 
regime is better at buffering money demand shocks in terms of stability of output and 
price. However, in the case of no wage indexation, if the economy is hit by aggregate 
demand shocks then a flexible exchange rate regime is better than a fixed exchange rate 
regime in dealing with these shocks. In the presence of aggregate supply shocks the 
superior exchange rate regime depends on structural coefficients and the priority of the 
authorities between output and price stability. These results may be reversed for the case of 
wage indexation. Moreover, Pilbeam (2004) showed that if domestic goods account for a 
small proportion in the basket of consumption goods then a flexible regime is superior at 
stabilising output. Nonetheless, this study only considered the ranking of exchange rate 
regime in buffering domestic shocks, not external shocks.  
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3.3.2. Exchange rate regime classification 
There are two types of exchange rate regime classifications, namely the de jure and 
de facto classification. A de jure exchange rate regime classification embodies the 
exchange rate policy that a country commits to applying. It was announced by the IMF 
until 1998 in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
which is based on official government statements to the IMF. This classification comprises 
15 sub-categories which are grouped into three broad categories under the de jure 
classification: pegged regimes, intermediate regimes and floating exchange rate regimes.  
Tavlas et al. (2008) indicated some advantages of the de jure classification which 
are: the coverage of economies, observations over time, updating frequency of exchange 
rate regime and a good indicator of future policy actions. However, the de jure 
classification has a drawback which is that the intervention actions of monetary policy-
makers may be inconsistent with the policy commitment (Reinhart 2000; Frankel et al. 
2001; Reinhart and Rogoff 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005). Tavlas et al. 
(2008) indicated that although some countries announced a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
regime these countries implemented still devalued their currencies to improve 
competitiveness. Additionally, a flexible exchange rate regime, which is officially 
classified, may turn out to be a fixed exchange rate regime because the movement of the 
exchange rate is restricted via changes in the interest rate and foreign reserves. Hence, the 
de jure exchange rate regime classification may lead to biased results which in turn 
misinforms policy implications (Ahmad & Pentecost 2010). 
To overcome the disadvantage of a de jure classification, a number of studies have 
introduced a de facto classification, as done Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Ghosh 
et al. (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki et al. (2008). Some advantages of 
this can be seen as follows. Firstly, this classification is based on the actual policy rather 
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than the policy announcement (Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger 2005). In addition, a de facto 
classification has more advantages than a de jure classification in terms of having a wide 
cross-country and time series coverage (Ghosh et al. 2010). Although the de facto 
classification fails to distinguish whether stability is caused by the policy commitment or 
by the absence of a shock, it can control for the difference between the commitment and 
intervention by the authorities in the foreign exchange market (Chia et al. 2012).  
Based on the de jure exchange rate regime, the de facto exchange rate regime was 
revised by the IMF and some authors. Firstly, the IMF revised its de jure regime into a de 
facto exchange rate regime in 1998 by combining information on actual data for the 
exchange rate, foreign reserves and monetary policy (Kokenyne et al. 2009). Before 2008 
the IMF classified exchange rate regimes into eight categories, namely: no separate legal 
tender, currency union, currency board, conventional fixed, crawling peg, crawling band, 
independent float (which was renamed as free floating after 2008), and managed floating 
with no predetermined band (which was renamed as floating after 2008). From 2008 
onwards, three categories were added, including stabilised arrangement, pegged exchange 
rate regime with a horizontal band, and other managed arrangements (Ghosh 2014)
27
. 
Secondly, using cluster analysis, data for the exchange rate and international reserves 
of all IMF-reporting countries from 1974 to 2000, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
compressed exchange rate regimes into three types, these being the pegged exchange rate, 
intermediate exchange rate, and floating exchange rate regimes. All of these regimes were 
classified based on changes in the nominal exchange rate, the variability of exchange rate 
changes and the fluctuation of foreign reserves. In particular, these authors pointed out that 
the flexible exchange regime classification contains countries that have had large changes 
in their nominal exchange rate, substantial volatility of these changes and relatively stable 
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 See Table B1 in Appendix B for definitions of these exchange rate regimes. 
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fluctuations of foreign reserves. Conversely, countries with small changes in their nominal 
exchange rate, insignificant volatility of these changes and high fluctuation of foreign 
reserves are classified as a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Ghosh et al. (1997) reclassified the de jure pegged regime into “infrequent” and 
“frequent” pegged regimes. They also grouped intermediate and floating in the same 
classification. Next, by using the market-determined parallel exchange rate, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) classified exchange rate regimes into the de facto exchange rate regime 
which includes 15 categories.  
Although the de facto regime of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) has been applied in other studies, such as Chia et al. (2012) and Broda 
(2004), the de facto regime of the IMF has not as yet been employed to investigate the best 
exchange rate regime. Therefore, to confirm the accuracy of results from previous 
literature on the impacts of shocks on macroeconomic variables across exchange rate 
regimes, this study will use the de facto exchange rate regime of the IMF. This also helps 
in overcoming the drawbacks of the de jure classification. 
3.3.3. Empirical evidence 
The theory on the superiority of exchange rate regimes has also been investigated 
empirically. However, the results are mixed because the shocks employed are different. A 
good example is that by using Probit and OLS regression and de facto exchange rate 
regime classification of Ghosh et al. (1997) for a sample of 80 developing countries in 
period 1980-1989, Bleaney and Fielding (2002) found that countries with a fixed exchange 
rate regime experience greater fluctuations of output to TOT shock than countries with a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, Devereux (1999) discovered there is no 
difference in output volatility to a fiscal policy shock or supply shock between a fixed and 
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flexible exchange rate regime. We can see that Bleaney and Fielding considered external 
shock while domestic shocks were employed in the study by Devereux. Therefore, the 
contrary results reported in these two studies may be due to different types of shock.   
Elsewhere, Baxter and Stockman (1989) found that the behaviour of real macroeconomic 
aggregates (such as consumption, exports, imports, real exchange rate and output), except 
the real exchange rate, are similar between exchange rate regimes. Nonetheless, their 
analysis only compared the behaviour of variables between exchange rate regimes without 
considering the presence of any shocks which are the source of volatility of variables.  
The type of shock also affects empirical findings on the superiority of exchange rate 
regime in stabilising the price level. Chia and Alba (2006) found that consumer prices 
fluctuate to a negative TOT shock by less under a fixed than under a floating exchange rate 
regime. Nonetheless, Kemme and Koleyni (2017) investigated the effect of external 
shocks, namely a US technology shock, US preference shock and US monetary shock on 
the price level for Mexico. They found it is higher under a fixed than under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. It can be seen that different types of external shock may lead to 
different results concerning the role of exchange rate regime in transmitting the effects of 
shocks on price level. Furthermore, both studies above did not mention what exchange rate 
regime classification such as de jure or de facto are employed and hence, the inconsistency 
in the results may originate from the difference in exchange rate regime classification. 
Broda (2004) compared the effects of a TOT shock on real GDP, the real exchange 
rate and consumer prices under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime for 75 
developing countries in the post-Bretton-Woods period (1973-1996) using a structural 
vector autoregressive model (SVAR). To classify the fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes he used the classification of Ghosh et al. (1997), which is a combination of the de 
jure and de facto classification. The author concluded that a flexible exchange rate regime 
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is superior to a fixed exchange rate regime because the fluctuation of short-run real GDP to 
TOT shock is smoother under a flexible than under a fixed regime. Nonetheless, this 
combination may lead to mixed results concerning the reaction of variables to shocks; in 
particular, it is difficult to distinguish whether the stability of variables in the model 
derives from the absence of shocks or the intervention of authorities in offsetting the 
shocks. In addition, the author did not conclude the superiority of exchange rate regime in 
terms of the stability of price level. 
Unlike previous studies such as Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose 
(1995) who did not identify the source of volatility of variables, Broda isolated impacts 
and contribution of a real shock, namely a TOT shock. He found that the flexible exchange 
rate regime is better than the fixed exchange rate regime in insulating a TOT shock in 
terms of output stability. However, this study only focused on a specific type of shock. In 
theory, the superiority of the exchange rate regime depends, as emphasised previously, on 
the nature and type of shocks. Therefore, the unanswered question is whether a flexible 
exchange rate regime is better in coping with other types of shocks. The superiority of the 
exchange rate regime does not rely on the stability of output but also other criteria such as 
growth, inflation and consumption. Hence, a statement on the superiority of an exchange 
rate regime based on output stability does not appear to be suitable for a country pursuing, 
for example, an inflation targeting monetary policy. 
The classification of the exchange rate regime under which an economy is operating 
may, therefore, produce different outcomes for key macroeconomic variables from 
different shocks. Unlike Broda (2004), Hoffmann (2007) separately used exchange rate 
regime classifications, namely de jure - AREAER and de facto - while Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) compare the reaction of variables (real GDP, the real exchange rate and 
trade balance) to world real interest rate shocks under a fixed and flexible exchange rate 
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regime
28
. By using the two classification approaches separately, the author could 
distinguish the adjustment of variables to shocks between a de jure and de facto exchange 
rate regime. In addition, by considering two types of shocks, namely world output and 
world real interest rate shock, Hoffman could address the question whether the superiority 
of an exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) can work for any given type of shock or just 
a certain type of shock. However, Hoffman’s study only considered the shock coming from 
the monetary market while other types of shocks from the goods market such as foreign 
demand shock and world real oil price had not been considered in his study. Therefore, we 
do not know whether a flexible exchange rate regime is better than the fixed exchange rate 
regime to cope with shocks coming from other channels. 
Hoffman also found that the difference in responses of variables to world real interest 
rate shocks between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes under the de jure 
classification are more statistically significant than under the de facto classification. This 
implies that using different classification approaches may obtain varying conclusions on 
the superiority of one type of exchange rate regime. It can be seen that although various 
exchange rate regime approaches such as de jure of IMF, de facto of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), de facto of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), de facto of Ghosh et al. (1997) 
and de facto of Ilzetzki et al. (2008) have been used to investigate the role of the exchange 
rate regime in transmitting  shocks to the economy, no empirical work has employed the de 
facto exchange rate regime of the IMF. 
The advantage of some studies such as Hoffmann (2007) and Al-Abri (2013) is that 
they consider other types of shock rather than a TOT shock. Hoffmann (2007) investigated 
the role of the exchange rate regime in transmitting the effects of a world output shock and 
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 A comparison between a de jure fixed and de jure flexible exchange rate regime; and between de facto 
fixed and de facto flexible exchange rate regime. 
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world real interest rate shock for 42 developing countries. However, no comparison of the 
effects and contribution between these two types of shock had been made. Al-Abri (2013) 
examined the responses and variance decomposition of real output growth, inflation rate, 
real exchange rate and short-term interest rate of nine oil importing countries (Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) to a world real 
oil price shock under both a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime. However, the large 
sample in the study by Hoffmann and regional diversity in that by Al-Abri imply there is 
diversity in stages of development and economic characteristics which may increase the 
degree of heterogeneity in the sample.  
Kilian (2008) indicated that an increase in the price of energy is transmitted to 
aggregate demand via direct and indirect channels. In terms of direct channels, increases in 
energy prices lead to a reduction in the consumption of energy and energy-intensive 
durables because consumers expect more energy efficient technologies and an increase 
their precautionary savings. This reduces aggregate demand. Regarding the indirect 
channels, the reduced spending on energy-intensive durables such as automobiles, may 
result in a reallocation of capital and labour as they move out of the automobile sector. 
This causes unemployment which reduces consumption and enlarges the influence of 
higher energy prices on the real economy. The indirect effect could even be greater than 
the direct effect. Hence, Kilian believed that the reallocation effect can bring about 
asymmetric effects from a positive and a negative energy price shock. This asymmetric 
effect is generated because the reallocation effects amplify the behaviour of 
macroeconomic aggregates to a positive energy price shock but weaken the responses of 
macroeconomic aggregates in the case of a negative energy price shock. Hence, he 
concluded that responses of macroeconomic aggregates are more enlarged to energy price 
increases than to energy price decreases. 
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In addition, by examining the dynamic effects of external shocks (including crude oil 
supply shocks and unanticipated increases in global demand for all industrial commodities 
and for crude oil) on the real price of oil,  Kilian (2009) found that responses to a real oil 
price increase depends on the reasons for the oil price increase. If the increase in oil price 
is due to an increase in demand for crude oil then the real price of crude oil increases 
immediately, persistently and significantly. However, the increase in the real price of oil is 
delayed and prolonged in the case where there is an increase in aggregate demand for all 
industrial commodities. Interruptions in crude oil production lead to an insignificant and 
temporary increase in the real price of oil within the first year (Kilian 2009). 
To restrict the degree of heterogeneity of the sample, Zhang et al. (2014) investigated 
the transmission of foreign real interest rate shocks to real GDP, real exchange rate and 
CPI for a sample of nine East Asian countries. They also compared the contribution of this 
type of shock to the fluctuation of variables between a fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regime. They concluded that responses of variables to the shock differ under various 
exchange rate regimes and, hence, this should be more carefully considered when looking 
for integration and coordination in monetary policy among countries with different 
exchange rate regimes. Given this, it is an important issue in the context of the ASEAN 
countries that have their own separate exchange rate regimes but want regional integration 
to reduce income inequality within and between them. However, this issue has not been 
addressed in the literature. In particular, previous studies have mainly focused on the 
behaviour of output, real exchange rate and price level across an exchange rate regime 
while not many studies have investigated the role of the exchange rate regime in 
transmitting the impact of shocks onto income inequality. 
 Chia et al. (2012) examined the effects of two different types of shock, namely a 
TOT shock and a foreign nominal interest rate shock on real GDP, real exchange rate and 
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output stability under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes by SVAR and DSGE 
models and de facto exchange rate classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for 3 small 
Asian open economies from 1980 to 2009. They concluded that a flexible regime is better 
than a fixed exchange rate regime in stabilising real output. By considering both types of 
shocks, this study could examine separately the effects of a real and nominal shock. 
Nonetheless, the combination of both these shocks in one model may cause interaction 
between the two types of shocks. This may distort the impacts of each shock on variables 
across exchange rate regimes. Moreover, no comparison regarding the effect and 
contribution between two types of shocks under each exchange rate regime was undertaken 
by this study. Additionally, the superiority of exchange rate regime was only concluded 
based on the stability of output and no other criteria such as economic growth, real 
exchange rate stability or price level stability. 
By considering the presence of foreign currency debt, Cook (2004) emphasised that 
emerging countries having a high foreign currency debt prefer a fixed exchange rate 
regime to a flexible exchange rate regime. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, a 
depreciation arising from a world real interest rate shock and foreign demand shock makes 
foreign-currency borrowing increase in terms of domestic currency, which then reduces 
domestic firms’ profits. This leads to investment and output contraction.  
Towbin and Weber (2013) not only considered the foreign currency debt but also 
pass-through to import price when investigating the impact of a TOT shock and foreign 
interest rate shock on output and investment under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes for a sample of 101 countries from 1994-2007. They found that the merit of a 
flexible exchange rate regime in insulating shocks can be seen in countries with low 
foreign currency debt and high pass-through to import prices. However, for countries that 
have a high foreign currency debt and low pass-through to import prices, both a fixed and 
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flexible exchange rate regime have the same output stabilisation patterns. Hence, the 
traditional argument for the superiority of a flexible exchange rate regime in buffering real 
shocks is questionable in countries with high foreign currency debt and low pass-through 
to import prices. This study, however, ignored other aspects such as economic growth, real 
exchange rate stability and inflation stability when considering the influence of foreign 
currency debt on the superiority of exchange rate regime in buffering the external shocks. 
To investigate why East Asian emerging countries do not desire flexible exchange 
rate regimes, Shi et al. (2015) developed a small open economy model with sticky prices 
and considered various types of external shocks such as foreign demand shocks, 
technology shocks and foreign interest rate shocks. They found that two trade features 
(including a high use of foreign currency in export pricing and low elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign traded goods) prevent the adjustment of the exchange rate in 
responding to external shocks. Hence, a flexible exchange rate regime cannot ensure 
stability of the economy when it is hit by external shocks. Furthermore, they pointed out 
that because of high exchange rate pass-through in these countries, the exchange rate 
movement causes more disturbances to inflation under a flexible than a fixed regime. 
Therefore, the flexible exchange rate regime is not desirable in these economies or 
circumstances. 
Rogoff et al. (2004) found that the advantage of the flexible exchange rate regime 
rises if a country is more integrated into the global capital market. Based on results for 
inflation, output growth and growth volatility, they concluded that developed economies 
with a free floating exchange rate regime grow faster without higher inflation compared to 
other developed economies with their own exchange rate systems. Nonetheless, developing 
countries with a limited degree of integration into the global capital market and fixed 
exchange rate regimes experience lower inflation without incurring a lower growth or 
74 
 
higher growth fluctuation. Emerging countries with stronger links to the global capital 
market than developing countries, and with fixed or less flexible exchange rate regimes, 
experience crises more frequently.  
Aghion et al. (2009) discovered that a flexible exchange rate regime results in lower 
productivity growth in a country where financial development is low. They explained that 
volatility of the exchange rate under a flexible exchange rate regime results in large profit 
fluctuations for companies. This then reduces investment, R&D and productivity growth of 
the economy. They contended that countries with immature financial markets can actually 
benefit from a fixed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the source of the shocks such as 
real shocks and financial shocks, only problems at lower levels of financial development. 
Finally, some studies pointed out the link between the exchange rate regime and 
economic growth. A good example is that of Dornbusch (2001) who argued that lower 
inflation under a fixed exchange rate regime decreases the interest rate and uncertainty, and 
promotes investment and growth. Calvo (2001) indicated that a flexible exchange rate 
regime can lead to a decline in the rate of growth because a domestic currency depreciation 
resulting from external shocks exaggerates debt in terms of domestic currency. This may 
leads to bankruptcies and lower economic growth rate. However, Edwards and Levy 
Yeyati (2005) examined a TOT shock for 183 countries from 1974 to 2000, concluding 
that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes can minimise better the negative impact 
of such a shock on growth. However, these authors only investigated the effect of one 
particular shock on growth across exchange rate regimes. Therefore, it is uncertain whether 
the findings can be applied to any type of shock or just for the case of one particular shock. 
3.4. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME - 
LITERATURE ON OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA 
This section reviews the literature on currency areas where the choice of exchange 
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rate regime in economic integration is examined. The basic Mundell-Fleming model which 
is used to analyse the effects of exogenous shocks under different exchange rate regimes is 
subsequently utilised to develop the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA). Kwan (1998) 
indicated that an OCA consists of a group of countries establishing a monetary union 
which applies a fixed exchange rate regime among member countries while applying a 
flexible regime to the rest of the world. Mundell (1961) indicated that a group of closely 
integrated countries will get better outcomes if they apply a fixed exchange rate regime to 
each other. 
A country should join a monetary union if the benefits outweigh the costs of doing 
so. In terms of benefits, Mundell (1961) showed that a common currency lowers 
transaction costs and currency risk coming from currency exchange arising from exchange 
rate fluctuations and volatility of prices. A common currency stimulates international trade, 
capital flows, investment, economic growth and employment among countries joining the 
union. Madhur (2004) showed that trade is stimulated between countries in the OCA and, 
hence, the intra-regional trade volume and trade openness of a country will be greater 
under a fixed exchange rate regime after joining the OCA, rather than by having a flexible 
exchange rate regime but operating outside the OCA. However, the cost of the OCA is that 
members have to cede their independence on monetary and exchange rate policy in dealing 
with unexpected shocks (Bayoumi & Mauro 2001), causing potential problems in attaining 
internal (full employment and price stability) or external equilibrium (current account 
balance) (Kwan 1998).  
Arising from the benefits and costs of forming an OCA, previous studies noted some 
criteria that need to be considered. First, an OCA can be established if the shocks are 
highly correlated among participating countries, meaning that responses of macroeconomic 
variables to such shocks are similar among member countries (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 
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1963; Kenen 1969; Tower & Willett 1970; Fleming 1971; Bayoumi & Mauro 2001). A 
common monetary and exchange rate policy can deal with such shocks for every member 
country
29
. Another criterion for establishing an OCA was indicated by Kwan (1998); that is 
a mechanism, such as a high degree of intra-regional economic interdependence in trade, 
capital and labour mobility, able to deal with macroeconomic imbalances (such as a trade 
imbalance) coming from asymmetric shocks. In addition, Kwan pointed out that if member 
countries have synchronised business cycles then a common monetary policy can help 
them achieve internal balance.  
Lim and McAleer (2004) indicated that economic convergence is a precondition for a 
successful currency union. They showed that economic convergence happens when lower 
income countries can catch up to the high economic growth of higher income countries in 
the OCA. Xu et al. (2008) showed that economic convergence is affected by the stability 
of three major variables, namely per capita GDP, inflation and the exchange rate because, 
first, GDP per capita is a main indicator with which to measure convergence. Second, if 
inflation is similar between members then an OCA is feasible because member countries 
can conduct the same economic policies (Laabas & Limam 2002, cited in Xu et al. 2008, 
p.119). Finally, stability of the real exchange rate promotes trade and investment which in 
turns increases the chance of attaining a successful OCA (De Ocampo 2004, cited in Xu et 
al. 2008, p.119). 
The issue of an OCA has been investigated in some regions such as the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COSMESA), East Asia and ASEAN. A good 
example is the study by Njoroge et al. (2011) who examined whether it is feasible to have 
a monetary union for COMESA, by testing for the degree of symmetry in business cycles 
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 The exchange rate policy is all currencies are fixed to one another. 
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from 1990-2009. They compared the responses of output and consumer price to internal 
(demand and supply) and external (exchange rate) shocks between countries in COMESA 
by using a VAR model. The authors found that in terms of output volatility, a monetary 
union for this region is feasible because the responses of output of each member country to 
shocks are symmetric.   
In addition, by using a VAR model to investigate the symmetry of macroeconomic 
disturbances in East Asia, some studies found that it is impossible for this area to have a 
common currency because the responses to shocks by member countries are quite 
dissimilar due to differences in economic structure and stages of development. 
Nevertheless, small sub-regions in East Asia satisfy the prerequisite for an OCA (Bayoumi 
& Eichengreen 1994; Ling 2001; Kim 2007; Lee & Azali 2009; Nguyen 2010). A good 
example is the analysis by Kim (2007) who examined whether it was possible for an East 
Asian currency union between the ASEAN 4 (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the 
Philippines), China, Japan and South Korea. Kim found that the macroeconomic shocks 
affecting these countries are heterogeneous. Moreover, the macroeconomic responses to 
shocks are asymmetric. Hence, the results did not favour a monetary currency union 
among ASEAN countries or Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan and South Korea). 
Nonetheless, the outcome supports a currency union between China and Hong Kong. 
However, this study did not investigate the responses of variables to shocks under different 
exchange rate regimes and therefore, the symmetry responses may originate from the 
difference in exchange rate regime that each country applied. These studies, however, did 
not take into account the role of the exchange rate regime in investigating the 
symmetry/asymmetry in responses of variables to shocks. 
Nguyen (2010) examined the feasibility and desirability of forming an optimal 
currency area for East Asia, including the ASEAN 5, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong 
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Kong and Taiwan by checking the symmetry of shocks
30
. He found that in comparison to 
Europe, East Asia is less suited to a currency area because shocks in East Asia are more 
asymmetric than that of Europe. Nevertheless, a subgroup of East Asia including South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, is more plausible for a 
currency union because the shocks are quite synchronised. Furthermore, he concluded that 
if output volatility is driven mostly by regional shocks then a common currency is 
desirable. However, a common currency might not be wanted if volatility is affected 
mainly by country-specific shocks because a common policy is not enough to deal with 
asymmetric shocks and so a common currency will be costly.  
The idea of a single currency area for ASEAN was also considered in the study by 
Bunyaratavej and Hahn (2003). They showed that a common currency can make ASEAN 
countries resilient to future currency shocks and stability of exchange rates. They also 
indicated that a common currency plays a role in eliminating exchange rate risks which in 
turn creates a better trade and investment climate for ASEAN. Some studies indicated that 
the differential level of economic development of ASEAN is an obstacle to forming a 
common currency because income disparities can result in political and economic 
instability for the region (Bunyaratavej & Hahn 2003; Madhur 2004; Ramayandi 2005).  
By considering both types of β and σ convergences, Bunyaratavej and Hahn (2003) 
found that it was impossible for ASEAN to form a currency union because, firstly, their 
results for β convergence showed that lower income ASEAN countries did not seem to 
grow faster than the higher income countries
31. Moreover, the result for σ convergence 
indicates a high degree of GDP per capita divergence was evident among these countries
32
. 
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 ASEAN 5 includes Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
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 σ convergences is used to measure the convergence in GDP per capita where β convergence measures 
convergence in growth rates. 
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 A similar conclusion can be found in the following studies: (Bayoumi et al. 2000; Bayoumi & Mauro 
2001; Madhur 2004; Ramayandi 2005). 
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They concluded that low income ASEAN countries need many decades to catch up with 
average income per capita. Nonetheless, they showed that sub-groups such as the ASEAN6 
could be ideal for a common currency
33
.  
While most studies explored separately the convergence and symmetry of shocks, Xu 
et al. (2008) conducted a test for both economic convergence and symmetry of shocks to 
investigate whether it is feasible for the ASEAN 5 (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia) or a subgroup to have a common currency. In this study the 
nominal exchange rate, the real GDP growth rate and inflation were all used to test for 
economic convergence. The authors employed three types of shocks, namely domestic 
demand shocks, domestic supply shocks, external shocks and a SVAR model to test for the 
symmetry of shocks
34
. For the first precondition-economic convergence, the findings 
indicated that there are convergences in the nominal exchange rate and inflation of the 
ASEAN3 sub-group (Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand). However, there was no 
convergence found in terms of real GDP for the ASEAN-5 
For the second precondition, the authors examined the correlation of growth and 
inflation, correlation of demand and supply shocks and the correlation of the responses of 
variables to shocks. The findings indicated there is a high degree of correlation of growth 
and inflation in the ASEAN-5. Moreover, these five countries also exhibited a positive 
correlation in terms of external shocks. Nonetheless, only Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand had correlations to supply and demand shocks. Hence, based on the results of 
both criteria, they concluded that it is reasonable for these countries, but not the ASEAN-5, 
to be a common currency area.  
Xu et al. (2008) also pointed out that it is not easy to establish a currency union for 
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 ASEAN6 includes Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
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 The authors state that the correlation of external shocks should be taken into account because of their 
openness, which makes ASEAN countries vulnerable to external shocks. 
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all ten ASEAN countries primarily because of the large gap in economic development 
(GDP per capita). In particular, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei have a much 
higher GDP per capita than Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). In 
addition, these countries have very diverse exchange rate regimes ranging from a hard peg 
to a freely floating regime. It is difficult for the 10 ASEAN countries to agree on a 
common exchange rate regime as well as for lower income countries to catch up to higher 
income countries. One important dimension that is absent from this study is that the 
exchange rate regime plays a role in the behaviour of macroeconomic variables to shocks 
and, hence, at different stages of development, members of the AEC are likely to respond 
differently to external shocks. If they should not fix their exchange rates to each other, they 
may have to pursue their own optimal exchange rate regime given these shocks and 
minimise the effect on output variability and economic growth. By doing so they would 
then in aggregate reduce the income gap. Nevertheless, no recommendations on what is the 
best exchange rate regime for each ASEAN country to narrow the income gap were made 
by this study. Furthermore, this study was lack of direction for ASEAN members to 
achieve internal income equality and, in particular, income equality across members. 
3.5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
AND THE INCOME GAP  
3.5.1. Relationship between macroeconomic variables and between-countries 
income gap 
The income gap between countries has been considered in the literature in terms of 
income convergence or income divergence. Income convergence occurs when income gap 
falls, and income divergence means an increase in the income gap (Svedberg 2004). The 
“catch-up effect” theory assumes that the income per capita between lower and higher 
income countries will converge when the lower income country grows faster than the 
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higher-income country. 
 According to Park (2000) income convergence means that the gap in per capita 
incomes among nations narrows over time. He also indicated that to attain convergence, 
poorer countries need to grow faster than richer ones. The capital flows from higher 
income countries to lower income countries because of diminishing marginal returns to 
capital and the gap in relative endowments of capital between the rich and the poor 
countries. Therefore, the capital flow plays a role in increasing growth in lower income 
countries and then reducing the income gap. In the literature, economic growth is affected 
by shocks and the exchange rate regime plays a role in transmitting the effect of shocks to 
economic growth. Hence, this study did not indicate which exchange rate regime poor 
countries can implement to reduce the income gap more quickly. 
ECB (2015) indicated that macroeconomic stability is the first condition for 
sustainable real convergence, which is when GDP per capita of poorer countries catches up 
GDP per capita of richer countries. Schiavo (2008) pointed out that income convergence 
across countries relates to low volatility of the real exchange rate while income divergence 
is associated with high instability of the real exchange rate. Nonetheless, these studies only 
showed the correlation between macroeconomic stability and between-countries income 
gap. These studies did not find a strong relationship between the income gap and 
macroeconomic instability originating from shocks under different exchange rate regimes.   
3.5.2.  Relationship between macroeconomic variables and within-country income 
gap 
The relationship between economic growth and within-country income gap has been 
investigated in the literature. Kuznets (1955) hypothesised a nonlinear relationship 
between economic development and income inequality. In particular, income inequality is 
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higher at the premature stage of economic development; however, it is lower at the 
developed economic stage. This implies that income inequality increases during the rapid 
growth phase and may come down at higher levels of economic development. Kuznets 
(1955) hypotheses have been tested and analysed by many empirical studies which found 
that the stage of development determines the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) found a negative 
relationship between income inquality and economic growth. In particular, income 
inequality hinders economic growth in low-income countries  
Nevertheless, the link between income inequality and economic growth has been 
found to be positive. Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) showed that income equality 
lowers economic growth in high income countries. Shin (2012) explained that income 
redistribution from the rich to the poor in these countries discourages the rich from 
working harder or aiming to achieve more wealth. Additionally, the rich in these countries 
have a higher rate of saving than the poor and hence the saving rate of the economy falls 
when there is redistribution in favour of the latter. This reduces investment and economic 
growth.  
Stiglitz (2012) pointed out that output volatility may have adverse impacts on income 
inequality via direct and indirect channels. The direct channel is that output volatility 
causes unemployment in which the least skilled workers are more negatively affected. This 
is because firms prefer to retain skilled personnel to reduce training costs in periods of 
economic downturn. This leads to income disparity between skilled and unskilled workers. 
In terms of the indirect channel, Stiglitz argued that entrepreneurs need high-risk premiums 
in a highly unstable economy, and so they have to lower wages or increase profits to attain 
a similar level of investment on average. This leads to income disparity between 
entrepreneurs and workers. Alternatively, volatility produces a lower level of investment, 
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which then compromises economic growth, resulting in less being spent on public 
education and social welfare policy, which is important to the poor. 
Bulíř (2001) demonstrated that inflation is a factor affecting income inequality. 
There are two types of workers, those who work with a nominal wage contract and those 
who work with an inflation-adjusted wage contract. The inflation protected wage group 
can get higher income relative to the unprotected group. As a consequence this widens the 
income inequality. He found that the current level of income inequality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient, is affected by past inflation. He pointed out that price stability has a 
nonlinear positive impact on income distribution. In particular, income inequality reduces 
remarkably if inflation decreases from hyperinflation levels. However, income inequality 
decreases insignificantly if inflation declines from an already low level. This study, 
however, did not consider the effects of shocks that are one of the factors causing inflation, 
on income inequality. In addition, the effects of inflation on income inequality were not 
investigated under different exchange rate regimes, to better understand which exchange 
rate regime causes greater or less income inequality. 
Within-country income inequality is also affected by the real exchange rate. 
Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua (2001) investigated the impact of the real exchange rate 
on income per capita inequality between urban and rural areas in China. They found that 
rural households consume a greater share of non-tradable goods whereas more tradable 
goods are consumed by urban families. A real depreciation of the domestic currency 
increases the price of tradable goods. As a result the consumer price in the city rises faster 
than in the country. This narrows the income gap between urban and rural areas. Moosa 
(2005) showed that the “real exchange rate may be a proxy for the distribution of income 
among workers in the traded and non-traded goods sectors” and hence the real exchange 
rate contributes to the fluctuation of income inequality. This occurs via the transmission of 
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real exchange rate changes to the price of tradable and non-tradable goods. 
3.6. RESEARCH GAP IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of research gaps have been identified in the literature and these are 
explained in more detail here. Firstly, ASEAN countries are now indeed linked to the 
world economy via a variety of channels such as the goods market and financial market, 
resulting in these countries responding differently to shocks. Most studies considered just 
one type of shock such as a TOT shock, world real oil price shock or real interest rate 
shock. Therefore, the question is: can the findings on the superiority of an exchange rate 
regime be implied for one specific type of shock or should this be for all types of shock? 
The literature assumes that the response of the economy may differ depending on the 
nature of the shock. However, there have been scant empirical studies considering various 
types of shocks, especially the inclusion of a foreign trade shock, across exchange rate 
regimes. Therefore, a comparison of the effects and contribution of different shocks on 
variables under different exchange rate regimes has not been conducted. To fill this gap in 
our knowledge, this study will take into account various types of shock coming from 
different channels such as a foreign demand shock, world real oil price shock, and foreign 
real interest rate shock. This study also compares the effects and contribution of shocks on 
variables according to each type of exchange rate regime. 
Second, the role of exchange rate regimes on the behaviour of macroeconomic 
variables arising from exogenous shocks has been examined in the literature. The 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and the income gap (between and within 
countries) has been separately investigated. However, the importance of the exchange rate 
regime in transmitting the effects of exogenous shocks to income gaps (between and within 
countries) has not yet been analysed. This is important where countries wish to engage in 
closer economic integration and recognise the importance of closing income and 
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development gaps such as within the context of ASEAN. 
Third, any investigation of the impact of external shocks on ASEAN members has 
been limited to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. No study has 
covered this issue for all ten ASEAN countries as yet. Additionally, these studies have not 
considered the effects of external shocks on the income gap (between and within ASEAN 
countries) although Masron and Yusop (2008) found that external shocks simply increased 
the income gap between ASEAN countries. Furthermore, they did not incorporate the 
importance of different exchange rate regimes when investigating the impacts of external 
shocks on ASEAN member country economies. Moreover, the superiority of an exchange 
rate regime was concluded based on some criteria, these being output stability, price level 
stability, consumption stability and economic growth. However, an additional policy 
priority such as income equality that ASEAN countries are seeking to achieve has not been 
addressed in previous studies.  
Finally, as mentioned by Kim and Papi (2005), a de facto exchange rate regime is 
preferable to a de jure exchange rate regime and there is competition among 
methodologies in classifying a de facto exchange rate regime. Previous studies have 
employed some classifications of the exchange rate regime such as the de facto of Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), the de facto of Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and the de facto of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Although the IMF has reclassified the de jure to the de facto 
exchange rate regime since 1999, this new classification has not been employed in 
investigating the superiority of different exchange rate regimes in terms of buffering the 
effects of exogenous shocks. Using a different methodology to classify different exchange 
rate regimes may lead to varying results in regard to the superiority of an exchange rate 
regime. Hence, this study will apply the IMF’s new de facto classification to examine the 
responses of macroeconomic variables to shocks across different exchange rate regimes. 
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By doing so, this study provides additional empirical evidence on the merits and problems 
associated with different exchange rate regimes. 
3.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has reviewed the literature relating to the superiority of fixed or flexible 
exchange rate regimes based on comparing the responses of macroeconomic variables to 
different exogenous shocks. It can be seen from the literature that the optimal exchange 
rate regime depends on the type of shock, the policy priority for the choice of optimal 
exchange rate regime (e.g. output, price, exchange rate, trade balance and income gap 
volatility) and the country’s characteristics. The superiority of an exchange rate regime has 
also been scrutinised using OCA theory which is linked to the issue of regional integration 
in the context of ASEAN countries. This chapter has also reviewed the literature on the 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and the income gap (between and within 
countries). These links suggest the role of the exchange rate regime on the behaviour of the 
income gaps. 
However, from the literature review it can be seen that no study to date has 
investigated the effect of the exchange rate regime on the income gap. Additionally, the 
effects and contribution of external shocks on ASEAN economies and their income gaps 
under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime have not to date been investigated. 
Moreover, no empirical study has investigated the transmission of foreign trade shocks to 
ten ASEAN countries as a group through the exchange rate regime channel. 
There are two types of exchange rate regime classifications, namely de jure and de 
facto exchange rate regimes. The de jure classification may lead to biased results because 
there is inconsistency between the intervention actions of monetary policy-makers and the 
policy commitment. Although the de facto classification fails to distinguish whether the 
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stability of the exchange rate comes from the policy commitment or from the absence of 
shocks, it can control for the difference between the commitment and the intervention of 
authorities in the foreign exchange market.  
Although the IMF reclassified the de jure regime to a de facto regime in 1998, the 
latter has not been applied previously in studies on the choice of exchange rate regime. 
Therefore, this is the first study to do so for the ASEAN nations, in order to understand 
which is the best exchange rate regime that can minimise the negative effects of external 
shocks on real GDP, the real exchange rate, price level and between-countries and within-
country income gap for ASEAN countries? 
Finally, to address these research gaps this study will apply a panel vector 
autogressive model and the IMF’s de facto exchange rate regime to examine the responses 
of macroeconomic variables such as output, the real exchange rate, inflation and income 
gap (between and within nations) to external shocks under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes for ASEAN member countries. To investigate the contribution of external shocks 
on the volatility of variables under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime, this method 
is also used to generate variance decomposition of variables under a fixed and a flexible 
exchange rate regime. The specification of the panel vector autogressive model will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
This study is conducted to fill the research gaps under the following framework: 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, this study will fill the knowledge gap in the 
literature by investigating and comparing the impacts and contribution of various types of 
external shocks on output, price level, real exchange rate, between-countries and within-
country income gap under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. As well, this study 
compares between the effects and contribution of these shocks on macroeconomic 
variables under each exchange rate regime.  
We consider various external shocks such as a world real oil price shock, foreign 
demand shock and foreign real interest rate shock. There are some reasons for choosing the 
case of oil price shocks. Firstly, Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015) indicated that the change in 
oil price affects macroeconomic variables via its impacts on supply channels such as 
production, manufacturing and distribution cost. An increase in the oil price can result in 
contraction in output and aggregate supply due to the increase in production costs. 
Furthermore, an increase in the oil price leads to higher costs for consumption and 
expenditure by households, which subsequently reduces wealth. As a result, less prosperity 
reduces expenditure and demand for goods and services. They also pointed out that oil is 
an input for production and the distribution of goods and services and, hence, an increase 
in the oil price leads to higher price levels and inflation. Moreover, a change in the oil 
price affects the exchange rate and, in particular, a higher oil price leads to an appreciation 
of an oil-exporting country’s currency due to the increase in demand for that currency.  
We decide to also choose a foreign demand shock because of the following reasons. 
Firstly, Lindert and Pugel (1996) indicate that an international trade shock is the major 
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form of external shocks
35
. They indicate that it is actually a movement in an economy’s 
exports or imports. Furthermore, it was indicated in Chapter 2 that international trade plays 
an important role in the economic growth of ASEAN countries because most ASEAN 
countries are export-led growth oriented and have high trade openness. In addition, foreign 
demand shocks are considered to be common shocks that countries experience (Dollar & 
Kraay 2004). Finally, it was a major channel that transmitted the impact of the GFC into 
the ASEAN countries’ economies (Sangaré 2016).  
Finally, we investigate the effects of a foreign real interest rate shock because it is 
one of the most crucial mechanisms by which international shocks are conveyed from 
advanced economies to small open economies (Zhang et al. 2014). The importance of a 
foreign real interest rate shock to ASEAN countries is increasing because these nations are 
increasingly better integrated into the world’s financial markets and receive rising capital 
flows. 
The choice of other variables, namely real output, price level, real exchange rate, 
between-countries and within-country income gap occur for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the real exchange rate is chosen because any fluctuation in the real exchange rate will be 
treated as a misalignment, which can trigger macroeconomic instability. Secondly, Little 
(1993) points out that instability in the real exchange rate can seriously undermine growth 
and lead to uncertainty resulting in adverse effects on investment. Price and output 
volatility to foreign demand shocks are also examined because, as Serra and Stiglitz (2008) 
indicate,  output growth and price stability are key indicators of macroeconomic stability. 
Finally, we examine the behaviour of the between-countries and within-country income 
gap because it is particularly important for the ASEAN countries as they seek to achieve 
closer integration between their economies. 
                                                          
35
 They define international trade shocks as arising from exogenous changes in the country’s current account 
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This chapter aims to illustrate the nature of the data used in this study, to test the 
stationarity of the dataset and the methodology employed. Moreover, this chapter 
constructs two empirical models for ASEAN countries, which are presented in Section 4.2. 
The first model -  for the between-countries income gap - is established for evaluating the 
effects and contributions of external shocks on variations of real GDP, real exchange rate, 
the price level and income gap across ASEAN countries  fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. The second model - for the within-country income gap - will examine the impacts 
and contribution of external shocks on the behaviour of real GDP, real exchange rate and 
price level and income gap within ASEAN countries under fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes. Importantly, we aim to separately investigate the responses of the income gap 
across countries and within-countries to external shocks under fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes. This is done because to the best of our knowledge no existing theory has yet 
considered the relationship between between-countries income gap and within-countries 
income gap. Hence, we do not consider the feedback effect from changes and interaction of 
between-countries and within-country income gaps. Section 4.3 presents the data collection 
and, tests for stationarity and cointegration. To examine the effects and contribution made 
by external shocks to the fluctuation of variables, this chapter will apply a structural vector 
autoregressive model (SVAR), which is presented in Section 4.4. Finally, conclusions will 
be presented in Section 4.5. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE ASEAN COUNTRIES 
This section outlines two empirical models, namely the model for the between-
countries income gap and the model for the within-country income gap for ASEAN 
countries. In both models, we highlight the relationship between the key variables, these 
being external shock (EX), real output (y), price level (𝑃), real exchange rate (e) between-
countries income gap (BI) and within-country gap (WI) under fixed and flexible exchange 
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rate regimes. Broda (2004) points out that, in theory, small countries are price takers on 
global markets. ASEAN countries are predominantly small economies and, hence, this 
study assumes that external shocks are not affected by fluctuations occurring in individual 
ASEAN economies. In the models for ASEAN countries, external shocks are not affected 
by their output, price level, real exchange rate and income gap (between and within 
countries). 
4.2.1. Output equation 
Output responds differently to external shocks across different exchange rate 
regimes. A good example is that of Lindert and Pugel (1996) who showed that a decline in 
foreign demand reduces real domestic output. They state that a negative foreign demand 
shock results in domestic currency depreciation and, hence, under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the central bank will intervene by selling foreign exchange reserves and buying 
domestic currency. They indicated that if this intervention is not supported by sterilisation 
then the money supply will decline, and real national product will further fall. Nonetheless, 
under a floating exchange rate regime, a government does not intervene, and this will 
improve domestic competitiveness which then leads to: firstly, an increase in exports; and 
secondly, a decrease in imports. As a result, economic growth and income will improve. 
In terms of another external shock, namely a world interest rate shock, Hoffmann 
(2007) pointed out that a rising world real interest rate leads to a depreciation of the 
domestic real exchange rate. Under a floating exchange rate regime, the real depreciation 
results from nominal depreciation which leads to the falls in the relative price of domestic 
to foreign goods in terms of domestic currency. This helps to mitigate the negative impact 
of the world output shock and stabilises domestic economy output. However, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the real depreciation is caused by deflation, which results in 
adjustments in the real economy.  The real depreciation of domestic currency under a fixed 
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regime can be explained whereby the increase in world real interest rate causes capital 
outflow. This leads to an increase in the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, a country’s 
central bank intervenes to buy the domestic currency with foreign reserves, the domestic 
money supply falls and this puts downward pressure on demand for output and then the 
price. As a result the real exchange rate has depreciated.  
To differentiate the behaviour of output to external shocks, inflation and the real 
exchange rate between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime, variables in the 
equation for economic growth will be interacted with dummy variables for the fix and the 
flexible exchange rate regime. The equation for the behaviour of output of the model for 
between-countries income gap is: 
∆𝑦 =  𝑎11∆𝐸𝑋+𝑎12∆𝑃 + 𝑎13∆𝑒𝑟      (4.1) 
where ∆𝑦 is real GDP growth, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑃 is the change in price 
level, ∆𝑒𝑟 is change in the real exchange rate.  
The output equation of the model for within-country income gap is similar to that 
concerning the model for between-countries income gap. However, as indicated in Chapter 
3, it is evident that economic growth depends on within-country income inequality. In 
particular, changes in income inequality can have a negative or positive impact on 
economic growth depending on the development stage of a country. Hence, the equation 
for output behaviour concerning the model for within-country income gap is as follows: 
∆𝑦 =  𝑎11∆𝐸𝑋+𝑎12∆𝑃 + 𝑎13∆𝑒𝑟 + 𝑎14∆𝑊𝐼     (4.1)’ 
where ∆𝑦 is real GDP growth, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑃 is the change in price 
level, ∆𝑒𝑟 is change in the real exchange rate, ∆𝑊𝐼 is the change in within-country income 
gap.  
4.2.2. Price level equation 
External shocks have different effects on the price level under fixed and flexible 
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exchange rate regimes. For example, Lindert and Pugel (1996) argue that under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, a central bank has to buy domestic currency to prevent depreciation, 
which is a consequence of a negative foreign demand shock. They show that this 
intervention results in a decline in the domestic money supply, which in turn lowers the 
price level. Nonetheless, under a floating exchange rate regime, a depreciation of the 
domestic currency increases the domestic price level due to the rise in price of imports in 
terms of domestic currency.  
The price level also depends on output. In particular, a higher real GDP growth can 
increase the demand for transactions purposes and this may lead to higher price level. The 
price level is also affected by changes in the real exchange rate. An appreciation of the 
domestic currency leads to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports. As a result, the 
current account deteriorates and domestic aggregate demand falls. This plays a role in 
reducing the price level.  
The equation for the price level for both models, between-countries income gap and 
within-country income gap, is illustrated as follows: 
∆𝑃 = a21∆𝐸𝑋 + a22∆𝑦 + a21∆𝑒𝑟       (4.2) 
where ∆𝑃 is the change in price level, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑦 is real GDP 
growth, ∆𝑒𝑟 is the change in the real exchange rate.  
4.2.3. Real exchange rate equation 
The behaviour of real exchange rate under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate 
regime depends on external shocks. A good example is that Lindert and Pugel (1996) 
argued that a decline in foreign demand for exports can deteriorate the current account 
which may worsen the overall balance
36
. There is no change in the nominal exchange rate 
under a fixed exchange rate regime as the central bank will intervene by buying domestic 
                                                          
36
 They assume that there is no change in the capital account. 
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currency on the foreign exchange market. This intervention decreases the money supply 
and lowers the price level. A consequence of this is that the real exchange rate increases. 
Similarly, under a floating exchange rate regime, deterioration in the overall trade balance 
arising from a negative foreign demand shock leads to a depreciation of the nominal and 
real exchange rate. However, the response of the real exchange rate to the shock is stronger 
and faster under a floating than under the fixed exchange rate regime because the nominal 
exchange rate can adjust immediately while prices tend to adjust more slowly. 
The mechanism that output affects the real exchange rate is different across the 
exchange rate regimes. An increase in domestic output leads to an increase in imports and 
a deterioration in the trade balance which then causes a nominal depreciation. If the central 
bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange market such as under a floating exchange 
rate regime then the nominal depreciation results in a real domestic currency depreciation. 
Nonetheless, if the central bank intervenes to maintain a fixed exchange rate by buying 
domestic currency, then the intervention may lead to a fall in the price level in the case of 
no sterilisation. Consequently, this brings about the real exchange rate depreciation.  
The real exchange rate depends on the price level. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime the real exchange rate is affected by fluctuations of prices whereas both the 
domestic price level and nominal exchange rate play a role in the case of a flexible 
exchange rate regime
37
.  
Therefore, the equation for the real exchange rate in the model for between-countries 
income gap can be written as follows: 
∆𝑒𝑟 = 𝑎31 ∆𝐸𝑋 + 𝑎32 ∆𝑦 + 𝑎33∆𝑃      (4.3) 
where ∆𝑒𝑟 is the change in the real exchange rate, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑦 is 
real GDP growth, ∆𝑃 is the change in price level.  
                                                          
37
 This assumes that no change will occur in the foreign price level. 
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The real exchange rate equation developed in the model for within-country income 
gap is similar to that for the between-countries income gap. Nonetheless, Min et al. (2015) 
and Garcia (1999) find that income inequality affects the real exchange rate (see the 
discussion in Section 3.5) and hence the equation for the within-country income gap model 
is: 
∆𝑒𝑟 = 𝑎31 ∆𝐸𝑋 + 𝑎32 ∆𝑦 + 𝑎33∆𝑃 + 𝑎34 ∆𝑊𝐼    (4.3)’ 
where ∆𝑒𝑟 is the change in the real exchange rate, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑦 is 
real GDP growth, ∆𝑃 is the change in price level, ∆𝑊𝐼 is the change in within-country 
income gap.  
4.2.4. Income gap equation 
4.2.4.1. Between-countries income gap equation 
Section 3.5 indicated that economic growth plays an important role in the income 
gap between countries. In particular, if the economic growth of poorer countries is higher 
than that of richer countries then this income gap will shrink. Therefore, external shocks 
may affect the income gap between ASEAN countries via its impacts on output. A good 
example of this is when a negative export demand shock results in a decrease in export 
revenue and then economic growth and income, which in turns has an impact on the 
income gap between ASEAN countries. Under different exchange rate regimes, external 
shocks result in varied responses of macroeconomic variables (see Section 3.3) which then 
may lead to changes in between-countries income gap. For instance as stated in Section 
4.2.1, Lindert and Pugel (1996) opine that the recovery of output to a negative foreign 
demand shock is quicker under a flexible rather than a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Therefore, a lower income country which is hit by a foreign demand shock can recover 
more quickly under a flexible regime. This means a lower income country can reduce the 
income gap quickly if it applies a flexible exchange rate regime. 
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 Another example is that as indicated in Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3, where a 
negative foreign demand shock leads to different impacts on the price level and the real 
exchange rate under a flexible as compared to a fixed exchange rate regime. As a 
consequence, the difference in the behaviour of the price level and real exchange rate to the 
shocks between the fixed and the flexible exchange rate regime leads to differences in the 
behaviour of exports, imports, investment and per capita income. This situation thereby 
results in differences when changes occur in the between-countries income gap scenario 
between the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes
38
.  
The estimated equation of the between-countries income gap is given by: 
𝐼𝐺 = 𝑎41∆𝐸𝑋+𝑎42∆𝑦+𝑎43∆𝑃 +𝑎42∆𝑒𝑟     (4.4) 
where IG is the between-countries income gap, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑦 is real 
GDP growth, ∆𝑃 is the change in price level, ∆𝑒𝑟 is change in the real exchange rate. 
4.2.4.2. Within-country income gap equation 
External shocks may play a role in the context of within-country income inequality. 
Sumarto and Moselle (2015) indicated that the shock hurts poor households because they 
have little in the way of savings and this puts them at great risk of falling into poverty due 
to the economic shocks.  
Aizenman and Pinto (2005) pointed out that the source (exogenous, semi-exogenous 
such as TOT shock and domestic) and nature of shock affects within-country income 
disparity via different channels and intensity. They exampled that through the labour 
income channel, rural population tends to be affected by a decrease in commodity price 
shock and natural disasters. Nevertheless, urban population is more affected by financial 
shock via falls in asset prices. They also showed that the effects of macroeconomic 
volatility and shocks on income inequality depend on initial conditions such as the 
                                                          
38
 The income gap in this study refers to the difference in income per capita between countries. 
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exchange rate regime, degree of international integration such as trade openness, access to 
international capital markets and type of shock. However, this study did not show how 
shocks affect the within-country income gap under different exchange rate regimes.  
Laursen and Mahajan (2005) indicated that the lower income group may be more 
vulnerable to shocks than the higher-income group, mainly because the lower income 
group includes unskilled workers whose incomes mainly come from labour earnings and 
government transfers. Therefore, a negative foreign demand shock results in a decrease in 
export and government revenue which in turn may reduce government subsidies for the 
poor. Moreover, their lower level of assets and limited access to the financial market do 
not shield workers against employment shocks which are caused by a decline in export 
demand by other countries. As a result, a negative foreign demand shock can cause greater 
income inequality. However, this study did not discuss the case that a negative foreign 
demand shock may generate more income equality. It is because a decline in exports may 
disproportionately impact skilled workers and profits for entrepreneurs and hence, this 
could reduce income inequality. 
Other studies point out that inequality depends on economic growth, openness, real 
exchange rate and price stability. A good example is that Aizenman and Pinto (2005) 
showed that inflation and the real exchange rate are the main variables affecting income 
inequality because they affect the real wage, capital gain/loss, income transfers and 
employment among different income groups and economic sectors. In addition, as 
mentioned in chapter 3 that more non-tradable goods are consumed by rural households 
compared with urban households and therefore, devaluation make consumer prices 
increase more sharply in urban area than in rural area. This reduces income inequality 
between urban and rural area. 
The model for within-country income gap is: 
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 ∆𝑊𝐼 = 𝑎41∆𝐸𝑋+𝑎42∆𝑦+𝑎43∆𝑃+𝑎42∆𝑒𝑟     (4.4)
’ 
where ∆𝑊𝐼 is within-country income gap, ∆EX is an external shock, ∆𝑦 is real GDP 
growth, ∆𝑃 is the change in price level, ∆𝑒𝑟 is change in the real exchange rate.  
4.3. DATA AND STABILITY TEST 
4.3.1. Data source and definition 
To estimate the empirical model, 160 annual observations are collected from 10 
ASEAN countries from 1999 to 2014. As stated in Chapter 2, ASEAN was formed in 1967 
by Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. It was then further 
expanded to other countries, namely Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), 
Cambodia (1999) and Myanmar (1997). Due to the accession of Cambodia in 1999, this 
year is chosen for the starting year of the dataset. Moreover, it is the year in which the IMF 
began to release its de facto exchange rate regime classification which is used for the 
conduct of the empirical analysis of this study. The year 2014 was chosen as the end of the 
data period because at the time we collected data, data for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar 
and Vietnam after 2014 were not available.  
Variables used for the empirical analysis are external shocks (including foreign 
demand, world real oil price and foreign real interest rate), real output, the price level, real 
exchange rate, exchange rate regime, between-countries income gap and within-country 
income gap. Foreign demand is proxied by world real output. For the oil price, we follow 
Al-Abri (2013), who calculated the world real oil price by employing the average of three 
spot prices, namely Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh. These 
were measured by USD per barrel, then converted into the local currency and adjusted by 
CPI. The data are collected from World economic Outlook (WEO) of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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For the world real interest rate, we follow Hoffmann (2007) and Zhang et al. (2014) 
who calculated the average world real interest rate by GDP weighted sums of the G7 
countries’ real interest rates. The real interest rate of each G7 country is the short-term 
nominal interest rate, adjusted for inflation expectations. The data are taken from the 
OECD website.  
Real output-GDP, real exchange rate-ER, consumer price index-CPI, between-
countries income gap (BI) and within-country income gap (WI) are collected from the 
IMF, World Bank, UNDP and ADB. The details of the sources and measurement are 
presented in Table C3 in Appendix C. Real GDP, the real exchange rate and between-
countries income gap are calculated by the following formulas: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 =
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐶𝑃𝐼
       (4.5) 
where real GDP is real gross domestic product; nominal GDP is nominal gross 
domestic product; CPI is the consumer price index.   
The real exchange rate is calculated as: 𝑅𝐸𝑅 = 𝑒
𝐶𝑃𝐼∗
𝐶𝑃𝐼
    (4.6)  
where RER is the real exchange rate to the United States dollar; e is the nominal 
exchange rate to the United States dollar
39
 which is expressed as units of domestic 
currency per one unit of the US’s currency; CPI* is the consumer price index of the United 
States; and CPI is the consumer price index of the ASEAN countries. 
There are two main types of real convergence, specifically beta (β) convergence and 
sigma (σ) convergence. Lim and McAleer (2004) indicated that σ convergence is a more 
accurate index for measuring income convergence between countries while β convergence 
is just a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for reducing the income gap over time. In 
                                                          
39 The nominal exchange rate to the USD is employed because the USD accounts for 80-95% of the basket 
of foreign currencies in the foreign reserves of ASEAN countries (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Ilzetzki et al. 
2009, cited in Allegret et al. 2012). 
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addition, Kaitila (2013) showed that sigma convergence is a simple and unambiguous 
measurement for calculating  convergence. Moreover, he indicates that it is not linked to 
any specific growth model. For this reason this study will apply the formula of sigma 
convergence in output series that is applied by Lim and McAleer (2004) to calculate the 
income gap between countries
40
. 
𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦
∗
𝑡
        (4.7) 
 where 𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 is the income gap of country i at time t; 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is real GDP per capita based 
on purchasing power parity (PPP) for country i at time t; 𝑦𝑡
∗ is the average real GDP per 
capita based on PPP for the ten ASEAN countries such that 𝑦𝑡
∗ =
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
10
𝑖=1
10
  (4.8) 
The income gap will change for a period of time; in particular: 
𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡+1 = µ𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡         (4.9) 
The income gap between country i and the sample group will reduce if µ < 1 and 
vice versa. 
  Trade openness, which is measured by total exports and import to GDP, can affect 
the trade balance which then affects the real exchange rate, inflation and real GDP which 
in turns affect the income gap. Therefore, we will employ data on trade openness for the 
conduct of a sensitivity analysis. 
4.3.2. Exchange rate regime classification 
The exchange rate regimes of the ASEAN countries, which are based on the de facto 
classification of the IMF, are summarised in Table C1 in Appendix C. The definition of 
these exchange rate regimes is presented in Table C2 in Appendix C. Following Ghosh 
(2014), this study accepts the three-way classifications of the exchange rate regime, 
including fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes. In particular, the fixed 
                                                          
40
 Most of the studies measure income as per capita GDP but is adjusted by PPP (Svedberg 2004). 
 
102 
 
exchange rate regime category includes - a country not having separate legal tender, 
operating a currency board and operating with a conventional fixed exchange rate regime. 
The intermediate exchange rate regime includes a peg with horizontal bands, crawling 
pegs, crawling band, stabilised arrangement and other managed arrangements. Finally, the 
floating exchange rate regime contains an independent float (or free floating) and managed 
floating with no predetermined band (or floating). Based on this three-way classification, 
the exchange rate regimes of ASEAN countries are grouped and documented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: ASEAN countries and their exchange rate regimes 
Countries Fixed years Intermediate years Floating years 
Brunei 1999-2014   
Cambodia  2009-2012 1999-2008, 2013-2014 
Indonesia  2010, 2012 1999-2009, 2011, 2013, 2014 
Lao PRD  2008-2014 1999-2007 
Malaysia 1999-2004  2005-2014 
Myanmar 1999-2000 2008-2014 2001-2007 
Philippines   1999-2014 
Singapore  2009-2014 1999-2008 
Thailand   1999-2014 
Vietnam 2005-2007 1999-2000, 2008-2014 2001-2004 
Source: Data from 1999-2014 is from AREAER and grouped following Ghosh (2014) 
Dividing the exchange rate regimes of the ASEAN countries into fixed, intermediate 
and floating regimes results in a small data set for each exchange rate regime and this may 
affect the robustness of the empirical results derived. Hence, similar to Broda (2004) and 
for econometric purposes, the exchange rate regimes of the ASEAN countries are 
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condensed  into two regimes, fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, where the flexible 
exchange rate regime encompasses the intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes.  
4.3.3. Descriptive statistics  
To provide more insights into the data before conducting the empirical analysis in 
Chapter 5, this section presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample and two 
separate cases, namely the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in Table 4.2. It can be 
seen from the standard deviation in Table 4.2 that for the whole sample, in terms of 
external shocks, the world real oil price shock is subject to the most volatility, followed 
by a foreign real interest rate shock. Considering the fluctuation of domestic variables, 
real GDP is the most volatile, followed by the real exchange rate.  
The whole data is spilt into fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Comparing 
the standard deviation of domestic variables between the fixed and flexible regime, it can 
be seen that most of the variables, except within-country income inequality are more 
volatile under a flexible rather than a fixed exchange rate regime. There is no difference 
in the variation of CPI between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime.  
It can be seen from Table 4.2 that under a fixed exchange rate regime, all variables, 
except between-countries income gap, have right tails because they have positive 
skewness. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, foreign demand, world real oil price, 
CPI and within-country income gap are negatively skewed whereas other variables are 
positively skewed. The positive kurtosis value of variables in both exchange rate regimes 
shows that all variables have heavier tails and sharper peaks compared to the normal 
distribution. Meanwhile, probability shows that the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution is rejected at the 1% significance level for all variables under both exchange 
rate regimes based on the Jarque-Bera test. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Probability 
Whole sample 
WO 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.001 0.013 -1.25 5.46 97.28 0.0000 
OIL 9.03 8.00 14.43 3.48 3.77 0.11 1.36 18.27 0.0000 
IR 0.35 0.27 2.75 -1.92 1.43 0.14 1.86 9.25 0.0000 
GDP 4.90 5.0 11.43 -1.77 3.72 0.04 2.37 3.11 0.2116 
CPI 4.46 4.55 5.04 2.71 0.37 -1.92 8.66 369.59 0.0000 
ER 5.02 3.82 10.15 0.17 3.72 0.08 1.34 21.94 0.0000 
BI -0.79 -1.14 1.58 -2.60 1.22 0.62 2.13 17.99 0.0001 
WI 0.67 0.66 0.93 0.40 0.13 0.10 2.21 5.24 0.0729 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime  
 WO 0.01 0.00 0.056 -0.001 0.02 2.16 6.01 219.10 0.0000 
OIL 0.89 0.00 14.31 0.00 2.37 3.46 17.36 2012.37 0.0000 
IR 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 2.27 10.59 521.90 0.0000 
GDP 0.12 0.00 10.19 -1.77 1.59 4.73 29.22 6151.35 0.0000 
CPI 0.69 0.00 4.63 0.00 1.65 1.92 4.73 140.23 0.0000 
ER 0.27 0.00 10.07 0.00 1.31 6.71 49.21 18329.73 0.0000 
BI 0.07 0.00 1.58 -2.56 0.57 -0.33 10.73 476.52 0.0000 
WI 0.12 0.00 0.86 0 0.29 1.96 4.97 153.38 0.0000 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime  
   WO 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.001 0.02 -0.79 2.45 22.20 0.0000 
OIL 8.14 7.92 14.43 0.00 4.78 -0.38 1.91 13.78 0.0010 
IR 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.33 2.30 6.11 0.0472 
GDP 4.77 4.42 11.43 0.00 3.52 0.35 2.22 8.69 0.0130 
CPI -0.69 0.00 0.00 -4.63 1.62 -1.92 4.73 140.23 0.0000 
ER 4.75 3.78 10.15 0.00 3.84 0.10 1.36 21.68 0.0000 
BI -0.87 -1.08 1.26 -2.60 1.02 0.45 2.30 10.24 0.0006 
WI 0.54 0.61 0.93 0.00 0.26 -1.11 3.30 39.69 0.0000 
Note: WO: World output; OIL: World real oil price; IR: Foreign real interest rate; GDP: real GDP, 
ER: real exchange rate, CPI: Consumer price index, BI: Between-countries income gap, WI: Within-
country income gap. 
Source: Author 
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Table 4.2 highlights some differences in mean values between fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes. In particular, CPI increases under a fixed exchange rate regime 
but decreases under a flexible exchange rate regime. This shows there is inflation in a 
fixed exchange rate regime but deflation in a flexible exchange rate regime. In addition, 
real GDP is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime. Besides, the real exchange rate 
is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime. Furthermore, a country with a fixed 
exchange rate regime has greater income than the average income of the 10 ASEAN 
countries. However, the income of a country with a flexible exchange rate regime is lower 
than the average income of the group. Finally, the within-country income inequality is 
higher under a flexible exchange rate regime than under the fixed version.  
4.3.4. Unit root test 
4.3.4.1. Theoretical approach of the unit root test for panel data 
Before conducting the statistical analysis all the variables are tested for a unit root. 
There is a plethora of tests for panel stationarity such as Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) (LLC), 
Harris–Tsavalis (1999) (HT), Breitung (2000), Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) (IPS), Fisher-type 
(Choi 2001) and Hardi LM (2000).  
Generally, the panel model for a unit root test is: 
yit = ρiyi,t−1 + z
′
itγi + εit       (4.10) 
 where yit is the variable to be tested for the existence of a unit root; i = 1,… , N are 
cross-section units, t = 1,… , T is the time index; z′itγi is a panel fixed effect. 
For most of the tests (LLC, HT, Breitung, IPS and Fisher-type), the null hypothesis 
for a panel unit root test is H0: pi = 1 (data have a unit root or are non-stationary) and the 
alternative hypothesis is HA: pi < 1 (data does not have a unit root and are stationary for 
one panel or some panels or all panels). However, in the Hardi LM test, the null hypothesis 
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is that all panels are stationary while the alternative hypothesis is that at least some panels 
are non-stationary. There are important differences between the types of tests. First, 
unbalanced data are permitted in the IPS, Hardi and Fisher-type tests while the remaining 
tests can only be applied to balanced datasets
41
. Second, some tests, such as the LLC, HT 
and Breitung tests assume that the autoregressive parameters (ρ) are common for all cross-
sections while other tests have panel-specific (fixed effect) autoregressive parameters. 
Finally, the size of panels, N and time series T, is also different between the different types 
of tests. In particular, the LLC test is suitable for a moderate dataset with a smaller number 
of cross-sections relative to time periods. The HT test can be applied to the dataset with a 
large number of cross-sections. The Breitung, Fisher and Hardi tests are appropriate for a 
panel with a long time series. The IPS test can be applied for the case of any number of 
cross-sections and time periods.  
The size of the sample always plays an important role in determining which test is 
suitable. It can be seen that the Breitung, Fisher, HT and Hardi tests are not appropriate for 
this study because both the number of cross-sections and time series are small. The data 
used in this study satisfy the sample size requirement of the LLC and IPS tests. However, 
the LLC test depends on restrictions on the common autoregressive parameters which is 
relaxed in the IPS test (Li & Liu 2005). This study includes data for ten ASEAN countries 
so the IPS test can deal better with the heterogeneity of the sample. Therefore, this study 
uses the IPS test to test for a unit root. 
4.3.4.2. Results from the unit root tests 
Variables tested for stationarity are all in logarithmic form, except for foreign 
demand, world real interest rate and between-countries income gap. Prior to conducting the 
unit root test, the series of these variables for each of the ten ASEAN countries are graphed 
                                                          
41
 A balanced dataset means that each cross-section has a similar number of observations. 
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to determine whether they have an intercept and/or a trend. The graphs indicate that all 
variables have intercepts but no trend
42
. However, the series will be tested for a unit root 
with an intercept. 
The results from the unit root test are summarised in Table 4.3
43
. It can be seen from 
Table 4.3 that at the 5% level of significance, foreign demand and the world real oil price 
are stationary at a particular level while the foreign real interest rate, real GDP, real 
exchange rate, CPI, between-countries and within-country income gap are stationary in 
terms of first differences. 
 
Table 4.3: Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) unit root test results 
Variables Prob. at level Prob. at first difference 
Foreign demand 0.0000  
World real oil price 0.0488  
Foreign real interest rate 0.0991 0.0000 
Real GDP 0.8701 0.0000 
Real exchange rate 0.7611 0.0000 
CPI 0.3049 0.0000 
Between-countries income gap (BI) 1.0000 0.0000 
Within-country income gap (WI) 0.0894 0.0000 
Source: Author 
4.3.5. Cointegration test  
 Engle and Granger (1987) showed that non-stationary variables may be linear 
stationary. This means that these variables are co-integrated and have a long-term 
relationship. This section will test for co-integration between the I(1) variables, namely 
                                                          
42
 See Figure C1in Appendix C. 
43
 Detailed results of the unit root tests are shown in Table C4 in Appendix C. 
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foreign real interest rate, real GDP, real exchange rate, CPI, between-countries income gap 
and within-country income gap. There are three widely used methods to conduct a co-
integration test for panel data, these being the Pedroni (1999, 2004), Kao (1999) and Fisher 
(1932) methods.  
The Pedroni (1999, 2004) test allows for heterogeneous intercepts and trend 
coefficients across cross-sections. The regression function is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗1𝑖𝑥1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗2𝑖𝑥2𝑖,𝑡 +⋯+ 𝜗𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡   (4.11) 
where 𝛼𝑖and 𝛾𝑖 are the intercept and trend coefficients; y, x are integrated of order 
one; t is the time period with t=1,…, T; i is cross-section with i=1,…,N; m=1, …, M; 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is 
a residual. 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡        (4.12) 
The null hypothesis of no co-integration requires 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 to be integrated of order one 
I(1), meaning that 𝜑𝑖=1. There are two alternative hypotheses, firstly, the homogenous 
alternative (𝜑𝑖<1) for every i and secondly, the heterogeneous alternative (𝜑𝑖<1) 
Although the Kao (1999) test follows a similar approach to that of the Pedroni test, 
the intercept is heterogeneous for cross-sections and the parameters are homogenous across 
cross-sections. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡        (4.13) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡        (4.14) 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡        (4.15) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is heterogeneous; 𝜗 is homogenous across cross- sections. 
109 
 
Using the Fisher (1932) method, the results for individual cross-section cointegration 
tests are combined to obtain the result for the full cross-sections. 
This study is conducted for ten ASEAN countries which are heterogeneous in terms 
of their economic development. Hence, the Pedroni (1999, 2004) test is employed because 
it allows for heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across the cross-sections. The 
co-integration test for the between-countries income gap model is conducted for the 
foreign real interest rate, real GDP, real exchange rate, CPI and between-countries income 
gap. In the model for within-country income gap, the foreign real interest rate, real GDP, 
real exchange rate, CPI and within-country income gap are used for the co-integration test. 
The detailed results of the co-integration tests are shown in Table C5 and Table C6 in 
Appendix C. Results of the co-integration tests are summarised in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
Table 4.4: Panel cointegration test for the between-countries income gap model 
Dependent variable Panel rho-Statistic Prob. 
Foreign real interest rate 1.88 0.9700 
Real GDP 2.04 0.9793 
Real exchange rate 1.29 0.9020 
CPI 1.35 0.9114 
Between-countries income gap 1.84 0.9675 
 
Table 4.5: Panel cointegration test for the within-country income gap model 
Dependent variable Panel rho-Statistic Prob. 
Foreign real interest rate 1.16 0.8763 
Real GDP 1.46 0.9273 
Real exchange rate 1.38 0.9172 
CPI 0.89 0.8138 
Within-country income gap 0.94 0.8253 
It can be seen from Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 that all the outcomes are insignificant at 
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the 5% significance level. This means that the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot 
be rejected. Consequently, there is no long-term relationship between the I(1) variables. 
Consequently, the VAR model will be estimated without imposing a cointegration 
relationship between the I(1) variables. 
4.4. METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Structural vector autoregressive model 
This section describes the SVAR methodology which is widely employed by 
previous studies, for example Broda (2004), Zhang et al. (2014), Chia et al. (2012)
44
. The 
structural model has been expressed as a panel VAR in these studies. According to Canova 
and Ciccarelli (2013), the structure of panel VARs is the same as the VAR model in which 
all variables are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent
45
. However, a cross 
sectional dimension has been added and therefore the representation of panel VAR 
becomes: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑖(𝑡)+𝐴𝑖(𝐿)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where i=1,…, N (countries, sectors or markets); t=1,…, T (time). 
The methodology SVAR is ideal for examining the effects and contribution of 
external shocks to macroeconomic variables. This methodology will be used to investigate 
the response of economic growth, inflation, real exchange rate and income gap to foreign 
demand shocks under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes for ASEAN economies. 
The SVAR methodology is applied in this study because it can be used “to determine the 
dynamic responses of different economic variables to disturbances” (Bruneau & De Bandt 
2003). Added to this, SVAR is employed because it is a useful tool that can investigate the 
model’s dynamics when unexpected shocks occur (Gottschalk 2001). Furthermore, 
                                                          
44
 Pedroni (2013) has proposed a method investigating the decomposition and impulse responses into 
member-specific idiosyncratic and common structural shocks that drive the cross-sectional dependence 
among members. However, this method is outside the scope of my study. Hence, I follow Broda (2004), Chia 
et al. (2012), Zhang et al. (2014) which allow comparison of my results with past studies to be made. 
45 The respresentation of VAR:  Yt=A0t+ALYt-1+ut where A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator 
(Canova & Ciccarelli 2013). 
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although the standard VAR model is a tool that examines the responses of endogenous 
variables to shocks, SVAR is better because, in the former model, endogenous variables 
are only explained by their lag values whereas the latter explains contemporaneous effects 
among endogenous variables (Pfaff 2008). Bruneau and De Bandt (2003) showed that 
these instantaneous effects are hidden in the correlation structure of the covariance matrix 
derived from the vector of innovation in the standard VAR model
46
.  
A SVAR model can be expressed in the following way as illustrated below: 
|
1 𝑎12
𝑎21 1
… … 𝑎1𝑛
… … 𝑎2𝑛
. .
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. … .
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. … .
… … 𝑏𝑛𝑛
| (
𝑢1𝑡
𝑢2𝑡
.
𝑢𝑛𝑡
)        (4.16) 
Or in the form: 
𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑡        (4.17) 
where:  𝑌𝑖𝑡: (nx1) vector of stationary endogenous variables 
A: (nxn) matrix of structural parameters for the contemporaneous link between 
variables. 
B: a diagonal matrix that describes the contemporaneous responses of endogenous 
variables to shocks. 
A(L): (nxn) matrix of polynomial lag operators of order k. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡: (nx1) vector of structural innovation or structure errors with var(𝑢𝑖𝑡)=Ω. 
                                                          
46
 The standard form or reduced form of the VAR model is 𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑝
𝑡
𝑝=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 where 𝑦𝑡are 
endogenous variables; 𝑥𝑡: exogenous variables; 𝑦𝑡−𝑝: lagged endogenous variables; 𝑢𝑡: vector of innovations; 
𝐴𝑝 and B are matrices of coefficients. 
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The SVAR model (4.17) can be estimated by transforming it into a reduced form or 
standard VAR. Pre-multiplying SVAR by 𝐴−1, we get: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴
−1𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴
−1𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑡       (4.18) 
Set 𝐷(𝐿) = 𝐴−1𝐴(𝐿); 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴
−1𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑡, yields the reduced form as follows 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡        (4.19) 
To construct the matrix A it is necessary to impose an identification restriction. 
There are two issues when imposing identification restrictions. First, does the model have a 
recursive or non-recursive structure? Second, does the model require short-run or long-run 
restrictions to be imposed?  
For the first issue, the recursive model is known as Choleski decomposition, in which 
the restriction is imposed so that the value of the latter variable does not have a 
contemporaneous effect on the previous variable. Stock and Watson (2001) assert that in 
recursive VAR, the error term of the subsequent equation is not correlated to the error term 
of the previous equation. Hence, the dependent variable of the first equation is a function 
of lagged values of all variables. The dependent variable of the second equation is a 
function of lagged values of all variables plus the current value of the dependent variable 
in the first equation. Similarly, the dependent variable of the third equation is a function of 
lagged variables of all variables plus the current value of dependent variables of the first 
and second equations. In the non-recursive VAR, contemporaneous relationships between 
variables (or restrictions) are based on economic theory. 
With regard to the second issue, an identification strategy can be implemented by 
imposing short-run and/or long-run restrictions. Schwert (2009) showed that the 
identification restriction in the short-run commonly has the form Ae=Bu. Long-run 
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restrictions are proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1988). Schwert (2009) indicates that the 
long-run response to structural innovation has the following form: 
C=Ψ̂∞A
−1B           (4.20) 
where Ψ̂∞=(I − Â1 −⋯− Âp)
−1 is the forecast accumulated responses to the 
reduced form shocks. The author shows that long-run restrictions are imposed in the form 
of zero restrictions in elements of matrix C. The restriction Cij = 0 shows that the j-th 
structural shock has no long-run accumulated impact on the response of the i-th variable 
(Schwert 2009).  
This study will apply the non-recursive VAR model because the contemporaneous 
relationship of variables is based on economic theory. This study considered the short-run 
restriction because output is not affected by demand shocks in the long-run (Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen 1992). 
4.4.2. Contemporaneous restrictions 
 We estimate the panel SVAR model for between-countries income gap as follows 
𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 = cit + 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡        (4.21) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
(
 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
∆𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 )
 
 
 is a column vector of stationary endogenous variables, 
including external variables (foreign demand, the logarithm of the world oil price and first 
difference of the foreign real interest rate), first differences of the logarithm of output, 
logarithm of the price level, logarithm of the real exchange rate and the first difference of 
the between-countries income gap. In terms of external shocks, a foreign demand and 
world real oil price will be estimated at level whereas foreign real interest rate is estimated 
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at first difference. Importantly, we aim to separately investigate the effects of different 
types of external shocks to avoid the interaction between external shocks. 
Here, A is a contemporaneous matrix, A(𝐿) are 5x5 matrices of polynomials in the 
lag operator of order k and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = (𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑅, 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝐼) is a vector of structural 
errors; 𝑐it: country specific effect.  
Similarly, the panel SVAR model for within-country income gap as follows: 
𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 = cit + 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡        (4.22) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
(
 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
∆𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
∆𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡 )
 
 
 is a column vector of stationary endogenous variables, 
including external variables (foreign demand, the logarithm of the world oil price and first 
difference of the foreign real interest rate), first differences of the logarithm of output, 
logarithm of the price level, logarithm of the real exchange rate and the first difference of 
the logarithm of within-country income gap. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = (𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑅 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐼) is a 
vector of structural errors; 𝑐it: country specific effect. 
The SVAR model for ASEAN countries with short-run restrictions is based on 
 Aeit = Buit. The links between innovations uit and structural shocks eit are symbolised as 
follows. The matrices that are presented in the following studies include three values. First, 
a zero value indicates no relationship exists between variables. Second, a unity value 
shows the contemporaneous relationship of the variables themselves. Finally, the 
remaining variables indicate a contemporaneous relationship between variables. A good 
example is that aij indicates that variable j wields a contemporaneous impact on variable i.  
The SVAR model for between-countries income gap for ASEAN countries with 
short-run restrictions is based on  Aeit = Buit or 
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|
|
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   (4.23) 
Similarly, the SVAR model for within-country income gap for ASEAN countries 
with short-run restrictions is based on  Aeit = Buit or 
|
|
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   (4.24) 
As  indicated by Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015), most of the ASEAN countries are 
small economies and, hence, foreign variables are not affected instantaneously by changes 
in domestic variables. Therefore, external shocks are assumed to have a contemporaneous 
impact on domestic variables whereas domestic variables have no effects on external 
shocks. Hence, we assume that in both models a12=a13 = a14=0.  
The real exchange rate responds rapidly to related economic changes and, hence, it is 
affected contemporaneously by other variables in the economic system. In addition, the 
movement of the real exchange rate is influenced by changes in the nominal exchange rate 
and/or price. Therefore, this study assumes that the real exchange rate is affected 
instantaneously by foreign demand, economic growth and inflation. However, the real 
exchange rate has no contemporaneous effect on economic growth and inflation. Manalo et 
al. (2015) explained that this is because firms need time to adjust prices and make 
production decisions in response to changes in the exchange rate. Hence, regarding the 
between- countries income gap and within-country income gap models, this amounts to 
imposing the restrictions that a24=a34=0. 
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Similar to Gumata and Ndou (2017), this study assumes that growth responds slowly 
to inflation whereas inflation is affected instantaneously by economic growth. Hence, for 
both models we assume a23=0. Following Lim and McAleer (2004), the between-countries 
income gap in this study is calculated based on GDP per capita and subsequently this study 
assumes that changes in output, which affects GDP per capita immediately affect the 
between-countries income gap. Following Partridge (2005), this study assumes that the 
level of economic development has contemporaneous impacts on within-country income 
gap.  
 In addition, due to the assumption of contemporaneous effects of external shocks on 
output which then exerts contemporaneous impacts on the between-countries and within-
country income gap, a foreign demand shock is assumed to have an instantaneous impact 
on the income gap. Based on the immediate effect of the real exchange rate on domestic 
and foreign income, as shown in Section 2.2.4, this study assumes that the real exchange 
rate has a contemporaneous impact on the income gap. Moreover, as a consequence of the 
immediate impact of the price level on the real exchange rate, this study assumes that the 
price level has a contemporaneous effect on the income gap.  
However, it is assumed that the between-countries and within-country income gaps 
have no contemporaneous effect on external shocks, output, price level and real exchange 
rate because in reality the fluctuations of four of these variables are not directly affected by 
the between-countries and within-country income gap
47
. Hence, in both models we have 
made the assumption a15=a25=a35 = a45=0. 
Based upon the above assumptions, the SVAR model for between-countries gap 
model will become: 
                                                          
47
 It is stated by Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Ramos and Roca‐Sagales (2008) that economic growth 
seems to only respond to fluctuations of inequality in the long-run. This is because within-country income 
inequality needs time to make an impact on economic growth via human capital accumulation. 
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𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋 + ∑ 𝑎11
𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋      (4.25) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 −𝑎21
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴2(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃     (4.26) 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼 − 𝑎31
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎32
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  + 𝐴3(𝐿)Y𝑖𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼    (4.27) 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑅 − 𝑎41
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎42
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑎43
0 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴4(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑅  (4.28) 
𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝐼 − 𝑎51
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎52
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑎53
0 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−𝑎54
0 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝐴5(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑅 (4.29) 
Similarly, the SVAR model concerning the within-countries income gap will 
become: 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋 + ∑ 𝑎11
𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑋      (4.30) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑎21
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴2(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃     (4.31) 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼 − 𝑎31
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎32
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  + 𝐴3(𝐿)Y𝑖𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼    (4.32) 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑅 − 𝑎41
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎42
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑎43
0 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴4(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑅  (4.33) 
𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡=𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐼 − 𝑎51
0 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑎52
0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑎53
0 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−𝑎54
0 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴5(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐼 (4.34) 
Following Broda (2004), the exchange rate regime is grouped into two groups, 
specifically fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, as mentioned previously. The 
flexible exchange rate regime encompasses the intermediate and floating exchange rate 
regimes. To distinguish the fluctuation of variables between different exchange rate 
regimes, Yit will be interacted with dummy variables for different exchange rate regimes 
(Dpeg=0 if fixed and Dflex=1 if a flexible exchange rate regime). 
Hence, the SVAR model is as follows: 
Yit = Cit + 𝐴peg(L)Yit ∗ Dpeg+𝐴flex(L)Yit ∗ Dflex + 𝑒it   (4.35) 
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4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework and a structural VAR model. To 
contribute to the existing literature and extend it, this chapter has devised two empirical 
models that are applicable to ASEAN countries. The first model - model for the between-
countries income gap - highlights the relationship between variables, namely external 
shocks, output, real exchange rate, price level and between-countries income gap. The 
relationship between external shocks, output, real exchange rate, price level and within-
country income gap has also been illustrated for the within-country income gap model. 
This study has also examined issues concerning the SVAR model’s contemporaneous 
short-run and long-run restrictions and two types of SVAR forms, recursive and non-
recursive. The SVAR model for ASEAN countries takes a non-recursive form because it 
can overcome the limitations of the recursive form in which the contemporaneous 
relationships between variables are permitted based on economic theory. 
To estimate the empirical model, 160 annual observations have been collected for the 
10 ASEAN countries covering the period from 1999 to 2014. Data are collected from 
accurate and reliable sources, these being the IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD and UNDP. 
Based on the de facto exchange rate regime of the IMF, the exchange rate regimes of the 
ASEAN countries are divided into fixed, intermediate and floating regimes. However, due 
to the small sample size for each of these three exchange rate regimes (fixed, intermediate 
and floating), they are, instead, grouped into two exchange rate regimes, namely a fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regime (which includes intermediate and floating exchange rate 
regimes).  
From an empirical perspective, it emerged that all variables are not normally 
distributed. Moreover, the world oil price has experienced the most fluctuations compared 
to other external shocks. In terms of domestic variables, real GDP exhibits the most 
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volatility. Most of the variables fluctuate by more under a flexible rather than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Before conducting the empirical analysis, the stationarity of 
endogenous variables was tested using the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test. The results 
indicate that the foreign real interest rate, real GDP, real exchange rate, CPI, between-
countries and within-country income gaps are stationary at first difference while foreign 
demand and world real oil price are stationary in the level.  
 Engle and Granger (1987) in their study contended that non-stationary variables may 
be linear stationary. Hence, the Pedroni (1999, 2004) co-integration test was applied to the 
two models to examine whether there is a long-run relationship between the non-stationary 
variables. Results from the co-integration tests show there is no co-integration among the 
foreign real interest rate, real GDP, real exchange rate, CPI, between-countries and within-
country income gap. Finally, based on the outcomes of unit root and co-integration tests, 
the SVAR model is estimated at the level for foreign demand and world real oil price. In 
addition, the model will be estimated with the first difference of the foreign real interest 
rate, real GDP, real exchange rate, inflation, between-countries and within-country income 
gap. The results from this estimation are presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE BETWEEN-
COUNTRIES INCOME GAP MODEL 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the SVAR model for ASEAN countries 
constructed in Chapter 4. This chapter aims to investigate and compare the impacts of a 
negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock on real GDP, the price level, real exchange rate and between-
countries income gap between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime for all 10 
ASEAN countries. In this study, a negative foreign demand shock is proxied by a one 
standard deviation fall in world real output. A positive world real oil price shock is proxied 
by a one standard deviation increase in the world real oil price. A positive foreign real 
interest rate shock is proxied by a one standard deviation increase in the foreign real 
interest rate. 
In doing so, we use the impulse response function to capture the dynamic response of 
each variable under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime to each type of shock. 
Another objective of this chapter is to investigate and compare the degree to which each 
type of shock influences the fluctuation of each variable under a fixed and a flexible 
exchange rate regime. To obtain the desired results, the variance decomposition will be 
used for each variable under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Notably, in this study, real GDP and CPI are estimated in the first difference of 
logarithm form, which turns out to be economic growth and inflation. The rise/fall in 
economic growth means there is an increase/decrease in real output. As well, the 
increase/decrease in inflation means an increase/decrease in the price level. Hence, we use 
interchangeably the terms increase/decrease in real GDP and increase/decrease in 
economic growth. The interchangeability is also applied to the scenario of an 
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increase/decrease in price level and increase/decrease in inflation. It is worth noting that 
this interchangeability was applied in other studies and in particular the first difference of 
logarithm of these variables. For example, see Broda (2004), Zhang et al. (2014), Basnet 
and Upadhyaya (2015), Zaidi et al. (2013), Al-Abri (2013), Hoffmann (2007) and Chia et 
al. (2012). 
To obtain the desired empirical results, EVIEWS-8 software will be used to estimate 
the Structural VAR model. The research methodology involves the following steps: 
(1) Conducting lag length selection and stability. There are some criteria for 
choosing the optimal lag length
48
. Due to the limited data observations, however, this study 
does not consider higher order lags. The optimal lag length also needs to satisfy stability. 
Therefore, the AR Characteristic Polynomial test will be applied to check the stability of 
the SVAR model. If the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle then the model satisfies the 
stability requirement.  
(2) Testing the exogeneity of external shocks by using the Granger causality test. In 
Chapter 4, it was assumed that external shocks are exogenous because ASEAN countries 
are price takers and, therefore, their domestic macroeconomic variables have no effect on 
foreign demand. To identify this assumption, a Granger causality test is applied to 
determine whether there is a causal relationship between domestic variables and external 
shocks. 
  (3) Reporting the results of impulse response to compare the responses of variables 
to each type of external shock between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
                                                          
48
 namely LR: sequential modified LR test statistic, FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike information 
criterion, SC: Schwarz information criterion, HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
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(4) Reporting the results of variance decomposition so that the contribution of each 
type of shock on the fluctuation of variables under a fixed and a flexible regime can be 
evaluated. 
(5) Conducting robustness tests by changing the order of the price level and the real 
exchange rate in the contemporaneous matrix.  
 This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the lag length selection 
and stability check. The investigation of exogeneity is described in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
discusses the empirical results. Section 5.5 concludes the discussion of this chapter. 
5.2. LAG LENGTH SELECTION AND STABILITY CHECK 
Due to limited data observations, this study does not consider higher order maximum 
lags. This study considers 7 lags as maximum lags. Table 5.1 summarises the results for 
the optimal lag length which are chosen using some specific criteria
49
. 
Table 5.1: Results for optimal lag length 
 LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
Foreign demand shock 
1 lag  x  x x 
7 lags x  x   
World real oil price shock 
1 lags    x x 
7 lags x x x   
Foreign real interest rate shock 
1 lag    x  
4 lags     x 
5 lags x x x   
6 lags x x x  x 
7 lags x x x x x 
Source: Author 
                                                          
49
 namely LR, FPE, AIC, SC and HQ 
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Considering the foreign demand shock, it can be seen from Table 5.1 that HQ, SC 
and FPE suggests a lag length of 1 while 7 lags are chosen by LR and AIC. We choose 1 
lag for estimating SVAR because it is chosen by more criteria. This lag length also satisfies 
the stability requirement
50
.  
In terms of an oil price shock, 1 lag and 7 lags are selected. 1 lag is selected by the 
SC and HQ criteria. This lag length satisfies the requirement for stability. Although 7 lags 
are selected by more criteria (namely LR, FPE and AIC) than the 1 lag length, it does not 
satisfy the requirement of stability because some roots lie outside the unit circle
51
. Hence, 1 
lag is chosen for the oil price shock model. 
Referring to the foreign real interest rate shock, at first we conduct a lag selection 
with a maximum of 7 lags. It emerges that all criteria select 7 lags as the optimal lag 
length. However, model with 7 lags does not satisfy the stability requirement because some 
roots lie outside the unit circle. Hence, we implement another lag selection with a 
maximum of 6 lags. This lag length also does not satisfy the requirement of stability. 
Therefore, maximum of 5 lags is chosen for conducting the lag selection. The result 
indicates that the optimal lag length can be 1 lag, 4 lags and 5 lags. However, the stability 
condition does not satisfy with 5 lags. Hence, we conduct a likelihood ratio (LR) test to 
decide whether the optimal lag is 1or 4
52
. The findings indicate that the model with 1 lag is 
the best. Therefore, we choose 1 lag for estimating SVAR. This lag length also satisfies the 
                                                          
50
 See Figure D1 in Appendix D. 
51
 See Table D2 and Figure D2 in Appendix D. 
52
 The likelihood ratio test statistic is LR
*
=2*{lr(m2)-lr(m1)}, where lr(m1): likelihood of restricted model (1 
lag); lr(m2): likelihood of unrestricted model (4lags). From the VAR estimation, we have lr(m2)=1146.52 
and lr(m1)=1330.6. We then compare LR
*
 and the critical value with the Chi distribution, 75 degrees of 
freedom at α=5% (104.88). If LR*> critical value then we reject the null hypothesis that the restricted model 
is better than the unrestricted model. Hence, we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the model 
with 1 lag is better than the model with 4 lags. 
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stability requirement
53
. To conclude, 1 lag is chosen for the model dealing with the foreign 
demand, world real oil price and foreign real interest rate shocks.   
5.3. EXOGENEITY OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
Table 5.2: Granger causality test for the between-countries income gap model 
 Chi-sq Prob. 
1. Foreign demand with 1lags   
Real GDP does not Granger-cause foreign demand 8.67E-07 0.9993 
CPI does not Granger-cause foreign demand 2.506 0.1132 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause foreign demand 0.3531 0.5523 
Between-countries income gap does not Granger-cause foreign 
demand 
0.5497 0.4584 
2. Oil price with 1 lags   
Real GDP does not Granger-cause world real oil price 0.1084 0.7420 
CPI does not Granger-cause world real oil price 0.2705 0.6030 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause world real oil price 0.1679 0.6820 
Between-countries income gap does not Granger-cause world 
real oil price 
0.3014 0.5830 
3. Foreign real interest rate shock with 1 lag   
Real GDP does not Granger–cause foreign real interest rate  0.0248 0.8749 
CPI does not Granger-cause foreign real interest rate 0.7982 0.3716 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause foreign real interest 
rate 
0.5848 0.4444 
Between-countries income gap does not Granger-cause foreign 
real interest rate 
0.0013 0.9713 
Source: Author 
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, most of the ASEAN countries are small economies 
and, hence, it is assumed that domestic variables have no effect on external shocks. Like 
previous studies such as those by Hoffmann (2007), Chia et al. (2012), Al-Abri (2013), 
Zhang et al. (2014) and Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015), we have tested the exogeneity of 
                                                          
53
 See Figure D1 in Appendix D. 
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external shocks by using a causality test. This study applies the Granger causality test. The 
results are summarised in Table 5.2. At the 5% significance level, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that each variable (namely real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and between-
countries income gap) does not Granger-cause external shocks. Thus, the results suggest 
that none of the variables, namely real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and between-
countries income gap, Granger-cause external shocks. This outcome confirms the 
assumption that the domestic variables of the 10 ASEAN countries have no effect on 
external shocks. 
5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
5.4.1. Impulse response function 
According to Zhang et al. (2014), impulse response function describes the behaviour 
of one variable to one shock of another variable in the system, while assuming other types 
of shocks equal zero.  Figure 5.1 below shows the impulse responses and accumulated 
impulse responses of real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and between-countries income gap 
to a negative one standard deviation foreign demand shock under a fixed (left-hand panel) 
and flexible exchange rate regime (right-hand panel).  
The solid line indicates the impulse response function while the dashed lines depict 
the 90% confidence intervals (with 5th and 95th percentiles). An analytic (asymptotic) 
response standard error is applied to generate the impulse response of variables to foreign 
demand shocks over 20 periods.  
i. Foreign demand shock 
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 Fixed ERR Flexible ERR 
a. Real GDP 
Impulse 
response 
  
Accumulated 
impulse 
response 
  
b. Price level 
Impulse 
response 
   
Accumulated 
impulse 
response 
  
c. Real exchange rate 
Impulse 
response 
  
 
Accumulated 
impulse 
response 
  
d. Between-countries income gap 
Impulse 
response 
 
  
 
Accumulated 
impulse 
response 
  
Figure 5.1: Impulse response of a negative foreign demand shock  
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Figure 5.1a compares the impulse response and accumulated impulse response of 
real GDP to a positive foreign demand shock under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. It can be seen that a negative unanticipated foreign demand shock leads to a 
contemporaneous real output decline under both exchange rate regimes. This is consistent 
with the literature which agrees that negative foreign demand shocks decrease exports and 
output. As well, the economic policies of the ASEAN countries are generally export-driven 
and hence the decrease in foreign demand leads to an output contraction through export 
channels. The shock has a more prolonged effect on real output when a flexible exchange 
rate regime is operating. In particular, the shock lasts for 9 periods under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, but just 3 periods under a fixed exchange rate regime. In addition, 
the response is observed to be more volatile under a flexible regime than under a fixed 
regime. This is confirmed by the fact that under the fixed exchange rate regime real GDP 
declines contemporaneously by 0.19%, but decreases by 0.21% under the flexible 
regime
54
.  
The finding that real output experiences a larger fluctuation more so under a fixed 
regime rather than a flexible exchange rate regime is consistent with the findings of Shi et 
al. (2015). They show that two important trade characteristics of some ASEAN countries 
that affect the superiority of a flexible exchange rate regime in buffering the foreign 
demand shock in terms of real output are “weak input substitution between local labour 
and import intermediated inputs in traded goods production” and “extensive use of foreign 
currency in export pricing”. These characteristics restrain the adjustment role of the 
exchange rate, which makes the flexible exchange rate regime become inferior compared 
to a fixed exchange rate regime. To explain this, in the short-run, the prices of exported 
goods are fixed in terms of foreign currency and hence, the devaluation as a result of a 
negative foreign demand shock cannot improve export competitiveness. Furthermore, 
                                                          
54
 See Table D6 and Table D7 in Appendix D for the results. 
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aggregate output in the trade sector is fully affected by foreign demand shocks when export 
prices are fixed. On the production side, low substitutability between imported inputs and 
domestic inputs weakens the expenditure-switching effect in input substitution. This means 
cost of imported inputs is mostly affected by the devaluation. A benefit of the flexible 
exchange rate regime in buffering the effect of the shock on real output vanishes. 
Meanwhile, cost of imported inputs is not affected by changes of exchange rate under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. It means that a negative foreign demand shock reduces output 
contemporaneously more under a flexible rather than under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In terms of accumulated responses, the shock leads to lower economic growth under 
a fixed exchange rate regime. Economic growth also decreases under a flexible exchange 
rate regime but just in the short-run. Over the longer term horizon, the shock generates 
higher economic growth under a flexible exchange rate regime.  
The greater output fluctuation under a flexible exchange rate regime in this study 
differs from those documented in previous studies, such as Lindert and Pugel (1996), 
Broda (2004), Chia and Alba (2006), Hoffmann (2007), Chia et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. 
(2014), who find that the instantaneous output contraction is greater under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. A good example of this is the work by Lindert and Pugel (1996), 
which shows that a negative foreign demand shock results in domestic currency 
depreciation and, hence, under a fixed exchange rate regime the central bank will intervene 
by selling foreign exchange reserves and buying the domestic currency. They indicate that 
if this intervention is not supported by sterilisation then the money supply will decline and 
real national product will further decline. Nonetheless, the non-intervention of a 
government under a floating exchange rate regime will improve domestic competitiveness, 
which leads to rising exports and falling imports. As a result, real domestic output will 
improve. 
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The high degree of economic openness of ASEAN countries may be a factor eroding 
the superiority of their flexible exchange rate regime in terms of output stability. As is 
shown by Watson (2016), high economic openness leads to greater firm competitiveness 
which reduces price stickiness. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the depreciation of 
the real exchange rate is affected not only by the flexible movement of the nominal 
exchange rate but also by the less rigid movement of the price level. This limits the 
movement of the real exchange rate. As a result, the flexible exchange rate regime is not 
the best tool in buffering the effect of a negative foreign demand shock on the short-run 
real GDP of ASEAN countries. 
Following Cook (2004) and Towbin and Weber (2013), the greater contraction of 
output under a flexible exchange rate regime in this study can be explained as follows. The 
nominal depreciation originating from the foreign demand shock leads to the dominated 
foreign currency debts of ASEAN countries becoming more expensive in terms of 
domestic currency and hedging
55
. This increases the borrowing cost and limits investment. 
Consequently, the decline in investment results in more contraction in domestic demand 
and real output under a flexible exchange rate regime compared to under a fixed one.    
In terms of responses of the price level, it can be seen from Figure 5.1b that the 
contemporaneous impact of a foreign demand shock on the price level depicts a decline 
under both exchange rate regimes. In particular, the foreign demand shock reduces the 
price level contemporaneously to 0.055% and 1.42%, respectively, under the fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes. The effect of the shock is greater and more long-lasting 
under a flexible exchange rate regime. The greater volatility of the price level under a fixed 
exchange rate regime can be explained in that the immediate response of nominal 
exchange rate under a flexible exchange rate regime leads to faster changes in the imported 
                                                          
55
 Sangaré (2016) shows that the debt of ASEAN countries is dominated mainly by foreign currency  
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price and then the price level. However, under a fixed exchange rate regime the 
intervention of a government to maintain a fixed rate which changes money supply and 
then the price level, is passive and time-lagged (Terra 2015).   
The contemporaneous decrease in the price level to a foreign demand shock for 
ASEAN countries with a fixed exchange rate regime is consistent with theory. In 
particular, Lindert and Pugel (1996) argue that under a fixed exchange rate regime, a 
central bank has to buy domestic currency to prevent nominal depreciation which is a 
consequence of a negative foreign demand shock. They show that this intervention results 
in a decline in domestic money supply which in turn lowers the price level.  
Figure 5.1c depicts the movement of the real exchange rate to a negative foreign 
demand shock under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. If the solid line is 
above the time horizon then the domestic currency is real depreciated. However, a 
domestic currency appreciation occurs when the solid line is under the horizontal line. The 
real exchange rate is weakly affected by external shocks under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, while it fluctuates more under a flexible exchange rate regime. For example, one 
negative standard deviation of a foreign demand shock contemporaneously leads to a 
0.056% real appreciation under the fixed regime but a 2.73% real depreciation under the 
flexible regime
56
.  
In the short-run, price is sticky and hence, the muted effect of shocks on the real 
exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime is due to the intervention of monetary 
authorities attempting to fix the nominal exchange rate. However, the instantaneous real 
depreciation under a flexible exchange rate regime is largely driven by the changes of the 
nominal exchange rate to shocks where prices and wages are sticky in the short-run. 
Therefore, the real exchange rate is more volatile to the shock under a flexible exchange 
rate regime than under a fixed exchange rate regime, and this can be explained by the price 
                                                          
56
 See Table D6 and Table D7 in Appendix D for the results. 
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adjusting slowly because of its stickiness in the short-run while nominal exchange rate 
responds more rapidly. Consequently, the real exchange rate responds faster to the shock 
under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Figure 5.1d illustrates the responses and accumulated responses of between-countries 
income gap to a negative foreign demand shock under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. If the solid line is above the horizontal line then the between-countries income 
gap increases and vice versa. For both exchange rate regimes, a negative foreign demand 
uncertainty causes an instantaneous decline in between-countries income gap. Under the 
fixed exchange rate regime, the between-countries income gap increases in the third year 
until the shock is less influential as time passes. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the 
between-countries income gap is reduced during 9 periods after the foreign demand shock. 
After that, it returns to the steady state value. In terms of the accumulated impulse 
response, it can be seen that under a flexible exchange rate regime, a negative foreign 
demand shock leads to accumulated declines in the between-countries income gap. 
However, the accumulated response of the income gap indicates that it is insignificant 
affected by the foreign demand shock under a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
accumulated responses of between-countries income gap under both exchange rate regimes 
can be explained by the fact that as shown in Figure 5.1a, higher economic growth under a 
flexible exchange rate regime plays a role in reducing the income gap more than under a 
fixed exchange rate regime.  
To conclude, a fixed exchange rate regime is better than a flexible exchange rate 
regime in stabilising the output, price level and real exchange rate to a negative foreign 
demand shock. However, in terms of accumulated value, a flexible exchange rate regime 
generates higher economic growth, lower inflation and more income equality compared to 
a fixed exchange rate regime when a country is hit by a negative foreign demand shock.  
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ii. World real oil price shock 
Figure 5.2 below shows the impulse responses and accumulated impulse responses of 
real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and between-countries income gap to a positive one 
standard deviation world real oil price shock under a fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regime. 
Figure 5.2a shows the response of real output to a positive world real oil price shock. 
Consistent with the findings reported by Al-Abri (2013), the economic growth suffers 
more from the shock under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. A good example of this is when the shock results in 0.02 higher economic 
growth under a fixed exchange rate regime, but 1.06% less economic growth under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. The real output contraction under a flexible exchange rate 
lasts for five years after the shock commenced. However, the shock has a negligible impact 
on real output under a fixed exchange rate regime compared with the impact under a 
flexible exchange rate regime.  
The accumulated impulse response of real output to the world real oil price shock 
indicates that the shock stimulates output growth under a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
contrast, the shock leads to accumulated contraction in real output under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Higher economic growth under a fixed exchange rate regime is 
possible because most observations are from Malaysia and Brunei which are net oil 
exporters. Therefore, revenues from higher oil prices will boost the real output growth. 
The behaviour of real output under a flexible exchange rate regime can be explained 
that the increase in oil price leads to an increase in production costs which in turn triggers 
inflation. The inflation results in the erosion of purchasing power and this situation curtails 
demand and economic growth ceases (Raghavan 2015).  
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Figure 5.2: Impulse response of a positive world real oil price shock 
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Figure 5.2b indicates that the positive world real oil price shock results in an 
immediate higher price under both exchange rate regimes. However, the effect of the shock 
on prices lasts longer under a flexible exchange rate regime. To illustrate this, the effect 
gradually dissipates after 5 years under a fixed exchange rate regime but it is 11 years 
under a flexible exchange rate regime. In terms of accumulated impacts, ASEAN countries 
under both exchange rate regimes also suffer from higher price level resulting from a world 
real oil price shock. As explained above, an increase in the world real oil price leads to 
rising price level because production costs have increased.  
The effect of an increase in world real oil price on inflation under a fixed exchange 
rate regime is less than under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is because inflation is 
affected by an increase in the oil price under a fixed exchange rate regime whereas it is 
affected by both an increase in the oil price and higher import costs coming from domestic 
currency depreciation. In other words, the price level in a flexible exchange rate regime is 
affected by higher price of imported goods and higher price of domestically produced 
goods. Meanwhile, the price level in a fixed exchange rate regime is only affected by 
higher price of domestically produced goods. Additionally, most of observations in this 
study under a fixed exchange rate regime are from Brunei and Malaysia which are net oil 
exporters and hence, their price level is less affected by an increase in world real oil price. 
These result in higher inflation under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime.  
Furthermore, higher inflation under a flexible exchange rate regime leads to a greater 
loss of competitiveness and reduced more demand for domestic goods under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. It means that real output will be more affected by a world real oil 
price shock under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
It can be seen from accumulated responses of price level and real output that under a 
flexible exchange rate regime, higher price level due to the world real oil price shock is 
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accompanied by a reduction in real output.  This can be explained that under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the positive world real oil price shock boosts foreign currency 
demand which puts downward pressure on the domestic currency. This increase costs of 
production in terms of domestic currency and lead to the reduction in firm’s output (Jin 
2008). In addition, higher price level coming from a positive world real oil price and 
domestic currency depreciation leads to the deferral of individuals and households in 
buying goods and services and investment which then leads to output contraction (Ahmed 
& Wadud 2011). Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the more stability of exchange rate 
plays a role in stabling the accumulated price level and hence, the world real oil price 
shock seems have a little impact on real output.  
Figure 5.2c shows that under both exchange rate regimes, a positive world real oil 
price shock results in real depreciation. The oil price shock wields a more significant effect 
on real exchange rate under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. A good 
example is that domestic currency appreciates 0.37% under a fixed regime but depreciates 
6.4% under a flexible regime. Notably, despite the increase in the price level under a 
flexible exchange rate regime, the domestic currency still depreciates. This is because the 
real exchange rate is also affected by the increase in foreign price level as a result of a 
positive world real oil price shock. Therefore, changes in real exchange rate under a 
flexible exchange rate regime depend on how the domestic price changes relative to 
foreign price. Additionally, real exchange rate is more volatile under a flexible than under 
a fixed exchange rate regime because the price level increases more strongly under a 
flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Figure 5.2d illustrates the responses of between-countries income gap to a positive 
world real oil price shocks under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. A positive 
world real oil price increases contemporaneously between-countries income gap under 
both exchange rate regimes. However, the gap starts to decrease in the sixth year under a 
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fixed exchange rate regime. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the gap continues to 
increase until the effects of the shock becomes less significant as time passes. In terms of 
accumulated value, the world real oil price shock results in increases in between-countries 
income gap under both exchange rate regimes. Higher income gap between-countries can 
be explained that ASEAN includes oil exporters and oil importers and hence, higher world 
real oil price creates more income for oil exporters but more expenses for oil importers. 
This leads to greater income gap between ASEAN countries. 
The gap is wider under a flexible rather than a fixed exchange rate regime. Following 
Nenova (2004), the lower volatility of the price level and real exchange rate to a positive 
world real oil price shock under a fixed exchange rate regime in relation to a flexible one 
promotes private investment, productivity and output growth. In turn this generates a 
smaller between-countries income gap under a fixed than under a flexible exchange rate 
regime. Moreover, most of the observations in a flexible exchange rate regime are oil-
importing countries (which have more expenditure because of a higher oil price) whereas 
most of the observations in a fixed exchange rate regime are oil-exporting countries (which 
have revenue from higher oil price). Therefore, between-countries income gap is greater 
under a flexible exchange rate regime compared with under a fixed exchange rate regime.  
In summary, it can therefore be seen that the world real oil price shock has serious 
consequences for economic activities under both exchange rate regimes because it cause 
lower economic growth, higher inflation and greater between-countries income gap. This 
finding is consistent with Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015) who indicate that ASEAN 
countries are oil-importing nations which are negatively affected by a world real oil price 
shock. In addition, a fixed exchange rate regime is better than a flexible exchange rate 
regime in coping with a positive world real oil price shock because under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, real output, the price level and the real exchange rate are more stable. 
Furthermore, a country with a flexible exchange rate regime suffers more from lower 
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economic growth, higher inflation and greater between-countries income gap compared to 
a country with a fixed exchange rate regime.  
iii. Foreign real interest rate shock 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the impulse responses and accumulated impulse responses 
of real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and between-countries income gap to a negative one 
standard deviation foreign real interest rate shock under a fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regime. Similar to Zhang et al. (2014), the positive foreign real interest rate shock has a 
positive contemporaneous effect on GDP under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is 
explained via exchange rate channel that real depreciation boosts exports and then 
economic growth of ASEAN countries. The adjustment of real output to a foreign real 
interest rate shock in Figure 5.3a is more volatile under a flexible than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Real output declines contemporaneously by 0.004% under a fixed 
regime but it is 2.1% increase under a flexible regime. 
In term of accumulate value, the shock leads to real economic growth contraction 
under a fixed exchange rate regime but real economic growth expansion under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. This finding is consistent to Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) 
who found that higher foreign interest rate has a contraction impact on real economic 
growth but just in case under a fixed exchange rate regime. The accumulated response of 
real output to a foreign real interest rate shock under a fixed exchange rate regime shows 
that the shock triggers a minor problem for real output. Nonetheless, the shock has a larger 
positive accumulated impact on GDP under a flexible exchange rate regime. The larger 
reaction of output to a foreign real interest rate shock under a flexible exchange rate regime 
can be explained as follows. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in the 
foreign real interest rate leads to capital outflow. A consequence of this is a nominal 
domestic currency depreciation which stimulates output. Nonetheless, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the effect of a foreign real interest rate shock on output is limited. It 
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is because capital outflows will result in balance of payments deficits which put downward 
pressure on the currency which will be met by a decline in the money supply. This will 
push down prices and increase the domestic interest rate, which will have both positive and 
negative impacts on GDP, respectively. Hence, the impact is probably more clear-cut with 
a flexible exchange rate. 
Similar to Zhang et al. (2014), the positive foreign real interest rate shock has a 
positive contemporaneous effect on GDP under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is 
explained via exchange rate channel that real depreciation boosts exports and then 
economic growth of ASEAN countries. The adjustment of real output to a foreign real 
interest rate shock in Figure 5.3a is more volatile under a flexible than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Real output declines contemporaneously by 0.004% under a fixed 
regime but it is 2.1% increase under a flexible regime. 
In term of accumulate value, the shock leads to real economic growth contraction 
under a fixed exchange rate regime but real economic growth expansion under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. This finding is consistent to Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) 
who found that higher foreign interest rate has a contraction impact on real economic 
growth but just in case under a fixed exchange rate regime. The accumulated response of 
real output to a foreign real interest rate shock under a fixed exchange rate regime shows 
that the shock triggers a minor problem for real output. Nonetheless, the shock has a larger 
positive accumulated impact on GDP under a flexible exchange rate regime. The larger 
reaction of output to a foreign real interest rate shock under a flexible exchange rate regime 
can be explained as follows. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in the 
foreign real interest rate leads to capital outflow. A consequence of this is a nominal 
domestic currency depreciation which stimulates output. Nonetheless, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the effect of a foreign real interest rate shock on output is limited. It 
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is because capital outflows will result in balance of payments deficits which put downward 
pressure on the currency which will be met by a decline in the money supply. This will 
push down prices and increase the domestic interest rate, which will have both positive and 
negative impacts on GDP, respectively. Hence, the impact is probably more clear-cut with 
a flexible exchange rate. 
The contemporaneous impact of a foreign demand shock on the price level depicts a 
decline under a flexible exchange rate regime but small increase under a fixed exchange 
rate regime.  The accumulated effect of a positive foreign interest rate on price level in 
countries with fixed exchange rate regime is insignificant compared with the response 
under the flexible exchange rate regime. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the shock 
leads to an accumulated decrease in inflation. This can be explained as follows. Real 
interest rate is the difference between nominal interest rate and inflation rate. International 
Fisher effect stated that domestic real interest rate equals foreign real interest rate. Hence, 
assuming no change in the domestic nominal interest rate, inflation will be lower when 
foreign real interest rate increases.   
Figure 5.3c compares the responses of real exchange rate to the foreign real interest 
rate shock between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. The contemporaneous 
impact of the shock on the real exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime is 
insignificant because the price level is sticky in the short-run and the nominal exchange 
rate does not change. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, a positive foreign real interest 
rate shock increases net capital outflow. This results in an increase in foreign currency 
demand and domestic currency depreciation. This causes real depreciation. Similar to 
Zhang et al. (2014) and Hoffmann (2007), real exchange rate regime is larger volatility to 
the foreign real interest rate shock under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is because in 
the short-run, the price level is sticky while the nominal exchange rate responds faster and 
stronger.  
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response of a positive foreign real interest rate shock  
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The foreign real interest rate shock has a brief and little impact on the between-
countries income gap in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore, it can be 
confidently asserted that the foreign real interest rate shock seems to have small impact on 
the gap under a fixed exchange rate regime. Nonetheless, under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, the foreign real interest rate shock increases the gap contemporaneously, followed 
by a decrease in the second year after the shock. The effect of the shock is short-lived and 
completes in the third year.  
The contemporaneous behaviour of the between-countries income gap can be 
explained as follows. As indicated previously, ASEAN countries’ debt is mainly in foreign 
currency and hence, under a fixed exchange rate regime higher foreign real interest rate 
increases interest payment of net borrowing countries (generally, they are lower income 
countries) and interest yield of net lending countries (generally, they are higher income 
countries). This leads to higher income gap between ASEAN countries. Similarly, under a 
flexible exchange rate regime, a positive foreign real interest rate widens between-
countries income gap. However, between-countries income gap under flexible exchange 
rate regime is more affected by the shock compared to that under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. This is because greater interest payment/yield under a fixed exchange rate regime 
only results from higher foreign real interest rate while under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, it is caused by both higher foreign real interest rate and depreciation. 
Regarding to cumulative value, the foreign real interest rate shock has a trivial 
accumulated impact on the gap under a fixed exchange rate regime compared with the 
impact under a flexible exchange rate regime. Although the foreign real interest rate shock 
leads to an accumulated decrease in between-countries income gap under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, this decrement is limited. The muted influences of a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock on between-countries income gap is because most financial markets 
in ASEAN countries have not been not completely liberalised and integrated into the world 
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financial market. Therefore, higher foreign real interest rate does not affect significantly 
income of ASEAN countries. 
iv. Comparisons between the effects of external shocks 
From the results of impulse responses, we find that the short-run effects of all types 
of external shocks under a flexible exchange rate regime are greater than that under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Furthermore, under both exchange rate regimes, the external shocks 
have unremarkable effects on variables in the long-run. In addition, the external shocks 
have more prolonged effects on variables under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Moreover, a foreign demand shock and world real oil price shock have long-
lasting impacts whereas the effect of the foreign real interest rate shock is short-lived. This 
means that the trade channel does have a critical influence whereas foreign monetary 
policy exerts only a weak impact on ASEAN countries under both a fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regime.  
Table 5.3 below presents summary responses of variables to a negative foreign 
demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate 
shock under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. This study also examined whether 
the effects of shocks on macroeconomic variables are symmetric or asymmetric by 
comparing the responses of real GDP between negative and positive shocks. As indicated 
by Broda (2004), there may be an asymmetric response to positive and negative shocks 
within exchange rate regimes. A good example is that under a fixed regime, there might be 
larger stickiness of prices when prices are required to decrease than when they have to 
increase.  Hence, the adjustment of output to positive shocks should be smoother than to 
negative shocks because the ease with which relative prices change. The results which are 
presented in Figure D6, Appendix D show that shocks have symmetric impacts. 
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Table 5.3: Summary comparison of the responses from the between-countries income gap model 
Type of shock Contemporaneous response Responses Accumulated responses 
Decrease Increase Negligible More 
fluctuated 
Short-lived More 
prolonged 
Decrease Increase Negligible 
Real GDP 
Foreign demand  Fixed, 
flexible 
  Flexible 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
Flexible 
(Short-run) 
Flexible 
(Medium and 
long-run) 
Fixed 
 
World real oil price  Flexible  Fixed 
 
Flexible  
Foreign real interest 
rate 
 Flexible Fixed 
Flexible 
 Flexible 
Real exchange rate 
Foreign demand   Flexible 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
 Flexible 
 
Fixed 
World real oil price   
Foreign real interest 
rate 
 Fixed 
Flexible 
CPI 
Foreign demand  Fixed, 
flexible 
  Flexible 
 
Fixed Flexible 
 
Flexile, Fixed   
 
World real oil price  Fixed, 
flexible 
   Flexible 
Foreign real interest 
rate 
Flexible Fixed  Fixed 
Flexible 
Flexible  Fixed 
Between-countries income gap 
Foreign demand   Flexible, 
Fixed 
 
 
Fix 
 
  Flexible Fixed  
World real oil price Fixed, 
flexible 
  Fixed (Long-
run) 
Flexible  
Foreign real interest 
rate 
Fixed Flexible Flexible Fixed 
Flexible 
Fixed, flexible   
Source: Author
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5.4.2. Variance decomposition 
This section presents the variance decomposition of real GDP, CPI, real exchange 
rate and between-countries income gap under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. 
The variance decomposition shows the contribution of each shock on the forecast error 
variance of the variables. Following Chia et al. (2012), the short-run refers to the first 
period after the shock. The medium-run covers two to five years after the shock. The long-
run is described as five years and more. The results of variance decomposition are 
presented in Table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4: Variance decomposition (%) based on a baseline model 
 Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
Real 
GDP 
CPI Real 
exchange 
rate 
Between-
countries 
income 
gap 
Real 
GDP 
CPI Real 
exchange 
rate 
Between-
countries 
income 
gap 
Foreign demand shock (negative) 
Short-run 4.58 39.10 21.23 0.53 0.04 8.60 0.52 0.02 
Medium-run 
3.78 45.60 
20.14 2.37 0.06 9.51 0.64 7.02 
Long-run 3.90 45.57 20.35 6.01 0.09 9.92 0.65 7.39 
World real oil price shock (positive) 
Short-run 0.05 77.40 9.54 21.08 0.99 14.32 2.85 5.10 
Medium-run 0.36 76.52 8.60 14.04 1.10 16.11 2.91 11.67 
Long-run 0.47 75.73 8.60 17.03 1.36 16.43 2.93 13.77 
Foreign real interest rate shock (positive) 
Short-run 
0.18 0.43 10.55 0.52 3.71 10.54 0.92 2.56 
Medium-run 
11.45 1.02 7.62 1.31 3.54 6.75 1.50 2.10 
Long-run 
11.42 
1.02 7.55 1.27 3.54 6.66 1.50 2.09 
Source: Author 
 
 
145 
 
 
In Table 5.4 it can be seen that under a fixed exchange rate regime, a foreign demand 
shock is the most important factor in explaining the variance of short-run real output 
compared with the remaining shocks. In particular, a negative foreign demand shock 
explains 4.58% of the fluctuation of economic growth in the short-run, respectively while 
it is less than 0.2% in the remaining shocks. This suggests that compared with the other 
two types of shocks, foreign demand is the most important external driver of the growth in 
the short-run under a fixed exchange rate regime.  
Economic growth is driven more by a foreign demand shock under a fixed exchange 
rate regime than under a flexible exchange rate regime. Compared with a flexible exchange 
rate regime, a fixed exchange rate regime stimulates international trade for ASEAN 
countries because it creates greater certainty for exporters and importers. In addition, some 
ASEAN countries are pursuing export-led growth policy. Therefore, foreign demand 
becomes more important to the behaviour of growth under a fixed than under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. 
A foreign interest rate is a major driver of long-run economic growth for countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime. It is also a main factor for the volatility of economic 
growth of countries with a flexible exchange rate regime. About 12% of the volatility of 
growth in the long-run in a fixed exchange rate regime is explained by a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock. Under a flexible exchange rate regime the foreign real interest rate 
shock is responsible for about 3-4% fluctuation of economic growth. The increasing 
contribution of a foreign real interest rate shock on the fluctuation of real output under a 
fixed exchange rate regime (from 0.18% in short-run to 11.42% in long-run) indicates that 
financial linkages are becoming more important in transmitting the financial external shock 
to ASEAN economies with a fixed exchange rate regime.  
The importance of the foreign interest rate in driving economic growth of ASEAN 
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countries can be explained as follows. FDI is defined as a capital flow that moves to 
countries that have higher rate of return compared with world interest rate (Siddiqui & 
Aumeboonsuke 2014). By implementing policies to attract FDI, FDI becomes one of the 
major drivers of economic growth throughout ASEAN. Hence changes in foreign interest 
rate affect the flow of FDI which plays an important role in economic growth of ASEAN 
countries. As shown by Iacoviello and Navarro (2018), higher foreign interest rate 
decreases income and expenditures abroad which then results in lower foreign demand for 
imported goods and subsequently domestic GDP shrinks. Therefore, given that 
approximately 75% of ASEAN’s trade is with extra-ASEAN countries and the importance 
of trading channels, a positive foreign real interest rate shock becomes an important source 
of economic growth.  
Table 5.4 shows that a positive foreign real interest rate shock explains a higher 
proportion of forecast errors in economic growth under a fixed exchange rate regime than 
under a flexible exchange rate regime. This implies that economic growth of countries with 
fixed exchange rate regime is more driven by the foreign real interest rate shock compared 
to that of countries with flexible one. This is because a fixed exchange rate regime brings 
more certainty to investors than a flexible one. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime 
promotes more FDI inflow, which is a better driver of growth in ASEAN countries than a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Therefore, a positive foreign real interest rate shock affects 
FDI inflow and economic growth. As a result, it becomes more important in driving 
economic growth under a fixed than under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
In addition, due the certainty in repayment in terms of domestic currency, a fixed 
exchange rate regime rather than a flexible one encourages borrowing in terms of foreign 
currency, which contributes to the behaviour of investment and economic growth. As a 
result, foreign real interest rate, which affects the interest rate of foreign currency 
borrowing, becomes a more important source for the behaviour of growth under a fixed 
147 
 
than under a flexible exchange rate regime.   
Compared to other types of shocks, uncertainty in the world real oil price becomes 
the most important factor driving the variation of the price level under both exchange rate 
regimes. A good example is that a positive world real oil price shock explained about 80% 
of the fluctuation of the price level under a fixed exchange rate regime whereas the 
contribution of the remaining types of shocks on the volatility of the price level is lower, 
about 45% and just 1% for the cases of foreign demand and world real interest rate shocks, 
respectively. Similarly, about 14-16% of the fluctuation of the price level under a flexible 
exchange rate regime is explained by a positive world real oil price shock whiles just 6-
10% with the remaining shocks.  
The world real oil price is more important for the fluctuation of real exchange rate 
regime under a fixed compared to a flexible exchange rate regime
57
. The real exchange rate 
under a fixed exchange rate regime is driven by the domestic price level whereas it is 
driven by both domestic price level and nominal exchange rate under a flexible exchange 
rate regime. As mentioned previously, ASEAN countries have a low degree of input 
substitution between imported input and domestic input. Therefore, the increase in price 
level as a result of higher imported input price coming from the effect of the shock offsets 
the effect of the shock on nominal exchange rate. Thus the real exchange rate regime under 
a fixed exchange rate regime is propelled more by the shock than under a flexible one. 
 Furthermore, it plays a greater role in explaining the fluctuation of between-
countries income gap compared to the remaining shocks. In particular, it is responsible for 
10-20% of the variation of the gap under both exchange rate regimes. The world real oil 
price shock wields the greatest impact on ASEAN economies. This is because the ASEAN 
countries are: firstly, very intensive in their production of oil; secondly, very trade 
                                                          
57
 The same circumstance can be seen in a negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign real interest 
rate shock. 
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intensive; and thirdly, highly integrated into global production chains (Downes 2007). 
Table 5.6 presents a summary of the contribution to fluctuations of each key variable 
for the major shocks for each type of exchange rate regime. 
Table 5.5: Summary of the shock that has the greatest contribution under a fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regime   
Variables Fixed Flexible 
Short 
-run 
Medium-
run 
Long-run Short 
-run 
Medium-
run 
Long-
run 
Real GDP Foreign 
demand 
shock 
Foreign real interest 
rate shock 
Foreign real interest rate shock 
CPI World real oil price shock World real oil price shock 
 Real exchange 
rate 
Foreign demand shock 
 
Between-
countries 
income gap 
World real oil price shock 
 
Source: Author 
5.4.3. Robustness test  
This section presents the results from the robustness test. Following Bhuiyan (2012), 
we implement the robustness test, that is changing restrictions in the contemporaneous 
matrix. There are two ways to impose the contemporaneous matrix regarding the order of 
the price level and real exchange rate. In particular, Zaidi et al. (2013) assumed that the 
real exchange rate is affected contemporaneously by inflation. However, Chia et al. (2012), 
Broda (2004) and Zhang et al. (2014) impose the restriction that the real exchange rate has 
a contemporaneous impact on inflation. Hence, to test the robustness of the results, in this 
section, the order of the price level and real exchange rate in the contemporaneous matrix 
is changed. In particular, the real exchange rate has a contemporaneous effect on the price 
level but the price level does not contemporaneously affect the real exchange rate. The 
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results are illustrated in Figure D4 in Appendix D. 
Based on the result of the robustness tests the impulse responses and accumulated 
impulse responses are similar to those from the original model. In particular, real GDP, the 
real exchange rate and price level fluctuate more to shocks under a flexible exchange rate 
compared to the fixed exchange rate regime. The response of the between-countries 
income gap to shocks is also stronger under a flexible exchange rate regime. It is also 
evident that external shocks, except a foreign demand shock, make a small and temporary 
impact on variables under a fixed exchange rate regime. Moreover, the shocks result in 
more prolonged and more immediate effects on variables under a flexible exchange rate 
regime. The effect of a foreign real interest rate shock on variables under a flexible 
exchange rate regime is short-lived. Finally, a positive world real oil price shock has 
negative impacts on the economy with a flexible exchange rate regime such as output 
contraction, higher price level, a real depreciation and a larger income gap with other 
countries. 
5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has investigated and compared the behaviour of real output, the real 
exchange rate, price level and between-countries income gap from various types of shocks 
under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The results of lag selection indicated that 1 
lag was to be used. We used these lag lengths to test for the exogeneity of external shocks. 
The results revealed that all external shocks are not affected by domestic variables. 
Therefore, external shocks are treated as exogenous variables in the SVAR model. 
The immediate movement of variables resulting from external shocks under a 
flexible exchange rate were far larger than those under a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
addition, the external shocks have more prolonged effects on variables under a flexible 
than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Under both exchange rate regimes, the external 
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shocks have a minor long-run impact on variables. The negligible impacts of external 
shocks on variables under a fixed exchange rate regime suggest that the influence of 
external shocks is less under such an exchange rate regime than under a flexible exchange 
rate regime. We subsequently conclude that a fixed exchange rate regime is better than a 
flexible exchange rate regime in reducing the instability of real output, the price level and 
real exchange rate. 
However, in terms of cumulative value, a flexible exchange rate regime is superior in 
generating higher economic growth, low inflation as a result of a negative foreign demand 
shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock.  A fixed exchange rate regime is better 
than a flexible one in coping with a positive world real oil price shock because it generates 
higher economic growth and lower inflation compared to a flexible exchange rate regime. 
In terms of between-countries income gap the results of accumulated responses 
indicate that a flexible regime is better in narrowing the income gap between ASEAN 
countries if the shock is a foreign demand shock. Similarly, for both exchange rate 
regimes, the between-countries income gap was not affected considerably by the positive 
foreign real interest rate shock. An increase in world real oil price widened the between-
countries income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime, with greater gap 
under the latter regime. 
By comparing the effect of shocks on variables, we find that under both exchange 
rate regimes all types of shocks have minor long-run impact on variables. In addition, the 
short-run effects of external shocks are greater under a flexible than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. The effects of external shocks are more prolonged under a flexible 
than under a fixed exchange rate regime. In general, the effects of foreign demand and 
world real oil price shocks are long-lasting whereas a foreign real interest rate shock only 
has a short-lived impact. This suggests that trade channel has a greater impact on ASEAN 
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economies compared with foreign monetary policy. 
Results of variance decomposition indicated that foreign demand is the main driver 
for short-run economic growth under a fixed exchange rate regime. However, long-run 
economic growth is mainly driven by the foreign real interest rate shock. In addition, world 
real oil price shock is the dominant source for the fluctuation of the price level and real 
exchange rate under both exchange rate regimes. Under both exchange rate regimes this 
shock explains the largest portion of the volatility of the between-countries income gap. 
  To test the robustness of the results, we changed the order of the variables in the 
contemporaneous matrix. The results were consistent with the results of the original model. 
This implies that the original model is robust. Another aim of this study is to investigate 
the impact and contribution of external shocks to the within-country income gap under 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The following chapter presents the empirical 
results for the within-country income gap model. 
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE WITHIN-COUNTRY 
INCOME GAP MODEL 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results for the within-country income gap model, 
specifically on the effects and contribution of various types of shock, i.e. a negative foreign 
demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate 
shock on real GDP, price level, real exchange rate and within-country income gap under 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Like the between-countries income gap model, 
certain steps need to be implemented before estimating the model, namely choosing 
optimal lag length and stability test. In addition, a Granger causality test will be employed 
to examine the exogeneity of external shocks. To investigate the impacts and importance of 
these external shocks, we implement the impulse response function and variance 
decomposition. Finally, to test the robustness of our results, we conduct a sensitive analysis 
by changing the order of variables.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 presents the lag length 
selection and stability check. The test for exogeneity of external shocks is described in 
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses the empirical results for the impulse response and 
variance decomposition, and robustness test. Finally, Section 6.5 is the conclusion. 
6.2. LAG LENGTH SELECTION AND STABILITY CHECK 
Similar to the model for between-countries income gap, the lag length selection and 
stability check will serve to find the optimal lag order for estimating the structural VAR 
model. As discussed in the previous chapter there are certain criteria for choosing the 
optimal lag length and these are LR, FPE, AIC, SC and HQ. We only consider a maximum 
of 7 lags because of the limited data observations. We apply the AR Characteristic 
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Polynomial test to examine the stability of the suggested lag length. The results for the 
optimal lag length are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Results of optimal lag length 
 LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
Foreign demand shock 
1 lag  x x  x 
5 lags x     
World real oil price shock 
1 lags    x x 
7 lags x x x   
Foreign real interest rate shock 
1 lag     x 
7 lags x x x   
Source: Author 
In terms of a foreign demand shock, 1 lag is selected by the FPE and AIC criteria 
while the LR criterion chooses two lags. We select 1 lag as an optimal lag length because 
more criteria select 1 lag rather than 5 lags. This lag length also satisfies the condition for 
stability
58
.  
From Table 6.1, it can be seen that in the model with a world real oil price shock, the 
SC and HQ criteria select 1 lag whereas 7 lags are chosen by the LR, FPE and AIC criteria. 
Using the AR Characteristic Polynomial test, we find that the model with 7 lags does not 
satisfy the requirement for stability. However, this condition is satisfied in the case of 1 
lag
59
. Therefore, 1 lag will be selected for estimating SVAR. 
Table 6.1 also presents the results for the chosen lag length regarding a positive 
foreign real interest rate shock. At first, seven lags are chosen by all of the criteria when 
                                                          
58
 See Table E1 and Figure E1 in Appendix E. 
59
 See Table E2 and Figure E2 in Appendix E. 
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we include the maximum of 7 lags. However, the model with 7 lags does not satisfy the 
stability condition. The model with 1 lag satisfied this condition
60
. Therefore, the model 
with a foreign real interest rate shock will be estimated utilising 1 lag. 
In summary, 1 lag length will help to estimate the model with foreign demand, world 
real oil price and foreign real interest rate shocks.   
6.3. EXOGENEITY OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
In this section, we conduct the Granger causality test to test for the exogeneity of 
external shocks. The results of the Granger causality test are summarised in Table 6.2. The 
null hypotheses are that variables, namely real GDP, CPI, real exchange rate and within-
country income gap do not Granger-cause external shocks. 
Table 6.2: Granger causality test for the within-country income gap model 
 Chi-sq Prob. 
1. Foreign demand with 1 lag   
Real GDP does not Granger cause foreign demand 0.06 0.8033 
CPI does not Granger-cause foreign demand 2.97 0.0849 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause foreign demand 0.33 0.5659 
Within-country income gap does not Granger-cause foreign demand 1.40 0.2363 
2. World real oil price with 1 lag   
Real GDP does not Granger-cause world real oil price 0.05 0.8146 
CPI does not Granger-cause world real oil price 1.60 0.2061 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause world real oil price 0.15 0.7025 
Within-country income gap does not Granger-cause world real oil 
price 
1.94 0.1632 
3. Foreign real interest rate shock with 1 lag   
Real GDP does not Granger-cause real foreign interest rate  0.22 0.6399 
CPI does not Granger-cause real foreign interest rate 2.22 0.1358 
Real exchange rate does not Granger-cause real foreign interest rate 0.64 0.4254 
Within-country income gap does not Granger-cause real foreign 
interest rate 
2.12 0.1451 
Source: Author 
                                                          
60
 See Table E3 and Table E4 and Figure E3 in Appendix E. 
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The results indicate that we do not reject the null hypothesis for the foreign demand, 
world real oil price and foreign real interest rate shocks at the 1 percent significance level. 
Therefore, these types of shocks are treated as exogenous.  
6.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.4.1. Impulse response function 
To analyse the effects of external shocks, this section will examine the impulse 
responses of real GDP, price level, real exchange rate and within-country income gap 
under a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime.  
i. Foreign demand shock 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the responses and accumulated responses of real GDP, the price 
level, real exchange rate and within-countries income gap to a negative foreign demand 
shock under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
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Impulse response 
  
Accumulated 
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c. Real exchange rate 
Impulse response 
  
Accumulated 
impulse response 
  
d. Within-country income gap 
Impulse response 
  
 
 
Accumulated 
impulse response 
  
Figure 6.1: Impulse response of a negative foreign demand shock 
 It can be seen from Figure 6.1a that real output under a fixed exchange rate regime 
declines with a negative foreign demand shock for the first four years before dying out. 
Similar to the fixed exchange rate regime, a negative foreign demand shock leads to a 
contemporaneous real output contraction under a flexible exchange rate regime
61
.  
However, the immediate response of real output to the shock is more volatile and 
prolonged under this regime. For example, the effect of the shock dies out in 5 periods 
after the shock under a fixed exchange rate regime but 11 periods after the shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime
62
. After an immediate decline, real output of countries with a 
flexible exchange rate regime begins an expansionary phrase in the designated time 
horizon.  
                                                          
61
 See Section 5.4.1.i for a detailed explanation of the contemporaneous real output contraction to foreign 
demand shock. 
62
 See Table E4 and Table E5 in Appendix E. 
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It can be observed from the accumulated response of real output to a negative foreign 
demand shock that under a fixed exchange rate regime, the economy experiences a lower 
economic growth. Meanwhile an economy with a flexible regime also suffers from a lower 
economic growth, yet this outcome is brief. After the first year, the shock generates an 
expansionary effect for a longer period. 
Regarding the reaction of the price level in Figure 6.1b, it can be seen that a foreign 
demand shock leads to a contemporaneous price level decrease under both exchange rate 
regimes, with smaller response in the fixed exchange rate regime. For instance, the price 
level reduces immediately by 0.5% and 1.6% under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate 
regime, respectively
63
. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the price level seems to be 
affected slightly and for only a short period by a foreign demand shock. However, a 
country with the flexible regime experiences lower and more prolonged inflation than a 
country with a fixed regime. This finding is consistent with Shi et al. (2015)
64
. 
It can be seen from Figure 6.1c that foreign demand uncertainty has small effects on 
the real exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime. A good example is that real 
exchange rate in a fixed exchange rate regime increases by just 0.56%. However, the real 
exchange rate is more volatile under a flexible exchange rate regime. Under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the real depreciation with 3.1% results from the contemporaneous 
effect of negative foreign demand shock
65
. However, the real exchange rate begins 
declining in the next year. Similarly, the shock has a greater accumulated impact on the 
real exchange rate under a flexible rather than a fixed exchange rate regime. In terms of 
cumulative value, countries with a fixed exchange rate regime experience with small real 
                                                          
63
 See Table E4 and Table E5 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
64
 See Section 5.4.1.i for a detailed explanation of price level responding to foreign demand shock. 
65
 See Table E4 and Table E5 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
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depreciation whereas the shock leads to larger real depreciation under a flexible exchange 
rate regime
66
. 
Figure 6.1d shows the responses of within-country income gap under a fixed and a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Within-country income gap increases when the solid line is 
above the horizontal line and vice versa. A negative foreign demand shock generates 
contemporaneous more income equality under both exchange rate regimes. This reaction is 
consistent with Lim and McNelis (2014) who found that countries with high trade 
openness, which is a salient feature of ASEAN countries, produce less income inequality 
in response to a negative export demand shock. Less within-country income inequality 
under both exchange rate regimes can be explained in terms of a decrease in foreign 
demand leading to lower incomes for people working in the tradable sector. This narrow 
income gap is between people working in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
However, this positive impact under a fixed regime is shorter and negligible 
compared with the effect under a flexible exchange rate regime. The results of accumulated 
responses also indicate that a flexible exchange rate regime is better than a fixed exchange 
rate regime in reducing income inequality if a country is hit by a foreign demand shock. 
The greater reduction in income inequality under a flexible regime can be explained as 
being due to higher volatility of real exchange rate, capital owners find difficulties in 
borrowing money from foreign sources. Therefore, investment declines and this leads to 
capital owners having less income. Hence, income inequality between owners of capital 
and the workforce falls more strongly under a flexible regime compared to a fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
Furthermore, as mentioned, following Shi et al. (2015), due to the foreign currency 
pricing on export goods of some ASEAN countries, nominal devaluation in a flexible 
                                                          
66
 See Section 5.4.1.i for a detailed explanation of the real exchange rate response to a foreign demand shock. 
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exchange rate regime do not play a role in stablising external demand. A negative foreign 
demand shock decreases the income of workers in the tradable sector. Moreover, the 
expediture-switching effect of depreciation under a flexible exchange rate regime leading 
to consumption of imported good is substitued by non-traded goods. This leads to an 
increase in incomes of people who are working in the non-trable sector. Consequently, the 
within-country income gap declines under a flexible exchange rate regime. Under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, within-country income also reduces but less so because the incomes 
of tradable sector workers fall while the incomes of people working in non-tradable 
industries remain the same. 
It can be seen from Figure 6.1 that the lower price level is associated with lower 
income inequality under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is consistent with previous 
studies such as Albanesi (2007) who found there is a positive relationship between 
inflation and income inequality. Dolmas et al. (2000) also indicated countries with high 
levels of income inequality are likely to have higher inflation. 
ii. World real oil price shock 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the responses and accumulated responses of real GDP, the price 
level, real exchange rate and within-countries income gap to a positive world real oil price 
shock under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 It can be seen from Figure 6.2a that real output under a fixed exchange rate regime 
seems to be insignificantly affected by the world real oil price shock. However, real output 
is more volatile under a flexible exchange rate regime. The shock leads to a decline in real 
output until the first four periods, before having only a trivial effect over the long-term 
horizon. In terms of accumulated impulse responses, the world real oil price shock also has 
a negligible accumulated impact on economic growth under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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Nevertheless, the economy suffers from lower economic growth under a flexible exchange 
rate regime
67
.  
Figure 6.2b shows that the response of the price level to a world real oil price shock 
in both exchange rate regimes is the same. In particular, a positive world real oil price 
triggers higher price level. The effect starts to diminish after the first year. Nonetheless, the 
reaction of the price level is stronger under a flexible rather than under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. A good example is that the price level increases instantaneously only 0.8% 
under a fixed regime but 1.8% under a flexible regime
68
. The accumulated responses also 
show that countries with a flexible exchange rate regime suffer from higher inflation than 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime
69
. 
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 See Section 5.4.1.ii for a detailed explanation of the real output responding to world real oil price shock. 
68
 See Table E6 and Table E7 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
69
 See Section 5.4.1.ii for a detailed explanation of price level responding to world real oil price shock. 
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Figure 6.2: Impulse response of a positive world real oil price shock 
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It can be seen from Figure 6.2c that an increase in the world real oil price also has an 
insignificant impact on the real exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime 
compared with a flexible regime. On the contrary, the currencies of the ASEAN countries 
suffer from a real depreciation under a flexible exchange rate regime. Real depreciation is 
6.4% under a flexible exchange rate regime whereas it is just 0.3% real appreciation under 
a fixed exchange rate regime
70
.  The real depreciation is no longer significant after the third 
year, meaning that the uncertainty of a positive world real oil price shock has a very small 
effect on the real exchange rate in the long-run. The accumulated impulse response of the 
real exchange rate indicates that the shock has a lesser accumulated effect under a fixed 
rather than under a flexible exchange rate regime. In particular, its impact is mute under a 
fixed exchange rate regime while it causes a real depreciation under a flexible exchange 
rate regime
71
. 
Figure 6.2d illustrates the responses of within-country income gap to a positive world 
real oil price shock under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. Within-country 
income in both exchange rate regimes becomes more unequal if the world real oil price 
increases. The instantaneous response to income inequality is not much different between a 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regime. In particular, within-country income gap increases 
1.46% under fixed and 1.54% under a flexible exchange rate regime
72
. Nevertheless, the 
effect of such a shock under a flexible regime seems more prolonged than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime and, hence, the accumulated income inequality is greater under a 
flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed exchange rate regime. To explain this, 
compared with a fixed exchange rate regime, the higher real depreciation under a flexible 
exchange rate regime reduces the purchasing power of poor people more because their 
earnings are mainly in terms of domestic currency. Moreover, they have to cope with the 
                                                          
70
 See Table E6 and Table E7 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
71
 See Section 5.4.1.ii for a detailed explanation of the real exchange rate response to a positive world real oil 
price shock. 
72
 See Table E6 and Table E7 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
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greater risk of having their asset values reduced in terms of foreign currency under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. This leads to the greater within-country income gap under a 
flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Additionally, as 
indicated in chapter 5, most of the observations under a fixed exchange rate regime are oil-
exporting countries (who have revenues from higher real oil price) while the majority of 
observations under a flexible one are oil-importing countries (who pay more because of 
higher real oil price). Hence, more subsidies are spent on the poor under a fixed than under 
a flexible exchange rate regime. Consequently, the within-country income inequality is 
greater under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed one. 
As indicated in Section 3.5, Bulíř (2001) indicates that inflation widens the level of 
income inequality. According to what is illustrated in Figure 6.2, a positive world real oil 
price shock results in higher inflation under a flexible exchange rate regime compared to 
that of a fixed exchange rate regime. This leads to greater income inequality under the 
former regime. Furthermore, in the case of a negative foreign demand shock, a flexible 
regime produces higher deflation and, for this resason, the work by Bulíř (2001) confirms 
that greater deflation under a flexible regime leads to a correspondingly larger decrease in 
income inequality compared to a fixed exchange rate regime.  
iii. Foreign real interest rate shock 
The behaviours of real output, the price level, real exchange rate and within-country 
income gap to a positive foreign real interest rate shock are presented in Figure 6.3 as 
follows. 
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 Figure 6.3: Impulse response of a positive foreign real interest rate shock 
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The positive foreign real interest rate shock does not significantly affect real output 
under a fixed exchange rate regime, whereas real output reacts positively and strongly to 
the shock under a flexible exchange rate regime. For example, the shock leads to a 0.06% 
decrease in real output under a fixed regime, but a 2.24% increase in real output under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. However, the effect of the shock on real output is not long-
lasting. Compared to the flexible exchange rate regime, the shock has a muted accumulated 
impact on output under a fixed exchange rate regime
73
.  In terms of cumulative value, the 
shock results in poorer economic growth under a fixed but better economic growth under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) found that higher 
foreign real interest rate shock leads to a contraction in economic growth for ASEAN 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. The same conclusion was reached by 
AbuDalu et al. (2014). 
Similarly, the price level is more stable to a foreign real interest rate shock under a 
fixed compared to a flexible exchange rate regime. The price level increases immediately 
0.05% under a fixed regime. However, under a flexible exchange rate regime the shock 
leads to 1.4% lower price level. However, this effect dies out after the first year
74
. The 
accumulated responses of the price level suggest that a foreign real interest rate shock 
seems to wield an unremarkable effect on inflation under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Despite the fact this type of shock generates lower accumulated inflation under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, it is insignificant
75
. 
Similar to model for between-countries income gap, a positive real foreign interest 
rate shock has a greater immediate effect on the real exchange rate under a flexible rather 
than under a fixed exchange rate regime. The shock results in 0.33% and 13.7% real 
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 See Section 5.4.1.i for a detailed explanation of the real output responding to foreign real interest rate 
shock. 
74
 See Table E8 and Table E9 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
75
 See Section 5.4.1.iii for a detailed explanation of price level responding to foreign real interest rate shock. 
 
166 
 
depreciation under a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime, respectively
76
. As explained 
in chapter 5, this is because an increase in foreign interest rate leads to an outflow of 
capital which then increases the nominal exchange rate. Under a flexible exchange rate, 
real exchange rate increases immediately and more strongly as a result of the increase in 
nominal exchange rate. However, the short-run change in real exchange rate under a fixed 
exchange rate regime is slower because its movement just depends on the sticky price 
level. The accumulated responses of the real exchange rate are also unremarkable under a 
fixed exchange rate regime compared with a flexible exchange rate regime. The effect of a 
positive foreign real interest rate shock is short-lived. Under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, real appreciation in terms of accumulated value is induced by a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock
77
.  
Under both exchange rate regimes, a positive foreign real interest rate shock has a 
very small and temporary impact on income inequality, lasting only for the first two years. 
After that, the shock is no longer significant. Similarly, the shock has a muted accumulated 
effect on income inequality under both exchange rate regimes. The insignificant impact of 
a foreign real interest rate shock on income inequality can be explained that most of 
ASEAN countries have limited linkage to the international financial market (Tang 2011) 
and therefore, the higher foreign real interest rate shock does not affect significantly on 
income of domestic lenders and borrowers.  
We can explain the relationship between accumulated within-country income 
inequality and accumulated real output in this study as follows. As mentioned in Section 
3.5 regarding the early stages of economic development, a high level of inequality can 
hinder sustainable economic growth. Most of the ASEAN countries are developing 
economies and, therefore, greater income inequality leads to lower economic growth. For 
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 See Table E8 and Table E9 in Appendix E for detailed results. 
77
 See Section 5.4.1.iii for a detailed explanation of the real exchange rate response to a positive foreign real 
interest rate shock. 
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example, larger income inequality in response to a world real oil price shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime is associated with lower economic growth, whereas smaller 
income inequality is accompanied by positive economic growth under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Similar results can also be observed for a negative foreign demand shock. 
iv. Comparisons between the effects of external shocks 
From the responses of variables to external shocks, we conclude that the similarity 
between external shocks (a negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price 
shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock) is that under both exchange rate 
regimes, they seem to have no significant long-run impact on variables. Also, they have 
larger contemporaneous impacts on variables under a flexible under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. They have more prolonged effects on variables under a flexible than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. In terms of accumulated responses, all of these shocks have smaller 
impacts on variables under a fixed than under a flexible exchange rate regime. Compared 
to a negative foreign demand shock and a positive world real oil price shock, the effects of 
a positive foreign real interest rate shock on variables under both exchange rate regimes are 
more short-lived. This implies that the degree of international financial dependency is 
smaller than that of trade dependency. In addition, the degree of financial development and 
openness are also lower than that of international trade development and openness.  
Table 6.3 below is a summary for the responses of variables to external shocks under 
a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. Similar to the model of between-countries 
income gap, this study also examined whether the effects of shocks are symmetric or 
asymmetric by comparing the responses of real GDP between negative and positive 
shocks. The results which are presented in Figure E6, Appendix E show that shocks have 
symmetric impacts. 
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Table 6.3: Summary comparison of responses of the within-country income gap model to exogenous shocks 
Type of shock Contemporaneous response Responses Accumulated responses 
Decrease Increase Negligible More 
fluctuated 
Short-lived More 
prolonged 
Decrease Increase Negligible 
Real GDP 
Foreign demand  Fixed, 
flexible 
  Fixed 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
Flexible 
(Short-run) 
Flexible 
(Medium and 
long-run) 
Fixed 
 
World real oil price  Flexible  Fixed 
 
Flexible  
Foreign real interest 
rate 
 Flexible Fixed 
Flexible 
 Flexible 
Real exchange rate  
Foreign demand   Flexible 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
Fixed 
 
Flexible 
 
Flexible  Fixed 
 World real oil price   Flexible 
Foreign real interest 
rate 
Fixed 
Flexible 
  Fixed, 
flexible 
CPI 
Foreign demand  Fixed, 
flexible 
  Flexible 
 
Fixed Flexible 
 
Flexile  Fixed 
 
World real oil price  Fixed, 
flexible 
   Flexible 
Foreign real interest 
rate 
Flexible Fixed  Fixed 
Flexible 
  Fixed, 
flexible 
Within-country income gap 
Foreign demand  Fixed, 
Flexible 
  
 
Flexible 
 
Fixed Flexible 
 
Flexible  Fixed 
World real oil price  Fixed, 
flexible 
    Fixed, 
flexible 
 
Foreign real interest 
rate 
Flexible  Fixed Flexible Fixed 
Flexible 
  Fixed, 
flexible 
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6.4.2. Variance decomposition 
Table 6.4 illustrates the contribution of external shocks to the fluctuations of 
domestic variables under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Table 6.4: Variance decomposition (%) based on a baseline model 
 
 Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
Real 
GDP 
CPI Real 
exchange 
rate 
Within-
country 
income 
gap 
Real 
GDP 
CPI Real 
exchange 
rate 
Within-
country 
income 
gap 
Foreign demand shock (negative) 
Short-run 14.49 36.82 21.53 43.09 0.01 9.8 0.67 10.38 
Medium-run 13.27 44.15 21.38 51.65 0.028 10.13 0.73 11.0 
Long-run 13.41 44.28 21.51 51.86 0.033 10.15 0.73 11.02 
World real oil price shock (positive) 
Short-run 0.58 75.26 7.23 50.65 1.01 13.32 2.86 5.05 
Medium-run 1.20 75.32 6.78 54.33 1.13 14.24 2.89 12.08 
Long-run 1.21 74.92 6.85 54.22 1.40 14.54 2.90 17.25 
Foreign real interest rate shock (positive) 
Short-run 0.43 0.30 8.22 0.02 4.43 8.86 0.96 0.00 
Medium-run 15.0 0.84 6.60 4.93 4.21 5.79 1.54 0.10 
Long-run 14.94 0.85 6.59 4.91 4.20 5.71 1.54 0.10 
It can be seen from Table 6.4 that similar to the model for between-countries income 
gap, a foreign demand shock is a main external driver for short-run economic growth of 
ASEAN countries. The world real oil price shock explains less than 2% of the variation of 
real output. This suggests that the world real oil price does not play a crucial role in 
determining the real output of ASEAN countries. As indicated in Chapter 5 that because of 
the export-led growth strategy of ASEAN countries, foreign demand shock plays an 
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important role in the economic growth. 
The foreign demand shock is more important to explaining the fluctuation of real 
GDP under a fixed regime than under a flexible exchange rate regime. In the context of the 
former, it contributes to about 15% fluctuation of real output but only less than 1% for the 
latter. As explained previously, exporters and importers feel more certainty under a fixed 
exchange rate regime than under a flexible exchange rate regime and therefore, a fixed 
exchange rate regime promotes more international trade. Changes in foreign demand have 
a more important role in to play when explaining the fluctuation of economic growth under 
a fixed exchange rate regime compared to a flexible one. The rising importance of a 
foreign demand shock from the short-run to the long-run suggests that a foreign demand 
shock becomes more important for economic growth during the time horizon.  
Consistent with the finding from the model for between-countries income gap, the 
world real oil price shock explains most of the fluctuation of the price level under both 
exchange rate regimes. It induces about 75% and 15% of the variation in the price level 
under the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, respectively. This suggests that the 
world real oil price is the important source for explaining the fluctuation of the price level 
of ASEAN countries. As explained earlier, the importance of world real oil price to the 
price level is a consequence of oil-intensive production. In addition, some ASEAN 
countries highly depend on oil imports (Basnet & Upadhyaya 2015). Therefore, 
consumption price is volatility to the world real oil price. The foreign demand and world 
real oil price are the most dominant external source for the changes in within-country 
income gap compared to the remaining shocks. It is responsible for about 40-50% of the 
fluctuation of the within-country income gap volatility under a fixed exchange rate regime 
and about 5-17% of within-country fluctuation under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Table 6.5 presents a summary of the contribution to fluctuations of each variable for 
each shock for each type of exchange rate regime. 
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Table 6.5: Summary of the shock that makes the greatest contribution to each 
variable under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes 
 Fixed Flexible 
Short-run Medium-run Long-
run 
Short-
run 
Medium-
run 
Long-
run 
Real GDP Foreign 
demand 
shock 
Foreign interest rate 
shock 
Foreign real interest rate shock 
CPI World real oil price shock World real oil price shock 
 Real 
exchange 
rate 
Foreign demand shock 
Within-
country 
income 
gap 
World real oil price shock Foreign 
demand 
shock 
World real oil price 
shock 
 
6.4.3. Robustness test 
Similar to the between-countries income gap model, changing the order of restriction 
in the contemporaneous matrix between the price level and real exchange rate, is also 
employed. The results of the robustness test is illustrated in Figure E4 in Appendix E. 
The results of the robustness tests are similar to those of the original within-country 
income gap model, confirming the robustness for the within-country income gap model. In 
particular, variables respond more strongly and are persistently to external shocks under a 
flexible than a fixed exchange rate regime. A flexible exchange rate regime is better than a 
fixed exchange rate regime in reducing within country income inequality if a country is hit 
by a negative foreign demand shock. However, a fixed exchange rate regime is superior for 
the case of a positive world real oil price shock because it minimises negative impact on 
within country income inequality. Finally, a foreign real interest rate shock seems to have 
minor impact on within income inequality under either exchange rate regimes.  
6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has employed model of within-country income gap to investigate the 
effects and contribution of external shocks (including a negative foreign demand shock, a 
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positive world real oil price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock) to real 
output, CPI, real exchange rate, and within-country income gap under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes. To obtain the results, it is necessary to select the optimal lag length 
for the within-country income gap model. Our models for foreign demand, world real oil 
price and foreign real interest rate shocks were estimated with 1 lag. Following that, the 
exogeneity of external shocks was checked by the Granger causality test. The results of 
this test show that foreign demand, world real oil price and the foreign real interest rate can 
be treated as exogenous variables.  
The results of impulse responses based on estimating the SVAR model are very 
consistent with what the model of between-country income gap produced. It is evident that 
the price level and real exchange rate are more volatile to external shocks under a flexible 
compared to a fixed exchange rate regime. Also, the effects of external shocks on these 
variables are more prolonged under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Under both exchange rate regimes, the long-run impacts of the external shocks on these 
variables are unremarkable.   
In terms of cumulative value, the results regarding the responses of real GDP, the 
price level and real exchange rate regime to the external shocks in model for within-
country income gap are similar to that for the model for between-countries income gap. In 
particular, a negative foreign demand shock, except in the short-run generates higher 
economic growth under a flexible exchange rate regime and not a fixed exchange rate 
regime. A positive foreign real interest rate shock also generates higher economic growth 
for ASEAN countries with a flexible regime than countries with a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Additionally, a negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign real interest 
rate shock trigger lower inflation in a country with a flexible exchange rate regime.  The 
accumulated effects of both types of shocks on inflation seem very small under a fixed 
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exchange rate regime. Moreover, in terms of accumulated value, these two types of shocks 
cause a small real depreciation for countries with a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Nonetheless, these shocks seem to have negligible impacts on real exchange rate under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Referring to accumulated responses, a negative foreign 
demand shock equalises within-country incomes under both exchange rate regimes, with 
greater reduction in a flexible regime. A positive foreign real interest rate shock appears to 
have insignificant effects on within-countries income gap under both exchange rate 
regimes. 
Similar to the model for between-countries income gap, the results for the within-
country income gap model suggest that in terms of cumulative value, a fixed exchange rate 
regime is superior to a flexible one in buffering a positive world real oil price shock. In 
particular, the shock generates higher economic growth under a fixed exchange rate regime 
but lower economic growth under a flexible one. The shock results in higher inflation 
under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. However, a country with a flexible 
exchange rate regime suffers from higher inflation when the world real oil price increases. 
For accumulated effects, countries with a flexible exchange rate regime experience real 
depreciation as a result of a positive world real oil price shock. Real exchange rate under a 
fixed exchange rate regime seems to not be affected significantly by the shock. Finally, the 
within-country income gap is widened by a positive world real oil price shock under a 
flexible than under a fixed regime.  
The results of variance decomposition indicate that a foreign demand shock which is 
followed by a foreign real interest rate is the main economic growth driver for countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime. A foreign demand is also a dominant source for the 
volatility of real exchange rate in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
fluctuations in price level of countries with a fixed exchange rate regime are mostly driven 
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by the world real oil price. Again, a world real oil price shock is a major factor explaining 
the variation of income inequality under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Compared to the remaining shocks, foreign real interest rate is more important in 
explaining the volatility of economic growth of countries with a flexible exchange rate 
regime. More volatility of the price level and real exchange rate of countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes is explained by the world real oil price shock rather than the 
remaining types of shocks. World real oil price is also responsible for the largest medium-
run and long-run variation of within-country income inequality under a flexible exchange 
rate regime. The short-run of within-country income inequality under a flexible exchange 
rate regime is mostly driven by a foreign demand shock.  
To test the robustness of the model of within-country income gap, a different 
approach, namely changing the order of the price level and real exchange rate in the 
contemporaneous matrix was employed. The robustness tests elicited the same results as 
those reported in the original model. It can therefore be stated that the within-country 
income gap model is robust. In the next chapter the empirical results will be employed to 
discuss the implications for the policies chosen by ASEAN countries. 
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated and compared the effects of external shocks (a 
negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a positive foreign 
real interest rate shock) on domestic macroeconomic variables and the income gap between 
and within ASEAN economies.  
The results from using an impulse response function showed that in general real 
output, the price level and real exchange rate fluctuate by more from external shocks under 
a flexible exchange rate regime compare to that under a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
terms of accumulated value, a negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign real 
interest rate shock generate higher economic growth and lower inflation under a flexible 
exchange rate regime than under a fixed one. In addition, compared with a fixed exchange 
rate regime, a negative foreign demand shock can reduce by more the between-countries 
and within-country income gap under a flexible exchange rate regime. A positive foreign 
real interest rate shock seems to have very small impact on the between-countries and 
within-country income gap. In general, a positive world real oil price shock has negative 
impacts on ASEAN countries. In general, a positive world real oil price shock leads to 
lower economic growth for countries with flexible exchange rate. Under both exchange 
rate regimes, a world real oil price shock causes higher inflation and a higher between-
countries and within-country income gap.    
The results of variance decomposition indicated that foreign demand and foreign real 
interest rate shocks are major drivers of changes in economic growth while prices, 
between-countries and within-country income gaps are mainly driven by world real oil 
price shock. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 that the establishment of the AEC in 2015 is a milestone 
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for the regional integration. Regional integration encourages the movement of goods, 
services, investment, labour and capital which then promotes output and economic growth. 
However, external shocks may be threats to the success of the AEC in attaining targets 
such as high economic growth, macroeconomic stability, narrowing the between-countries 
and within-country income gap. Hence, this section presents exchange rate policy 
implications for the authorities of ASEAN countries in obtaining these targets. Instituting 
these policies will help them cope with external shocks and enable them to achieve 
macroeconomic priorities. This will contribute to the success of the AEC. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents policy implication for 
choosing the exchange rate regime for the success of the AEC. Section 7.3 discusses policy 
implications for dealing with external shocks. Policy implications for monetary 
cooperation are discussed in section 7.4. Finally, major conclusions from this chapter are 
presented in Section 7.5. 
7.2. THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME FOR THE SUCCESS 
OF THE AEC 
The results from the impulse response functions shown in the two previous chapters 
indicate that the superiority of the exchange rate regime depends on the types of shocks 
that occur and key policy targets. These include output stability, price stability, real 
exchange rate stability, narrowing income gaps between countries and within a country. 
These objectives are also what the AEC wants to achieve. Therefore, the choice of 
exchange rate regime to make this happen is key to the success of the AEC. This section 
will suggest the choice of exchange rate regime depending on how the authorities prioritise 
these targets.  
Output stability: the empirical results for real GDP for both the between-countries 
income gap model and the within-country income gap model show that output volatility to 
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external shocks (a negative foreign demand, a positive world real oil price and a positive 
foreign real interest rate) is larger under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime should be applied if an 
ASEAN country pursues the target of output stability. The application of a fixed exchange 
rate regime to stabilise output; however, also may vary depending on the stage of 
development. A good example of this concerns those ASEAN countries in the early 
economic phase of development such as the CLMV countries, may prefer their currencies 
to be undervalued rather than overvalued. Although undervaluation results in costlier 
imported goods and services in terms of domestic currency, it increases international trade 
competitiveness, exports and foreign investment. At this stage of development, people tend 
to save more than spend and, therefore, they have less demand for imported goods and 
services. Therefore, an undervaluation can play a role in stabilising output via exports. 
Regarding ASEAN countries at a higher stage of development with high imported-input 
such as Singapore, this country may not undervalue its currency to improve the trade 
balance. Hence, this country tends to overvalue its currency but it does not seriously 
undermine the competitiveness of exports because a lower price of imported-input 
decreases the costs of export production (Abeysinghe & Yeok 1998). However, the 
overvaluation plays a role in maintaining low inflation which promotes saving, investment 
and then output stability. Therefore, output stability can be attained by overvaluation in 
Singapore. 
The effectiveness of a fixed exchange rate regime in ensuring greater output stability 
depends on the degree of financial market development. Levine (1999) pointed out that a 
well-developed financial sector assists the risk management and supplies information about 
risks which helps allocate capital more effectively. This contributes to reducing growth 
volatility. Denizer et al. (2002) concluded that countries with a higher level of financial 
market development experience smaller output volatility from shocks. Kunieda (2008) 
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argued that at first, more developed financial markets reduce output volatility. Nonetheless, 
further development of financial markets can magnify the impacts of shocks on the 
economy because businesses increase their financial leverage which creates higher risks 
and volatility. Based upon these studies, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of a 
fixed exchange rate regime on reducing the output volatility depends on the level of 
development of the financial markets of ASEAN countries. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of a fixed exchange rate regime in creating less output 
stability depends on the importance of the trade channel (Iacoviello & Navarro 2018). A 
good example is that a country with higher trade dependency is more affected by a positive 
foreign real interest rate shock. This is because a higher foreign real interest rate reduces 
the demand for imported goods by foreigners. As a result, with higher trade dependency, 
lower foreign demand decreases domestic real output by more. Therefore, assuming a fixed 
exchange rate regime, a country with lower trade dependency may stabilise real output 
more quickly than one with higher trade dependency.     
Price stability: Findings on the behaviour of the price level to external shocks 
indicate that the price level fluctuates more under a flexible exchange rate regime. This 
finding is consistent with Ghosh et al. (1997) and Das (2003). As mentioned earlier, the 
greater volatility of the price level under a flexible exchange rate regime is due to the 
immediate response of the nominal exchange rate to shocks which leads to faster changes 
in the imported price and then the domestic price level. However, under a fixed, the money 
supply and then the price level is passive and  subject to a time-lagged (Terra 2015). 
Hence, a fixed exchange rate regime is preferred if stability of the price level is a priority.   
However, the stability of the price level depends on characteristics of each country. 
For example, the more dependent one country is on imported oil the greater the impact on 
the price level and hence, countries with higher degree of imported oil dependency may 
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need more time to stabilise the price level compared to country with  less oil dependency. 
Real exchange rate stability: Guzman et al. (2018) pointed out that real exchange 
rate instability will drive uncertainty for the production of tradable goods and services. 
This reduces investment in these sectors. As indicated in the previous chapter, the real 
exchange rate is more stable under a fixed exchange rate regime. This is because in the 
short-run the nominal exchange rate responds faster than the price level and this leads to a 
larger adjustment of the real exchange rate under a flexible compared to a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime is the better choice for an ASEAN 
country if its target is to achieve stability of the real exchange rate. With a fixed exchange 
rate regime, governments can stabilise the nominal exchange rate which then contributes to 
stabilising the real exchange rate. 
However, the role of a fixed exchange rate regime in stabilising the real exchange 
rate depends on the characteristics of each of the ASEAN countries. Calderón and Kubota 
(2018) pointed out that trade openness can minimise or amplify the effects of nominal or 
real shocks on the real exchange rate. Therefore, assuming the presence of real shocks and 
a fixed exchange rate regime, countries with a lower trade openness can stabilise the real 
exchange rate more quickly than countries with more trade openness.  
Moreover, the superiority of a fixed exchange rate regime in stabilising of real 
exchange rate depends on the resource deposits and dependence on oil imports. Heavy 
dependence on oil imports would result in trade deficits and downward pressure on the 
currency and a loss of international reserves to maintain the exchange rate. Therefore, it is 
costlier to stabilise the real exchange rate in countries with higher degree of imported oil 
dependency than countries with lower degree of imported oil dependency. 
In addition, Calderón and Kubota indicated that financial openness can exacerbate or 
mitigate the impact of nominal or real shocks on the real exchange rate. Hence, with the 
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presence of real shock and a fixed exchange rate regime, the real exchange rate stability in 
countries with higher financial openness may need less time to stable real exchange rate 
than in countries with lower financial openness.  
Narrowing the between-countries income gap: The accumulated impulse response 
of between-countries income gap shows that a foreign real interest rate shock seems to 
have small impacts on the between-countries income gap under both exchange rate 
regimes. This indicates that most ASEAN countries are not well integrated into global 
financial markets. Hence, the choice of exchange rate regime seems not affect remarkably 
between-countries income gap of ASEAN countries for the case of a foreign real interest 
rate shock. 
The between-countries income gap in this study is calculated as the difference 
between the income of one country to the average income of all ten ASEAN countries. A 
decline in this income gap means more income convergence and hence, the income gap 
between richer and poorer countries has reduced. A good example is that if the income gap 
in Singapore reduces then Singapore’s income is demonstrating more convergent to the 
average income line. This leads to a reduction in the income gap between Singapore and 
lower income countries. In addition, a decrease in the income gap of Myanmar means its 
income is more convergent to the average income line. This reduces the income gap 
between Myanmar and higher income countries.  
The results of accumulated responses in both models for the between-countries 
income gap and within-country income gap show that a flexible exchange rate regime is 
superior to a fixed exchange rate regime in reducing the between-countries income gap if a 
country is hit by a negative foreign demand shock. The effect of a negative foreign demand 
shock on between-countries income gap of each country may vary according the degree of 
trade openness and trade dependence. For instance, countries with more trade openness 
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would be most impacted by a decline in foreign demand on income than countries with less 
trade openness. Therefore, the income gap may reduce by more for countries with lower 
trade openness. In addition, the stage of development may affect the income gap. For low 
income economies, they would require a depreciation of the currency to remain 
competitive and at least avoid a widening of the income gap. If the most trade dependent 
countries were high income countries a depreciation of the currency with a flexible 
exchange rate would reduce the income gap even more. To conclude, with the presence of 
a foreign demand shock, compared to a fixed exchange rate regime, a flexible exchange 
rate regime can help ASEAN countries reduce more between-countries income gap; 
however, the degree of reduction depends on characteristics of each country. 
The results on the accumulated responses of between-countries income gap to world 
real oil price shock indicates that the shock widens the gap under both exchange rate 
regimes. However, the shock causes by less the between-countries income gap under a 
fixed exchange rate regime compared to a flexible exchange rate. Hence, a fixed exchange 
rate regime seems better to minimise the negative impact of a positive world real oil price 
shock on between-country income gap. Nonetheless, the degree of the effectiveness of a 
fixed exchange rate regime in minimising the negative impact of the shock on between-
countries income gap depends on circumstances of each ASEAN country. As indicated 
earlier, heavy dependence on oil imports would result in trade deficits and downward 
pressure on the currency and a loss of foreign reserves to maintain the exchange rate. The 
money supply would decline, interest rates would rise putting further downward pressure 
on income. Therefore, assuming that a fixed exchange rate regime has been applied, 
between-countries income gap in countries with higher dependence on oil imports is more 
affected by the shock compared to that in countries with lower dependence on oil imports.  
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Narrowing within-country income inequality: Based on the results in the 
empirical chapters, we suggest that a flexible exchange rate regime rather than a fixed 
exchange rate regime should be chosen to narrow within-country income inequality when a 
negative foreign demand shock eventuates. Nominal devaluation as a result of a negative 
foreign demand shock does not play a role in stablising external demand because ASEAN 
countries price their export goods in foreign currency. This reduces workers’ incomes in 
the tradable sector. The incomes of people working in the non-tradable sector increase 
because the expediture-switching effect of a depreciation generates substitution from 
imported goods to non-traded goods. This reduces the income gap between workers in the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, only the incomes of 
workers in the tradable sector fall and therefore, the income gap reduces by less compared 
to that under a flexible exchange rate regime. However, how the within-country income 
gap decreases depends on the degree of trade openness and trade dependency. A country 
with a flexible exchange rate regime, a high degree of trade openness and trade 
dependency are more affected by a negative foreign demand shock. As a result, the income 
of workers in the export sector declines  more strongly while the income of workers in the 
non-tradable goods sector increases more sharply. Therefore, the within-country income 
gap is reduced by much more in these countries compared with countries having a lower 
degree of trade openness and trade dependency. 
The empirical results show that a positive world real oil price shock leads to higher 
within-countries income gap under both exchange rate regimes. However, this finding can 
only be applied to oil-importing countries because in oil-exporting countries, a positive 
world real oil price shock creates more revenues for governments which they can then use 
for welfare expenditure to assist the poor. Therefore, within-country income gap may be 
lower in oil-exporting countries. 
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The empirical results indicates that within-country income gap is higher under a 
flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. This can be explaine as follow. In regards 
to oil-importing countries, under both exchange rate regimes, higher price level, which is a 
result of a positive world real oil price shock, may lead to real output contraction and then 
unemployment. Essama-Nssah et al. (2007) pointed out that high-skilled workers are less 
affected by unemployment compared with low and medium-skilled workers. Therefore, the 
shock widens the within-country income gap in oil-importing countries. However, the 
within-country income gap will be greater under a flexible than under a fixed exchange 
rate regime because the price level increases more strongly under a flexible than under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. This is because the price level under a fixed exchange rate 
regime is only affected by higher price of domestic goods. Nonetheless, the price level 
under a flexible exchange rate regime results from both higher price of imported goods and 
higher price of domestic goods. As a result, higher price level under a flexible exchange 
rate regime leads to greater real output contraction and unemployment. This leads to 
greater income inequality between higher skilled and lower skilled workers under a 
flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime 
is a suggestion for oil-importing countries if the priority is limiting the negative effect of a 
positive world real oil price shock on within-country income gap.   
7.3. POLICY IMPLICATION IN DEALING WITH EXTERNAL SHOCK  
The results indicate that the effects of a shock depend on the types of external shocks 
and the exchange rate regime in operation. Therefore, this section presents policy 
implications for ASEAN countries in coping with external shocks according to exchange 
rate regime that they are applying. 
A negative foreign demand shock: The results indicate that although a negative 
foreign demand shock results in a short-run real depreciation, domestic currency is real 
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appreciation in the longer time horizon under a flexible exchange rate regime. This is 
because the price level is sticky in the short-run and hence, a nominal depreciation, as a 
result of a negative foreign demand shock, leads to a real depreciation. However, in the 
longer term, what happens to the real exchange rate regime depends on how the nominal 
exchange rate changes relative to prices. A real appreciation will affect competitiveness, 
which then dampens the demand for ASEAN goods and trade of the ASEAN economies as 
well as making the impact of the decline in foreign demand worse. Therefore, ASEAN 
countries with flexible exchange rate regimes can conduct policies to deal with the effects 
of the shock on the real exchange rate. For example, they can purchase foreign securities to 
decrease the nominal value of the domestic currency which contributes to a lower real 
exchange rate.  
Another policy to lower the real exchange rate is by easing monetary policy such as 
by increasing the money supply or reducing the interest rate if a country experiences low 
inflation. The expansionary monetary policy results in a fall in the nominal interest rate. 
This leads to a reduction in foreigners’ demand for the domestic currency of a given 
ASEAN country. In turn, this leads to a higher real exchange rate. In short, a flexible 
inflation-targeting monetary policy can be combined with a flexible exchange rate regime 
to ensure the exchange rate remains stable in the presence of external shocks. However, 
these policies’ effectiveness depends on the degree of trade openness and trade 
dependence. Countries with a higher degree of trade openness and trade dependence may 
be more affected by a negative foreign demand shock and therefore, these policies may be 
less powerful. This requires that these policies be implemented more frequently.   
The empirical results show that a negative foreign demand shock leads to a 
contemporaneous decline in economic growth under both exchange rate regimes. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy is ineffective while fiscal policy is effective. 
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Hence, to stabilise real output, ASEAN countries with a fixed exchange rate regime should 
conduct an expansionary fiscal policy. This increases output and then money demand. 
However, this may lead to an increase in the domestic interest and a nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. Therefore, ASEAN countries should buy foreign assets to offset these effects. 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an expansionary monetary policy should be 
conducted to encourage investment and consumption which then stimulates economic 
growth. The degree of the expansion of fiscal policy and monetary policy depends on the 
level of trade dependence and trade openness. A country exhibiting more trade dependence 
and a high degree of trade openness may be more affected by a negative foreign demand 
shock. Therefore, the expansion of fiscal policy or monetary policy may need to be greater 
and more long-lasting. 
A positive world real oil price shock: The results from the accumulated impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions indicate that in general, under both 
exchange rate regimes, a world real oil price shock is an important source of fluctuation of 
the price level, between-countries and within-country income gap. It also causes negative 
effects on the economy such as output contraction, higher inflation and greater income 
inequality (both between-countries and within-country). To deal with the world real oil 
price shock, the appropriate policy should be applied according to the characteristics of 
each of the ASEAN country such as whether it is an oil-importing or an oil-exporting 
country, and whether the exchange rate regime applied is fixed or flexible. For an oil-
exporting country a positive world real oil price shock generates an exchange rate 
appreciation which then reduces the price of imports. Changes in the overall price level 
depend on the decrease in the price of imports and increases in the price of domestically 
produced goods and services. In addition, a higher oil price increases tax revenue which 
then promotes government spending and real GDP. Nonetheless, an oil-importing country 
is faced with inflation and an output contraction as a result of a positive world real oil price 
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shock. This is equivalent to stagflation as a consequence of this supply shock. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime: An oil importer with a fixed exchange rate 
regime should ensure enough foreign reserves to maintain a fixed rate to cope with the 
increase in the oil price. Otherwise, it should devalue its currency. In addition, this country 
should conduct tight fiscal policy to control the inflation rate.   
Furthermore, the results show that a positive world real oil price shock causes a 
higher between-countries income gap for countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. This 
may be because higher oil price creates income gap between oil-exporting countries (which 
have revenues from higher oil price) and oil-importing countries (which have to pay more 
because of higher oil price). In our model, we did not distinguish between oil-importing 
and oil-exporting countries. Hence, in reality, this result is only valid in two cases: first, 
oil-exporting and high income countries (because the shock makes them become richer); 
and second, oil-importing and low income countries (because the shock makes them 
become poorer). If reducing between-countries income gap is a priority, these countries, 
especially oil-importing and low income ones, should apply fiscal expansion policy to 
increase aggregate demand. This contributes to higher economic growth and then reducing 
the income gap between-countries.  
Nonetheless, oil-exporting and low income countries become richer and hence, the 
between-countries income gap falls. Similarly, oil-importing and high income countries 
experience a lower between-countries income gap because a higher oil price makes them 
poorer.  
As indicated in chapter 6 that inflation, which is a result of a positive world real oil 
price shock, may lead to the higher within-country income gap for countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Therefore, fiscal policy expansion, in particular, subsidise on oil 
products should be conducted to keep price lower, which then play a role in reducing the 
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within-country income gap. 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime: the results show that a positive world real oil 
price shock results in higher inflation for ASEAN countries. Regarding oil-importing 
countries, if inflation stability is a priority then a contractionary monetary policy (with 
higher short-term interest rate or slower growth rate of money supply) should be applied. 
Economic growth and then inflation will fall. In terms of oil-exporting countries, monetary 
policy contraction is needed. The degree of contraction depends on the impact of higher oil 
price on household, export demand and flows of investment.   
Additionally, a positive world real oil price shock results in an immediate real output 
contraction. Therefore, an oil-importing country can conduct an expansionary monetary 
policy by maintaining a low short-term interest rate or increasing the money supply. This 
increased the aggregate demand which then promotes short-term real output. 
The results also show that a positive world real oil price shock increases the within-
country income gap in countries with a flexible exchange rate regime. Following Shi et al. 
(2015), because of the full exchange rate pass through to consumer price, the depreciation 
as a result of a positive world real oil price shock leads to even higher inflation. This leads 
to a decrease in aggregated demand and then non-traded goods demand. This causes 
unemployment and reduces the incomes of people working in the non-traded sector 
However, Shi et al. (2015) showed that an expenditure-switching effect of the deprecation 
leads to substitution between imported-goods and non-traded goods. This substitution 
effect increases the demand for non-traded goods which then creates more jobs and 
incomes for workers in the non-traded sector. In total, the income effect may dominate the 
substitution effect, resulting in lower incomes in the non-traded sector. In terms of 
employees in the traded sector, Shi et al. (2015) showed that the export price of ASEAN 
countries is fixed in terms of foreign currency and hence, the deprecation which results 
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from a positive world real oil price shock does not change the price and volume of export 
goods.  
Therefore, the incomes of workers in the traded sector do not change. As a result, a 
positive world real oil price shock widens the within-country income gap of oil importing 
countries. Consequently, if an oil-importing country with a flexible exchange rate regime 
wishes to reduce its with-country income inequality then and expansionary monetary 
policy should be applied because a lower interest rate promotes investment and creates 
more jobs. In addition, the expediture-switching effect of a depreciation which is as a result 
of an expansionary monetary policy moves consumption from imported goods to non-
traded goods. As a result, people working in the non-trable sector have more jobs and 
better incomes. This reduces the income gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
 A positive world real oil price shock also results in a higher between-countries 
income gap under a flexible exchange rate regime. This may be because oil-exporting 
countries obtain more revenues from a higher oil price while the cost of importing oil has 
increased in oil-importing countries. If oil-importing countries wish to narrow the between-
countries income gap then monetary policy expansion should be applied. By increasing the 
money supply or reducing the interest rate, an expansionary monetary policy can stimulate 
aggregate demand which plays a role in boosting economic growth. This helps these 
countries reduce the income gap with oil exporting countries.  
A foreign real interest rate shock: The results of variance decomposition show that 
a foreign real interest rate shock is the second most important source in driving fluctuations 
of economic growth. As previously indicated, higher foreign interest rate decreases income 
and demand on ASEAN goods of foreigners.  Hence, given that approximately 75% of 
ASEAN’s trade is with extra-ASEAN countries and export-led growth policy, a positive 
foreign real interest rate shock becomes an important source driving the economic growth 
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of ASEAN countries. 
In addition, FDI inflows depend on the difference between the rate of return from 
FDI and the foreign real interest rate. Hence, the foreign real interest rate is a determinant 
of FDI inflows. Due to FDI-led growth strategy of ASEAN countries, growth will be 
driven by FDI. Therefore, the foreign real interest rate plays an important role in driving 
the economic growth of ASEAN countries. This shock makes a more significant 
contribution to fluctuations of macroeconomic variables such as economic growth and the 
real exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime compared to that under a flexible 
one. As mentioned earlier, this is because compared to a flexible exchange rate regime, a 
fixed exchange rate regime brings more certainty for investors and, hence attracts more 
FDI inflows.  
Empirical results indicate that a foreign real interest rate shock leads to higher 
inflation in the short-run for country with a fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore, a 
country with a fixed exchange rate regime should pay more attention to coping with 
unanticipated foreign real interest rate shocks. Keeping low inflation leads to increased 
purchasing power, which increases the demand for goods and services. This results in a 
higher GDP level and economic growth and thereby contributes to reducing the income 
gap with other ASEAN countries.  
Other recommendations: Exchange rate risks such as a depreciation negatively 
affects foreign currency denominated debt, inflation and economic growth, which then 
contributes to increasing the between-countries and within-country income gaps. OECD 
(2018) has indicated that the CLMV countries have limited access to sources of local 
currency denominated debt. In addition, inadequate and costly exchange rate risk hedging 
instruments limit their access to the international capital market. Therefore, these countries 
should further develop exchange rate risk hedging instruments, which will contribute to 
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curtailing losses when taking part in the international capital market. This contributes to 
reduce the income gap between them and the higher income countries. 
Features of external shocks, for example temporary or permanent, should be taken 
into account because responses of the economy to each distinguished feature may vary, 
therefore, policies will differ. Downes (2007) showed that if households believe that a 
positive oil price shock is temporary then they will respond less to their lower real income 
and still retain their consumption via savings. Therefore, the responses of polices to deal 
with the shock may be smaller. However, a shock may have medium-run and long-run 
effects. Medium-run and long-run outcomes may last far beyond the effectiveness of short-
run policies. Therefore, the authorities should identify which types of external shocks have 
short-run and long-run effects. Identifying external shocks that have short-run effects helps 
the authorities devise suitable policies to implement suitable policies to deal with 
contemporaneous effects. In addition, identifying external shocks leading to long-run 
effects helps the authorities develop and implement appropriate policies for sustained 
economic growth.  
Moreover, ASEAN countries’ governments should monitor changes in the policies 
and the economy of major trading partners to predict changes in their demand on goods 
and services so they can implement prompt policies to deal with foreign demand shocks. 
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONETARY, FINANCIAL AND EXCHANGE 
RATE COOPERATION 
The empirical results for the model representing the between-countries income gap 
show that variables (output, price level, real exchange rate, income inequality) respond 
differently under different exchange rate regimes. This means that the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to the same shock vary within ASEAN because they have quite 
different exchange rate regimes as well as different economic structures, resources as well 
as being at different stages of development. Therefore, policies that each ASEAN country 
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applies to cope with shocks may be different. In addition, some ASEAN countries have a 
higher inflation rate than others and this difference leads to unbalanced or inconsistent 
purchasing power and investment. This affects economic growth and per capita income 
which then widens the income gap between the countries. In addition, ASEAN countries 
mostly trade with countries outside the region and hence, monetary and fiscal policy 
between ASEAN members seems to have little spill-over impacts. As a result, each 
country can independently operate its own monetary and fiscal policy (Downes 2007). This 
is an obstacle for policy coordination (such as exchange rate coordination) between the 
ASEAN countries. Capannelli and Menon (2010) pointed out that based on the European 
experience, the exchange rate regime chosen by members is not essential to establish a 
monetary union as long as their exchange rate regimes allow them to satisfy convergence 
criteria. They also showed there is no requirement of a common exchange rate regime for 
the period of transition. Therefore, Capannelli and Menon (2010) suggest that each 
ASEAN country apply its own exchange rate regime, yet have the same standard of 
inflation targeting where fluctuation bands and indicators should not differ. This helps 
ASEAN countries to simultaneously achieve targets such as reducing inflation and 
exchange rate stability. 
Yong (2004) indicates that the intensity of intra-regional trade and convergence in 
macroeconomic conditions (such as level of economic development and the readiness for 
economic integration) are two of the most crucial criteria for the suitability of a common 
currency. Since most ASEAN trade is with non ASEAN members, the major concern  is 
with maintaining exchange rate stability with currencies of major trading partners and in 
particular the US dollar rather than exchange rate stability between themselves. Therefore, 
to promote intra-ASEAN trade, the exchange rates of the ASEAN countries should be 
better coordinated. In particular, each country should retain intra-regional exchange rate 
stability. This promotes intra-ASEAN trade and FDI flows from the higher income 
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countries to the lower income ones, thereby stimulating economic growth and reducing the 
between-countries income gap. As suggested by Ho and Yuen (2011), to maintain the 
stability of the intra-ASEAN exchange rates, the countries should adopt the same basket of 
currencies to peg their currencies to such as  the USD, EUR or JPY. This helps ASEAN 
countries limit exchange rate risks and keeps the intra-ASEAN exchange rate stable. This 
then plays a role in reducing the transaction costs within ASEAN and promoting intra-
ASEAN trade, FDI and economic growth. As a result, this may generate a narrowing of the 
between-countries income gap which then creates greater convergence in macroeconomic 
conditions and the feasibility of a common currency in the future. In addition, reducing 
between-countries income gap promotes long-run coordination between ASEAN countries 
(Park 2000).  
At present, ASEAN countries do not meet the precondition for forming an OCA due 
to income disparity problems, economic divergence and the asymmetry of external shocks. 
The empirical results suggest that the responses of macroeconomic variables and the 
between-countries income gap to external shocks vary according to different exchange rate 
regimes. Therefore, policies aimed at dealing with external shocks that ASEAN countries 
should apply are different. In addition, applying a similar exchange rate regime for the 
ASEAN countries seems impossible at this juncture because each country has their own 
priorities. The key issue is the acceptance of common goals and priorities (for example, all 
countries accept that closing the income gap between them is the top priority) and taking 
actions in terms of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy to achieve this. If certain 
ASEAN countries have to accept greater domestic output, price and real exchange rate 
volatility then a critical issue is whether they will accept this just to enable other member 
countries to close the income gap. Therefore, as suggested by Rillo (2018), greater 
macroeconomic and policy coordination is desired to attain a common development goal. 
This coordination would include regional surveillance, peer review, policy discussions, and 
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market consultations. The author also suggested that trade and financial policies should be 
coordinated to facilitate deeper integration in trade and investment. A positive foreign real 
interest rate shock can lead to capital withdrawals of investors which then may result in 
financial instability. Hence, financial supports through Chiang Mai Initiative and its 
Multilateralization (CMIM) are needed to reduce the negative impact of the shock. 
Especially, the supports should be prioirtised on small and lower income countries such as 
CLMV.  
ASEAN countries should cooperate in elimiting regulatory barriers. This helps 
regional financial market become more integrated. An integrated regional financial market 
encourages the capital flows from the higher income countries to the lower income 
countries, which then promotes economic growth of the lower income countries and speed 
up the process of catching up in GDP per capita. This contributes to reduce between-
countries income gap in ASEAN.  
7.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has discussed issues for ASEAN countries in relation to choosing which 
exchange rate regime suits them best. The optimal exchange rate regime depends on the 
priorities that a country pursues. A fixed exchange rate regime based on the evidence 
presented in the previous chapter, will attain stable output, real exchange rate and price 
level stability. In terms of reducing the negative impact of shocks on between-countries 
and within-country income inequality, a flexible exchange rate regime is the better option 
if the shock emanates from foreign demand while a fixed exchange rate regime should be 
chosen if a world real oil price shock occurs. However, the effectiveness of these exchange 
rate regimes in stabilising output, real exchange rate, price level and narrowing between-
countries and within-country income gap depends on the characteristics of each ASEAN 
country such as degree of trade dependency, trade openness, financial development, 
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whether they are oil importers or oil exporters and stage of development. 
This chapter also suggested appropriate monetary or fiscal policy to deal with a 
foreign demand shock, world real oil price shock and foreign real external shocks 
according to each type of exchange rate regime that an ASEAN country has applied. In 
particular, to improve the competitiveness of ASEAN countries, those with a flexible 
exchange rate regime should conduct an expansionary monetary policy or purchase foreign 
securities. Additionally, an expansionary fiscal policy for countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes while an expansionary monetary policy for countries with a flexible one, 
should be applied to ameliorate the damage done by a negative foreign demand shock on 
economic growth.  
In terms of a positive world real oil price shock, this study suggests that a fiscal 
policy contraction for oil-importing countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and a 
monetary policy contraction for oil-importing countries with a flexible exchange rate 
regime should be employed to restrain the inflation. However, if a narrowing of the 
between-countries income gap is a priority then a fiscal policy expansion should be applied 
for oil-importing countries with fixed exchange rate regime whereas an expansionary 
monetary policy is a recommendation for oil-importing countries with a flexible exchange 
rate regime.  
A positive foreign real interest rate shock causes higher inflation for countries with a 
fixed exchange rate regime. This type of shock also plays an important role in the 
economic growth of countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore, these 
countries should pay more attention to this type of shock and conducting tight fiscal policy 
to curb inflation.  
 This chapter also suggests that ASEAN authorities should identify the characteristics 
of external shocks such as whether they are permanent or temporary and their effects on 
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variables (short-run or long-run), so they can implement appropriate policy responses. In 
addition, changes in policies and the economy of trading partners should be monitored to 
implement timely policies with the objective of limiting the negative effects of external 
shocks. Moreover, a world real oil price shock especially should be taken into account in 
establishing macroeconomic policies. This is because an oil price shock is the main source 
driving the fluctuations in the price level, the real exchange rate, between-countries income 
gap and within-country income gap.  
This chapter has also recommended some cooperation policies; in particular, while 
each ASEAN member country can pursue its own exchange rate regime, they should apply 
the same inflation targeting standard. This helps to promote intra-ASEAN trade. Doing so 
will encourage investment from higher income countries to lower income ones. Thus 
ASEAN can enjoy higher economic growth and reduce the income gap between member 
countries which is one of the main targets of the AEC. Finally, further macroeconomic and 
policy cooperation such as regional surveillance, policy discussion and market consultation 
should be conducted to obtain common development of mutual benefit.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1. INTRODUCTION  
Aiming to transform ASEAN into “a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive 
region with equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic 
disparity”, the AEC was established in 2015. The next phrase of economic integration is to 
achieve AEC in 2025, which was outlined in the AEC Blueprint 2025, with characteristics 
such as sustained high economic growth, resilience to the external shocks, more equitable 
and inclusive economic growth that narrow the income gap between and within ASEAN 
countries, highly regional integration, more integrated with the world economy. However, 
more integration to the global economy means that ASEAN will be more greatly affected 
by the external shocks which may in turn impact negatively on macroeconomic stability, 
economic growth and inflation. In the literature, exchange rate regime plays a role in 
transmitting the effects of external shocks on real output, real exchange rate and the price 
level.  
The literature shows the links between economic growth and between-countries 
income gap. It also indicates the relationship between real exchange rate, inflation, 
economic growth and within-country income gap. However, no study has yet investigated 
the role of exchange rate regime in transmitting the impacts of external shocks on between-
countries and within-country income gap. Hence, this thesis investigates the effects and 
contributions of external shocks to between-countries and within-country income gap 
under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. It also looks at the effects and the 
contribution of external shocks to real output, the price level and real exchange rate for 10 
ASEAN countries under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. This helps us better 
understand the external shocks mechanism transmission to real output, the price level, real 
exchange rate, between-countries and within-country income gap via the exchange rate 
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regime channel. This study suggests policy implications for ASEAN authorities for the 
attainment of the AEC. 
This study aims to answer the following questions: 1. What are differences in 
responses of real output, the price level and real exchange rate to external shocks 
(including a negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a 
positive foreign real interest rate shock) between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate 
regime? 2. What impacts do external shocks make on the between-countries income gap 
and within-country income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime? 3. What 
are the similarities and differences between the effects of external shocks under a fixed and 
a flexible exchange rate regime? 4. Which exchange rate regime is superior in minimising 
the negative effects of external shocks? 5. Which is the dominant external source of the 
volatility of real output, the price level, real exchange rate, between-countries income gap 
and within-country income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime?  
These research questions are addressed in the next section, Section 8.2. Section 8.3 
provides policy implications for ASEAN countries in coping with external shocks. It also 
give recommendations for the exchange rate regime best suited to ASEAN in reducing 
negative impacts of external shocks on real output, the price level, real exchange rate, 
between-countries and within-country income gap. Furthermore, it proposes 
recommendations on policies for regional cooperation. Section 8.4 presents some 
limitations of this study. Finally, based on these limitations, Section 8.5 suggests possible 
avenues that future research could pursue.  
8.2. SUMMARY OF MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section presents main findings for research questions which were raised in 
Chapter 1. The research questions are on the following: investigating and comparing the 
effects of external shocks on real output, the price level, real exchange rate, between-
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countries and within-country income gap between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate 
regime; identifying the dominant shocks driving the volatility of these variables under a 
fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime; and identifying the policy recommendations for 
ASEAN countries in reducing the negative impacts of external shocks and the attainment 
of the AEC. The main findings are summarised below. 
1. What are differences in responses of real output, the price level and real 
exchange rate to external shocks (including a negative foreign demand shock, a positive 
world real oil price shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock) between a fixed 
and a flexible exchange rate regime? 
To answer this question we used impulse response functions, which were generated 
from the model for between-countries income gap and model for within-country income 
gap. The empirical results from both models are consistent. In particular,  in general, real 
output, the price level and real exchange rate are more fluctuated to the external shocks 
under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In terms of accumulative value, a negative foreign demand shock and a positive 
foreign real interest rate shock generate higher economic growth and lower inflation under 
a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. These shocks result in real depreciation 
under a flexible exchange rate regime whereas they seem have muted impacts on real 
exchange rate regime under a fixed exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, countries with a 
flexible exchange rate regime suffer more from lower economic growth, higher inflation 
than countries with a fixed exchange rate regime when they are hit by a positive world real 
oil price shock.  
2. What impacts do external shocks make on the between-countries income 
gap and within-country income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime? 
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The findings from impulse responses function indicate that the effects of external 
shocks (a negative foreign demand shock, a positive world real oil price shock and a 
positive foreign real interest rate shock) on between-countries and within-country income 
gap are larger and long-lasting under a flexible exchange rate regime. Regarding the 
accumulated value, in general, a negative foreign demand shock narrowed between-
countries income gap more under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed 
regime. Nevertheless, a positive world real oil price shock increases the between-countries 
income gap and within-country income gap in a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime, 
with greater gaps in the latter regime. In terms of accumulated responses, the between-
countries income gap and within-country income gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange 
rate regime seem to change insignificantly if a country is hit by a positive foreign real 
interest rate shock. 
3. What are the similarities and differences between the effects of external 
shocks under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime?  
The results from the impulse response function show that all types of external shocks 
have greater short-run impacts on variables under a flexible than under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Additionally, under both exchange rate regimes, they have insignificant 
impacts on variables in the long-run. Furthermore, the effects of external shocks are more 
long-lasting under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Nonetheless, 
compared to the remaining types of shocks, the effect of positive foreign real interest rate 
shock is more short-lived. 
4. Which exchange rate regime is superior in minimising the negative effects 
of external shocks?  
We conclude that the superiority of exchange rate regime depend on the targets. In 
particular, a fixed exchange rate regime is better than a flexible one in reducing the 
volatilities of real output, the price level and real exchange rate.  
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 However, in terms of accumulated effects, a negative foreign demand shock and a 
positive foreign real interest rate shock generate an immediate and larger increase in real 
exchange rate regime which then promotes higher economic growth, and lower inflation 
under a flexible than under a fixed regime. This is because the larger immediate 
devaluation under the former regime results in a cushioning of real output from the full 
impact of a negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock. 
Therefore, it can be said that a flexible exchange rate regime is better in absorbing a 
negative foreign demand shock and a positive foreign real interest rate shock. Nonetheless, 
in terms of accumulated effects, with reference to countries with a flexible exchange rate 
regime, they suffer more from a positive world real oil price shock with lower economic 
growth and higher inflation. Although the world real oil price shock results in immediate 
and larger real depreciation, higher inflation under a flexible exchange rate regime limits 
any buffering of the shock of the real exchange rate regime. Therefore, the impacts of the 
shock fully pass through the economy with a flexible exchange rate regime. We conclude 
that the fixed exchange rate regime is better at coping with the world real oil price shock.  
5. Which is the dominant external source of the volatility of real output, the 
price level, real exchange rate, between-countries income gap and within-country income 
gap under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime?  
To answer this question, we employed variance decomposition to assess the 
contribution of each type of external shock on the short-run, medium-run and long-run 
volatilities of these variables under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. The 
findings concerning both models (i.e. between-countries and within-country income gaps) 
show that in general, the fluctuation of economic growth of ASEAN countries under both 
exchange rate regimes are more driven by a foreign demand shock and a foreign real 
interest rate shock.  The fluctuation of the price level in these countries with a fixed and a 
flexible exchange rate regime is mostly driven by the world real oil price shock. This type 
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of shock also makes the greatest contribution to the variation in the real exchange rate and 
between-countries income disparity under a flexible exchange rate regime. Under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, a world real oil price shock can explain the greatest percentage of 
changes of within-country income inequality. The shock also accounts for the largest 
proportion of long-run variation of within-country income gap under a flexible exchange 
rate regime.  
8.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of empirical analysis indicate that variables have responded differently to 
external shocks under a fixed compared to under a flexible exchange rate regime. There are 
differences in the contribution of external shocks to the volatilities of variables between a 
fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. This study has some policy implications and 
recommendations to make in choosing the exchange rate regime, dealing with external 
shocks and regional cooperation which contribute to attaining AEC. 
 First, this study recommends policies for the choice of exchange rate regime 
according to what the priorities are. In particular, a fixed exchange rate regime should be 
chosen if macroeconomic stabilities such as real output stability, price level stability and 
real exchange rate stability are desired. Furthermore, a flexible exchange rate regime is a 
good choice with the presence of a negative foreign demand shock if narrowing between-
countries and within-country income gap is what is wanted. However, for a positive world 
real oil price shock, a fixed exchange rate regime is better than a flexible one because it 
can minimise the negative impact of the shock on between-countries and within-country 
income gap. 
Second, this study has policy implications for coping with external shocks. In 
particular, in terms of a negative foreign demand shock, expansionary monetary policy or 
purchasing foreign securities should be employed for countries with flexible exchange rate 
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regimes to offset the real appreciation caused by the shock. This helps improve 
competitiveness for ASEAN countries. Due to the negative effects of a negative foreign 
demand shock on economic growth under both exchange rate regimes, this study suggests 
a fiscal policy expansion for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes while 
expansionary monetary policy for countries with a flexible one.  
In terms of a positive world real oil price shock, this study shows that oil-importing 
countries are negatively affected by the shock. For example, a positive world real oil price 
shock leads to poorer economic growth, higher inflation and greater income gap in both 
between-countries and within-country contexts. Oil-importing countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes should prepare enough foreign reserves to maintain the fixed rate 
and fiscal policy contraction to curb inflation. However, a fiscal policy expansion should 
be implemented if reducing between-countries income gap is a priority. Also, some 
policies for oil-importing countries will require a flexible exchange rate regime. A good 
example is where a contractionary monetary policy should be applied if these countries 
desire less inflation whereas monetary policy expansion is recommended to promote 
economic growth. In addition, an expansionary monetary policy encourages investment, 
aggregated demand, economic growth and employment which then play a role in reducing 
between-countries and within-country income gap. 
Regarding a positive foreign real interest rate shock causes higher inflation for 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. This type of shock also plays an important 
role in economic growth of countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. Therefore, these 
countries should pay more attention to this type of shock such as modelling the economy 
and conducting a tight fiscal policy to curb inflation.  
To deal with external shocks, this study suggests other recommendations. External 
shocks can cause exchange rate risk such as domestic currency depreciation. Hence, 
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CLMV countries should develop exchange rate risk hedging instruments to reduce the loss 
from the foreign capital market. This plays a role in reducing income gap to higher income 
countries. In addition, characteristics of external shocks such as temporary or permanent 
shocks and the effects of external shocks in the short-run and long-run should be taken into 
account when constructing policies. This helps policy-makers devise and implement the 
appropriate policies. Additionally, this study recommends that changes in policies and 
economic environment of trading partners should be carefully observed. 
Third, this study suggests some recommendations for the monetary, financial and 
exchange rate cooperation. A good example is that ASEAN countries can apply their own 
exchange rate regime; however, the same standard of targeting inflation should be 
implemented. In addition, the intra-ASEAN exchange rate needs to be stabilised to 
promote intra-ASEAN trade and investment. Next, ASEAN currencies should be linked to 
a basket of currencies instead of one specific currency, in order to reduce the exchange rate 
risk. This reduces transaction costs and promotes intra-ASEAN trade. Additionally, greater 
macroeconomic and policy coordination is needed to obtain a common economic 
development objective.  Finally, this study suggests that the cooperation in eliminating 
regulatory barriers should be conducted to make regional financial market become more 
integrated. This boosts economic growth of low income countries which then plays a role 
in narrowing between-countries income gap.  
8.4. CONTRIBUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research attempts to investigate what is the optimal exchange rate regime for 
ASEAN countries by comparing the effects external shocks on the fluctuation of 
macroeconomic variables, namely: real GDP, price level, real exchange rate, between-
countries and within-country income inequality under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. In addition, it attempts to evaluate the contribution of external shocks to the 
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fluctuations of variables under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. This research 
makes a significant contribution to the topic of the exchange rate regime and the attainment 
of economic integration as follows: 
(1) This research is the first empirical investigation on the effects and 
contribution of external shocks on the between-countries income gap under a fixed and a 
flexible exchange rate regime by involving a group of countries (ASEAN) wishing to 
engage in closer economic integration in which sustainable and equitable economic growth 
is seen as a high priority. So ASEAN countries represent an excellent case study of 
economic integration with a priority on between-countries income inequality.  
Traditional studies only focus on output, prices, trade balance, consumption and real 
exchange rate outcomes. Even the OCA literature has not given this issue credence but it 
has now become a critical aspect if closer integration is to be achieved. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, other studies only looked at the effects of external shocks on economic growth 
under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. Also, other analyses investigated the 
link between economic growth and income gap between countries. Hence, this study 
extends the literature by combining these two strands of research to investigate the effects 
and contributions of external shocks on between-countries income gap. As well, this study 
extends the literature on the choice of exchange rate regime by investigating the role of 
exchange rate regime in transmitting the effects of external shocks on between-countries 
income gap. 
(2) Similarly, Chapter 3 indicated that within-country income gap is affected by 
the external shocks, output, price level and real exchange rate. Moreover, the literature on 
the choice of exchange rate regime showed the role of exchange rate regime in transmitting 
the effects of external shocks on output, the price level and real exchange rate. Hence, this 
is the first empirical study bridging these two strands of research that investigates the 
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exchange rate regime channels, specifically in the context of transmitting the effects and 
contributions of external shocks to within-countries income gap. 
(3) To the best of our knowledge, there has been scant empirical study done on 
various types of external shocks in investigating the superiority of fixed or flexible 
exchange rate regime. This is the first study to investigate similarities and differences 
between the impacts and contributions of a financial shock (foreign real interest rate 
shock), a goods market demand shock (foreign demand shock) and a goods market supply 
shock (world real oil price shock) on macroeconomic variables, between-countries and 
within-country income gap under a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime. We found that 
the long-run effects of all three types of shocks on variables are relatively small. All of the 
shocks have larger short-run effects under a flexible rather than under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. A negative foreign demand shock and a positive world real oil price shock 
have more long-lasting effects than a positive foreign real interest rate shock.  
(4) Specifically, we expand the empirical literature on the choice of exchange 
rate regimes by focusing on countries which are part of an economic zone. Unlike Chia et 
al. (2012) who included all ten ASEAN countries in a sample of 33 small open Asian 
countries, this study seeks to minimise the heterogeneity of the sample by focusing only on 
these ten nations that share common economic features and trading policies and aims as 
given by the AEC. So this study considers some OCA issues but goes beyond this to look 
at the issue of income equality and sustainable development.  
(5). The next contribution of this study is to apply the IMF’s new de facto 
classification, which has not been previously employed in investing in the exchange rate 
regimen which is superior, and in so doing this study provides additional empirical 
evidence on the merits of different exchange rate regimes. In particular, Hoffmann (2007) 
and Zhang et al. (2014), who employed exchange rate classification of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki et al. (2008), respectively, found that a flexible exchange rate 
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regime can absorb a positive foreign real interest rate shock. By using the IMF’s de facto 
exchange rate regime classification, we provide evidence to support this assertion. In 
addition, Broda (2004), Hoffmann (2007), Chia et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2014) found 
that the contemporaneous effects of external shocks on real output is larger under a fixed 
exchange rate regime than under a fixed one. Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with 
Al-Abri (2013), Cook (2004) and Towbin and Weber (2013) who found that real output is 
more stable under a fixed exchange rate regime. Hence, using the IMF’s de facto exchange 
rate regime classification, this study provides more evidence to support Al-Abri (2013), 
Cook (2004) and Towbin and Weber (2013).  
(6) The empirical results have exchange rate policy implications for ASEAN 
countries in the context of regional integration.  This study suggests choosing an exchange 
rate regime according to the priorities of each country. In addition, this study suggests 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and other recommendations to deal with each type of 
external shock according to exchange rate regime being implemented. Finally, this study 
gives recommendations on how to achieve monetary and exchange rate cooperation.     
8.5. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
(1) Due to the unavailability the data, this study has only focused on ASEAN 
countries as a bloc. However, future studies should divide ASEAN into two groups: the 
higher-income countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore 
and Thailand; and lower income countries, these being Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. Doing so will make it easier to better understand the behaviour of the between-
countries and within-countries income gap in each group in reaction to shocks under fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes.  
(2) Chapter 3 indicates that the within-country income gap plays a role in economic 
growth which affects the between-countries income gap. Hence, there is a possible link 
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between the between-countries and within-country income gap. Nonetheless, no existing 
theories have considered this relationship. Hence, this relationship should be considered in 
future research. Especially, this relationship should be thoroughly investigated under 
different exchange rate regimes to understand better how they are connected. 
(3) Although the GFC played an important role in the ASEAN economy, the sample 
size for this study is too small for a division into two sub-samples (before and after the 
GFC). Hence, to better understand whether there is a difference in responses of variables to 
shocks between before and after the crisis, further studies should divide the sample into 
two sub-samples with a longer time period. 
(4) Due to the limited data, this study could not examine the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to shocks across exchange rate regime for each ASEAN country, 
to know whether the response of variables under each type of exchange rate regime is 
symmetric. This would help to conclude if an OCA between member countries is feasible 
for ASEAN. 
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Table A1: Summary of the process of regional cooperation 
Year Cooperation 
1961 Association of Southeast Asia 
1976 ASEAN Industrial Projects 
1977 ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement 
1981 ASEAN Industrial Complementation 
1983 ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures 
1988 Brand to Brand Complementation 
1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area 
1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 
1996 ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
1998 Framework Agreement for an ASEAN Investment Area 
2015 ASEAN Economic Community 
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Table A2: Annual inflation rate of ASEAN countries (1987-2017) 
 
Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Brunei Singapore 
1987 360.357 -31.248 6.112 n/a 9.273 0.737 3.042 2.502 1.275 0.483 
1988 374.354 23 14.8 n/a 8.044 0.29 12.23 3.833 1.193 1.523 
1989 95.77 63.8 59.7 n/a 6.418 2.557 11.367 5.403 1.31 2.294 
1990 36.031 141.8 -26.317 n/a 7.843 3.043 13.201 5.87 2.133 3.45 
1991 81.817 191 13.439 n/a 9.369 4.328 19.261 5.729 1.583 3.44 
1992 37.705 75 9.847 n/a 7.506 4.778 8.651 4.09 1.259 2.244 
1993 8.379 114.319 5.65 n/a 9.688 3.547 6.716 3.291 4.288 2.291 
1994 9.488 10.44 7.67 n/a 8.518 3.687 10.393 5.121 2.448 3.095 
1995 16.93 10.077 19.075 n/a 9.432 3.468 6.859 5.769 5.972 1.725 
1996 5.59 7.147 19.147 n/a 8.379 3.479 8.312 5.82 1.965 1.379 
1997 3.1 10.503 19.544 n/a 6.194 2.655 5.656 5.638 1.705 2.023 
1998 8.11 12.899 90.141 49.136 58.02 5.293 9.361 7.979 -0.424 -0.271 
1999 4.11 1.996 128.409 10.899 20.75 2.731 6.162 0.254 -0.008 0.024 
2000 -1.77 -0.826 8.373 -1.723 3.773 1.551 6.569 1.655 1.174 1.348 
2001 -0.31 -0.117 7.809 34.503 11.502 1.427 5.403 1.581 0.603 1.015 
2002 4.08 -0.036 10.633 58.104 11.78 1.793 2.723 0.725 -2.288 -0.392 
2003 3.3 1.027 15.489 24.948 6.773 1.074 2.269 1.812 0.3 0.487 
2004 7.89 3.925 10.467 3.757 6.062 1.42 4.791 2.761 0.897 1.672 
2005 8.39 6.349 7.167 10.741 10.459 3.039 6.595 4.519 1.087 0.468 
2006 7.5 6.143 6.546 26.328 13.104 3.621 5.467 4.664 0.154 0.963 
2007 8.35 7.668 4.662 30.935 6.662 2.027 2.942 2.203 0.966 2.105 
2008 23.12 24.997 7.629 11.543 9.777 5.429 8.184 5.462 2.085 6.628 
2009 6.72 -0.663 0.141 2.246 5.047 0.597 4.213 -0.848 1.043 0.597 
2010 9.21 3.997 5.983 8.222 5.14 1.72 3.784 3.286 0.216 2.823 
2011 18.669 5.478 7.569 2.766 5.344 3.174 4.718 3.811 0.142 5.248 
2012 9.103 2.925 4.255 2.829 3.981 1.664 3.171 3.013 0.108 4.576 
2013 6.595 2.955 6.371 5.716 6.413 2.105 2.933 2.185 0.382 2.359 
2014 4.085 3.852 4.066 5.109 6.395 3.143 4.174 1.896 -0.199 1.025 
2015 0.631 1.225 1.292 10.044 6.363 2.104 1.409 -0.9 -0.423 -0.523 
2016 2.668 3.025 1.644 6.765 3.526 2.076 1.784 0.188 -0.731 -0.532 
2017 3.521 2.906 0.825 5.1 3.809 3.799 3.176 0.665 -0.137 0.577 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
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APPENDIX B: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Table B1: Summary of the theoretical literature on the roles of exchange rate regimes in transmitting the effects of shocks on 
macroeconomic variables 
Authors Types of shocks Objective  Results 
Meade (1951), Friedman 
(1953) 
Real shock Output stability The fluctuation of output to real shocks is smoother under a flexible regime  
Fleming (1962), 
Mundell (1963) 
 
Real and nominal shocks Output stability The superior of exchange rate regime depends of degree of capital mobility and type of shock. A 
small open economy with a high degree of capital mobility can cope with nominal shock better if 
it applies a fixed regime whereas it can buffer the real shock better under a flexible regime. 
Moosa (2005)  Domestic/external 
shocks 
Output stability A flexible exchange rate regime is better to deal with external real shocks, external nominal 
shocks and internal real shocks. Nonetheless, a fixed exchange rate regimes is superior if the 
shocks are domestic nominal shocks. 
Poole (1970), Turnovsky 
(1976) 
Domestic/external shock Output stability Output is more stable under a flexible regime if shocks are from foreign trade or foreign price. A 
fixed regime is superior if shocks are domestic monetary. The superiority of exchange rate 
regime in dealing with other types of shocks depends on the countries’s characteristics.  
Krugman and Taylor 
(1978) 
Real exchange rate shock Output stability No exchange rate regime is better. 
Mundell (1961) 
McKinnon (1963) 
Real shock Output stability The superiority of exchange rate regime depends on the degree of oppeness. In particular, fixed 
exchange rate regime is better for small open economies in reducing output volatility. 
Fischer (1977), Frenkel 
and Aizenman (1982)  
Nominal and real shock Consumption 
stability 
Flexible/fixed exchange rate regime is better to cope with nominal/real shock. 
Flood (1979), Joshua 
(1983), Melvin (1985)  
Nominal shock Domestic price 
stability 
A fixed exchange rate regime is more prefererable. 
Devereux and Engel Monetary shocks Consumer price The merit of exchange rate regime depends on the currency that is set in the price of imported 
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(2003)  level goods. 
Marston (1981), 
Aizenman (1985) 
 
Internal/external 
monetary and aggregate 
demand shocks 
Output stability The degree of wage indexation decides the superiority of exchange rate regime. 
Pilbeam (2004) Money demand, 
aggregate demand and 
supply shocks 
Stability of output 
and price level 
The ranking of exchange rate regime depends on the weighting that the authorities put on output 
and price stability, wage indexation, the type of shocks hitting the economy, structural 
parameters such as income elasticity of demand, the degree of openness and the elasticity of 
aggregate demand to fluctuations in the real exchange rate and real interest rate 
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Table B2: Summary of the empirical literature on the roles of exchange rate regimes in transmitting the effects of shocks to 
macroeconomic variables 
Authors Countries 
and time 
periods 
Time period Methodology Types of shock Variables Exchange rate 
regime 
classification 
Results 
Bleaney and Fielding 
(2002) 
80 developing 
countries 
 
1980-1989 Probit & OLS 
regression 
TOT Inflation level, 
inflation stability, 
output stability 
Ghosh et al. (1997) Output is insensitive to the 
exchange rate regime 
Kemme and Koleyni 
(2017) 
Mexico 1960:Q1-
2014:Q4 
DSGE US technology 
shock, US 
preference 
shock and US 
monetary shock 
Price level Not mentioned Inflation due to shocks is 
higher under fixed than 
under flexible exchange 
rate regime 
Hoffmann (2007) 42 developing 
countries 
1973-1999 Exogenous VAR World output, 
world real 
interest rate 
shocks 
Real GDP, the real 
exchange rate and 
trade balance 
De jure of IMF 
and de facto of 
Reinharh and 
Rogoff (2004) 
The exchange rate 
classification has 
significant effects on the 
impacts of shocks on 
macroeconomics variables 
between the fixed and 
flexible exchange rate 
regimes.  
Broda (2004) 75 developing 
countries 
1973-1996 Structural vector 
autoregressive 
model (SVAR) 
TOT shock Real GDP, the real 
exchange rate and 
consumer price 
The combination 
of de jure and de 
facto of Ghosh et 
al (1997) 
The flexible exchange rate 
regime is better than the 
fixed exchange rate regime 
in minimising the negative 
effect of shocks on short-
run real GDP. 
Chia et al. (2012) 33 small Asian 
open 
economies  
1980-2009 DSGE model and 
SVAR model 
 
Foreign nominal 
interest rate 
shocks 
Real GDP, the real 
exchange rate and 
consumer price 
De facto exchange 
rate classification 
of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) 
The flexible exchange rate 
regime produces greater 
output stability.  
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Zhang et al. (2014) Nine East 
Asian 
countries 
1980-2010 Panel SVAR 
model 
Foreign real 
interest rate 
Real GDP, real 
exchange rate and 
price level. 
De facto exchange 
rate regime of 
Ilzetzki et al. 
(2008) 
The same conclusion as 
Chia et al. (2012) 
Towbin and Weber 
(2013) 
101 countries 1974-2007  Interacted Panel 
Vector 
Autoregression 
(IPVAR)  
Real external 
shocks  
Output stability De facto exchange 
rate regime 
classification of 
Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 
(2005).  
The merit of flexible 
exchange rate regime in 
insulating shocks can be 
seen in countries with low 
foreign currency debt and 
high pass-through goods. 
However, countries with 
high foreign currency debt 
and low pass-through 
goods, both fixed and 
flexible exchange rate 
regime have the same 
stabilization patterns.  
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Shi et al. (2015) East Asian  Calibration Foreign demand 
shock, 
technology 
shock in export 
sector, foreign 
interest rate 
shock 
Welfare  - The high use of foreign 
currency in export pricing 
and low elasticity of 
substitution between 
domestic and foreign 
traded goods prevents the 
adjustment of the exchange 
rate in response to external 
shocks. Hence, a flexible 
exchange rate regime 
cannot ensure the stability 
of the economy. 
- Inflation is more 
fluctuated under a flexible 
regime 
Rogoff et al. (2004) 158 countries 
from 1970 to 
1999 
   Inflation, output 
growth, growth 
volatility and the 
incidence of crises. 
De jure and natural 
classification 
The degree of access into 
global financial market 
affects the merit of 
exchange rate regime. 
Aghion et al. (2009) 83 countries 
from 1960 to 
2000, 
     The superiority of 
exchange rate regime 
depends on the degree of 
financial development 
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APPENDIX C: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4 
TABLE C1: EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES 1999-2014 
Year Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
1999 
Currency 
board 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
determined 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Independently 
floating 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Conventional 
pegged 
arrangement 
Conventional 
pegged 
arrangement 
Independently 
floating 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Independently 
floating 
Pegged 
exchange rate 
within 
horizontal 2000 
2001 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 Managed 
floating with 
no pre-
announced 
path for the 
exchange rate 
Conventional 
pegged 
arrangement 
2006 
2007 
2008 Floating 
Floating 
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
Floating 
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
2009 
Stabilized 
arrangement 
Stabilized 
arrangement 
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
Stabilized 
arrangement 
2010 
Stabilized 
arrangement 
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
2011 Floating 
2012 
Crawl-like 
arrangement 
Crawl-like 
arrangement 
2013 Other 
managed 
arrangement 
Floating Crawl-like 
arrangement 
Stabilized 
arrangement 
 
2014 
Source: Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangement and Exchange Restriction, IMF  
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Source: IMF (2006) 
        
 
  
TABLE C2: EXCHANGE RATE REGIME DEFINITIONS 
Exchange rate regime Definitions 
No separate legal tender A country uses the currency of another country 
Currency board A monetary arrangement where a domestic currency is maintained at a fixed rate of exchange with another currency. 
Conventional fixed A country pegs its currency to another country or a basket of currencies at a fixed rate of exchange.  
Peg with horizontal bands The value of a currency is maintained within a band that is ± 1% from a fixed central rate, or the margin between the minimum and maximum 
exchange rate is over 2%. 
Crawling pegs The currency is adjusted periodically by a small amount from a fixed rate of exchange rate or according to changes of some indicators such as the 
previous inflation gap with its main trading partners. 
Crawling band Similar to the peg but with horizontal bands, the value of a currency is maintained within a fixed central rate with a ± 1% band or the margin 
between the minimum and maximum exchange rate is over 2%. However, the central rate is periodically adjusted at a fixed rate or according to 
changes of specified indicators.  
Independent floating The exchange rate is determined by the market rate. Official intervention in the foreign exchange market aims to prevent unnecessary changes and 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. In this regime, independent monetary policy may be applied. 
Managed floating with no 
predetermined band 
The monetary authorities manage the exchange rate without a certain target or path. Intervention is based on indicators such as the balance of 
payments position, international reserves, with intervention on the exchange rate conducted directly or indirectly. 
Stabilised arrangement This regime requires the spot exchange rate to remain within a margin of 2% in 6 months or more 
Other managed arrangement This includes exchange rate regimes not belonging to the other exchange rate regimes identified above. 
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TABLE C3: DATA SOURCES 
Variable Source Definition Measurement 
Consumer price 
index (𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
Data for Laos and Vietnam: IFS, IMF
78
.   Index 
Exchange rate 
regime 
AREAER
79
 - IMF  Dummy variables 
Foreign demand WEO - IMF Proxy by world real GDP growth Percentage 
Income per capita WEO, IMF GDP per capita, PPP  USD 
Nominal GDP WEO - IMF  National currency 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
IFS - IMF Exchange rate to USD Domestic 
currency/USD 
Trade openness World bank. Data for Brunei 2014 and Myanmar 
are taken from UNCTAD 
Ratio between trade and GDP Percentage 
Within-country 
income gap 
UNDP Income Gini coefficient Index 
                                                          
78
 International Financial Statistic 
79
 Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  
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Figure C1: GRAPHS OF VARIABLES 
Source: Author 
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TABLE C4: UNIT ROOT TEST 
Table C4.1: Unit root test of foreign demand 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  W_OUTPUT     
Sample: 1999 2017     
𝐸𝑥ogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Total (balanced) observations: 180   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.84496   0.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar -3.84573   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22200   
   5% level   -2.00200   
   10% level   -1.89400   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
*** Critical values from original paper  
Table C4.2: Unit root test of world real oil price 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  LOILP      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Total number of observations: 179   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.65708   0.0488 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
Table C4.3: Unit root test of foreign real interest rate 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Series:  WORLIR      
Sample: 1999 2017      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0   
Total (balanced) observations: 180    
Cross-sections included: 10     
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -1.28680   0.0991 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar  -1.90048   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22200   
   5% level   -2.00200   
   10% level   -1.89400   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality  
*** Critical values from original paper    
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At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Series:  D(WORLIR)      
Sample: 1999 2017      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0   
Total (balanced) observations: 170    
Cross-sections included: 10     
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -9.07972   0.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar  -4.23232   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22800   
   5% level   -2.00800   
   10% level   -1.89600   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality  
*** Critical values from original paper    
 
Table C4.4: Unit root test of real GDP 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  LREALGDP_NEW     
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Total number of observations: 177   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   1.12676   0.8701 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
 
At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  D(LREALGDP_NEW)    
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Total number of observations: 163   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.73632   0.0000 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
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Table C4.5: Unit root test of real exchange rate 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  LREALER      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Total number of observations: 172   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   0.70974   0.7611 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
 
At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  D(LREALER)     
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Total (balanced) observations: 170   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.67203   0.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar -2.91429   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22800   
   5% level   -2.00800   
   10% level   -1.89600   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
*** Critical values from original paper  
 
Table C4.6: Unit root test of CPI 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  LCPI      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Total number of observations: 177   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -0.51028   0.3049 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
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At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  D(LCPI)      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Total (balanced) observations: 170   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.77012   0.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar -3.24265   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22800   
   5% level   -2.00800   
   10% level   -1.89600   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
*** Critical values from original paper  
 
Table C4.7: Unit root test of between-countries income gap 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  IGPPP      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Total (balanced) observations: 180   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   4.68504   1.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar -0.12915   
T-bar critical values ***:  1% level   -2.22200   
   5% level   -2.00200   
   10% level   -1.89400   
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
*** Critical values from original paper  
 
At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  D(IGPPP)     
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Total number of observations: 169   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.19627   0.0000 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
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Table C4.8: Unit root test of within-country income gap 
At level 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  LINEQUALITY     
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Total number of observations: 179   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.34418   0.0894 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
 
At first difference 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series:  D(LINEQUALITY)    
Sample: 1999 2017     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Total number of observations: 162   
Cross-sections included: 10    
        
        Method    Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.79004   0.0000 
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality 
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TABLE C5: COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR MODEL FOR BETWEEN-
COUNTRIES INCOME GAP 
Table C5.1: Dependent variable: Foreign real interest rate 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: WORLIR LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI IGPPP  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.575242  0.2826  0.586147  0.2789 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.914856  0.9722  1.880274  0.9700 
Panel PP-Statistic  0.583647  0.7203  0.538217  0.7048 
Panel ADF-Statistic -0.315616  0.3761 -0.198930  0.4212 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  3.341300  0.9996   
Group PP-Statistic  1.535938  0.9377   
Group ADF-Statistic  0.096669  0.5385   
      
       
Table C5.2: Dependent variable: Real GDP 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI IGPPP WORLIR  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.033993  0.5136 -0.164937  0.5655 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.252576  0.9879  2.038905  0.9793 
Panel PP-Statistic  0.515062  0.6967  0.264308  0.6042 
Panel ADF-Statistic  1.570102  0.9418 -0.481489  0.3151 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  3.349273  0.9996   
Group PP-Statistic -2.281060  0.0113   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.383263  0.0086   
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Table C5.3: Dependent variable: Real exchange rate 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LREALER LCPI IGPPP WORLIR LREALGDP_NEW  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.085986  0.4657  0.370787  0.3554 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.779311  0.9624  1.292882  0.9020 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.758720  0.2240 -1.801803  0.0358 
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.078402  0.1404 -2.110610  0.0174 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.625457  0.9957   
Group PP-Statistic -1.526717  0.0634   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.489318  0.0064   
      
 
 
Table C5.4: Dependent variable: CPI 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LCPI IGPPP WORLIR LREALGDP_NEW LREALER  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.240893  0.4048  0.234194  0.4074 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.388811  0.9176  1.349329  0.9114 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.996097  0.1596 -1.155391  0.1240 
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.768755  0.0385 -1.651968  0.0493 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.504884  0.9939   
Group PP-Statistic -1.526154  0.0635   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.745452  0.0030   
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Table C5.5: Dependent variable: Between-countries income gap 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: IGPPP WORLIR LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.487682  0.6871 -0.956609  0.8306 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.527935  0.9367  1.845823  0.9675 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.692474  0.2443 -0.114335  0.4545 
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.519839  0.0643 -0.948855  0.1713 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  3.025455  0.9988   
Group PP-Statistic -1.911918  0.0279   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.071361  0.0192   
 
 
TABLE C6: COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR MODEL FOR WITHIN-
COUNTRY INCOME GAP 
Table C6.1: Dependent variable: Foreign real interest rate 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: WORLIR LINEQUALITY LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.863354  0.1940  0.859061  0.1952 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.242206  0.8929  1.156818  0.8763 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.828690  0.2036 -1.034254  0.1505 
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.666262  0.0478 -1.823969  0.0341 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.418833  0.9922   
Group PP-Statistic -0.500240  0.3085   
Group ADF-Statistic -1.913649  0.0278   
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Table C6.2: Dependent variable: Real GDP 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI WORLIR LINEQUALITY  
Date: 09/07/19   Time: 20:34  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.624130  0.2663 -0.449257  0.6734 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.133923  0.5533  1.455678  0.9273 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.444604  0.0003 -0.617096  0.2686 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.782049  0.0001 -1.200071  0.1151 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.687095  0.9964   
Group PP-Statistic -0.494616  0.3104   
Group ADF-Statistic -1.589522  0.0560   
      
 
Table C6.3: Dependent variable: Real exchange rate 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LREALER LCPI WORLIR LINEQUALITY LREALGDP_NEW  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.349668  0.3633 -1.140214  0.8729 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.429616  0.9924  1.386558  0.9172 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.847734  0.1983 -1.904880  0.0284 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.514952  0.0000 -3.179896  0.0007 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.690946  0.9964   
Group PP-Statistic -1.774526  0.0380   
Group ADF-Statistic -3.604301  0.0002   
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Table C6.4: Dependent variable: CPI 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LCPI WORLIR LINEQUALITY LREALGDP_NEW LREALER  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  1.215643  0.1121  0.757796  0.2243 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.357135  0.6395  0.891915  0.8138 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.804214  0.0001 -2.733674  0.0031 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.917468  0.0000 -3.127294  0.0009 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.828747  0.9663   
Group PP-Statistic -4.518081  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -4.219425  0.0000   
 
 
 
Table C6.5: Dependent variable: Within-country income gap 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: LINEQUALITY LREALGDP_NEW LREALER LCPI WORLIR  
Sample: 1999 2017   
Included observations: 190   
Cross-sections included: 10  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.280291  0.3896  0.257557  0.3984 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.167920  0.8786  0.935945  0.8253 
Panel PP-Statistic -1.910354  0.0280 -2.069131  0.0193 
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.225603  0.0130 -1.806428  0.0354 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.795354  0.9637   
Group PP-Statistic -2.579658  0.0049   
Group ADF-Statistic -1.877652  0.0302   
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APPENDIX D: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5 
Table D1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign demand shock 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
 Endogenous variables: W_OUTPUT DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DIGPPP  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  747.5209 NA   9.43e-13 -13.50038 -13.37763 -13.45059 
1  806.6218  111.7544   5.08e-13* -14.12040  -13.38390*  -13.82167* 
2  821.8065  27.33243  6.08e-13 -13.94194 -12.59170 -13.39427 
3  854.0207  55.05700  5.37e-13 -14.07310 -12.10912 -13.27650 
4  881.3015  44.14524  5.22e-13 -14.11457 -11.53684 -13.06903 
5  905.9467  37.64005  5.37e-13 -14.10812 -10.91665 -12.81364 
6  931.7327  37.03802  5.47e-13 -14.12241 -10.31719 -12.57899 
7  960.9449   39.30366*  5.31e-13  -14.19900* -9.780030 -12.40664 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
1 lag 
 
Figure D1: Stability test – Foreign demand shock 
 
Table D2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for world real oil price shock 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: LOILP DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DIGPPP  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  143.2138 NA   5.58e-08 -2.512979 -2.390230 -2.463191 
1  471.9201  621.5536  2.23e-10 -8.034910  -7.298416*  -7.736184* 
2  480.1014  14.72647  3.04e-10 -7.729117 -6.378877 -7.181452 
3  514.2745  58.40491  2.59e-10 -7.895900 -5.931915 -7.099297 
4  544.5518  48.99409  2.38e-10 -7.991850 -5.414119 -6.946309 
5  583.9064  60.10524  1.88e-10 -8.252844 -5.061367 -6.958363 
6  624.3118  58.03682  1.47e-10 -8.532941 -4.727719 -6.989523 
7  673.1406   65.69698*   9.95e-11*  -8.966193* -4.547225 -7.173836 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
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1 lags 
 
7 lags 
 
Figure D2: Stability test - World real oil price shock 
Table D3: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign interest rate shock 
with maximum of 7 lags 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: D(WORLIR) DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DIGPPP  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  1292.043 NA   4.73e-17 -23.40078  -23.27803* -23.35099 
1  1341.025  92.62116  3.06e-17 -23.83682 -23.10033 -23.53810 
2  1351.395  18.66608  4.00e-17 -23.57082 -22.22058 -23.02316 
3  1384.490  56.56197  3.48e-17 -23.71800 -21.75402 -22.92140 
4  1441.115  91.62947  1.98e-17 -24.29300 -21.71527 -23.24746 
5  1473.281  49.12628  1.78e-17 -24.42329 -21.23182 -23.12881 
6  1551.683  112.6139  6.97e-18 -25.39424 -21.58902 -23.85082 
7  1598.926   63.56362*   4.87e-18*  -25.79866* -21.37969  -24.00630* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
Table D4: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign interest rate shock, 
maximum 6 lags 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: D(WORLIR) DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DIGPPP  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 120    
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0  1412.569 NA   4.46e-17 -23.45948  -23.34334* -23.41232 
1  1467.999  105.3170  2.69e-17 -23.96665 -23.26978 -23.68365 
2  1481.494  24.51542  3.26e-17 -23.77490 -22.49730 -23.25606 
3  1518.175  63.58153  2.70e-17 -23.96959 -22.11126 -23.21491 
4  1579.317  100.8833  1.49e-17 -24.57195 -22.13289 -23.58144 
5  1616.051  57.54998  1.25e-17 -24.76751 -21.74773 -23.54117 
6  1664.724   72.19781*   8.63e-18*  -25.16206* -21.56155  -23.69987* 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial  
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
231 
 
Table D5: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign interest rate shock, 
maximum 5 lags 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: D(WORLIR) DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DIGPPP  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 130    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  1542.011 NA   3.70e-17 -23.64632 -23.53603 -23.60151 
1  1602.941  116.2354  2.13e-17 -24.19909  -23.53735* -23.93020 
2  1613.530  19.38734  2.66e-17 -23.97739 -22.76420 -23.48443 
3  1655.460  73.53724  2.06e-17 -24.23784 -22.47320 -23.52081 
4  1725.765  117.8963  1.03e-17 -24.93484 -22.61876  -23.99374* 
5  1762.666   59.04277*   8.73e-18*  -25.11795* -22.25041 -23.95277 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
 
1 lag 
 
4 lags 
 
 
5 lags 
 
6 lags 
 
7 lags 
 
 
Figure D3: Stability test- foreign interest rate shock 
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Table D6: Impulse responses to a negative foreign demand shock under a 
fixed exchange rate regime   
     
     Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DIGPPP*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1 -0.001925 -0.005514  0.005620  0.000648 
  (0.00068)  (0.00061)  (0.00088)  (0.00068) 
 2 -0.000528 -0.003976  0.002931  0.000326 
  (0.00057)  (0.00056)  (0.00077)  (0.00056) 
 3  8.37E-05 -0.002553  0.000999  0.000745 
  (0.00048)  (0.00058)  (0.00074)  (0.00055) 
 4 -0.000113 -0.001524 -3.17E-05  0.000923 
  (0.00035)  (0.00054)  (0.00062)  (0.00053) 
 5 -0.000248 -0.000889 -0.000407  0.000999 
  (0.00026)  (0.00046)  (0.00050)  (0.00050) 
 6 -0.000240 -0.000520 -0.000499  0.001007 
  (0.00019)  (0.00040)  (0.00042)  (0.00046) 
 7 -0.000183 -0.000305 -0.000503  0.000965 
  (0.00016)  (0.00034)  (0.00036)  (0.00043) 
 8 -0.000130 -0.000176 -0.000481  0.000893 
  (0.00014)  (0.00029)  (0.00032)  (0.00040) 
 9 -9.47E-05 -9.68E-05 -0.000449  0.000807 
  (0.00012)  (0.00025)  (0.00029)  (0.00038) 
 10 -7.26E-05 -4.85E-05 -0.000411  0.000718 
  (0.00010)  (0.00022)  (0.00026)  (0.00035) 
 11 -5.78E-05 -1.97E-05 -0.000369  0.000632 
  (9.1E-05)  (0.00019)  (0.00024)  (0.00033) 
 12 -4.71E-05 -3.08E-06 -0.000327  0.000553 
  (7.9E-05)  (0.00017)  (0.00022)  (0.00030) 
 13 -3.88E-05  6.04E-06 -0.000287  0.000482 
  (6.9E-05)  (0.00015)  (0.00019)  (0.00028) 
 14 -3.23E-05  1.06E-05 -0.000251  0.000418 
  (6.1E-05)  (0.00013)  (0.00018)  (0.00026) 
 15 -2.71E-05  1.26E-05 -0.000218  0.000362 
  (5.3E-05)  (0.00011)  (0.00016)  (0.00023) 
 16 -2.29E-05  1.29E-05 -0.000189  0.000313 
  (4.6E-05)  (9.7E-05)  (0.00014)  (0.00021) 
 17 -1.94E-05  1.25E-05 -0.000164  0.000270 
  (4.0E-05)  (8.4E-05)  (0.00013)  (0.00020) 
 18 -1.65E-05  1.16E-05 -0.000142  0.000233 
  (3.5E-05)  (7.2E-05)  (0.00011)  (0.00018) 
 19 -1.41E-05  1.05E-05 -0.000122  0.000201 
  (3.1E-05)  (6.3E-05)  (0.00010)  (0.00016) 
 20 -1.21E-05  9.36E-06 -0.000105  0.000173 
  (2.7E-05)  (5.4E-05)  (9.3E-05)  (0.00015) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table D7: Impulse responses to a negative foreign demand shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime   
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DIGPPP*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1 -0.002107 -0.014217  0.027315  0.000360 
  (0.00818)  (0.00364)  (0.02897)  (0.00203) 
 2 -0.000720 -0.007159 -0.013265 -0.005303 
  (0.00716)  (0.00378)  (0.02491)  (0.00191) 
 3 -0.000559 -0.006580 -0.002473 -0.004569 
  (0.00417)  (0.00335)  (0.01339)  (0.00148) 
 4  0.000745 -0.005579  0.001429 -0.003230 
  (0.00286)  (0.00281)  (0.00822)  (0.00118) 
 5  0.001196 -0.004344  0.002314 -0.002203 
  (0.00202)  (0.00225)  (0.00537)  (0.00094) 
 6  0.001173 -0.003208  0.002217 -0.001482 
  (0.00144)  (0.00175)  (0.00362)  (0.00072) 
 7  0.000977 -0.002288  0.001823 -0.000988 
  (0.00103)  (0.00134)  (0.00248)  (0.00055) 
 8  0.000750 -0.001593  0.001390 -0.000653 
  (0.00073)  (0.00100)  (0.00171)  (0.00041) 
 9  0.000549 -0.001090  0.001013 -0.000429 
  (0.00052)  (0.00074)  (0.00118)  (0.00030) 
 10  0.000389 -0.000735  0.000716 -0.000280 
  (0.00037)  (0.00054)  (0.00082)  (0.00022) 
 11  0.000270 -0.000491  0.000495 -0.000182 
  (0.00026)  (0.00040)  (0.00056)  (0.00016) 
 12  0.000184 -0.000325  0.000337 -0.000118 
  (0.00018)  (0.00028)  (0.00039)  (0.00011) 
 13  0.000124 -0.000214  0.000227 -7.61E-05 
  (0.00013)  (0.00020)  (0.00027)  (8.0E-05) 
 14  8.26E-05 -0.000140  0.000151 -4.90E-05 
  (8.9E-05)  (0.00014)  (0.00018)  (5.6E-05) 
 15  5.46E-05 -9.11E-05  9.96E-05 -3.15E-05 
  (6.2E-05)  (0.00010)  (0.00012)  (4.0E-05) 
 16  3.59E-05 -5.90E-05  6.54E-05 -2.02E-05 
  (4.3E-05)  (7.1E-05)  (8.5E-05)  (2.8E-05) 
 17  2.34E-05 -3.82E-05  4.27E-05 -1.29E-05 
  (3.0E-05)  (5.0E-05)  (5.8E-05)  (1.9E-05) 
 18  1.52E-05 -2.46E-05  2.78E-05 -8.25E-06 
  (2.1E-05)  (3.5E-05)  (4.0E-05)  (1.3E-05) 
 19  9.87E-06 -1.58E-05  1.80E-05 -5.27E-06 
  (1.4E-05)  (2.4E-05)  (2.7E-05)  (9.1E-06) 
 20  6.37E-06 -1.01E-05  1.16E-05 -3.36E-06 
  (9.7E-06)  (1.6E-05)  (1.8E-05)  (6.2E-06) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table D8: Impulse responses to a positive world real oil price shock under a 
fixed exchange rate regime   
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DIGPPP*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1  0.000204  0.007744 -0.003769  0.003862 
  (0.00071)  (0.00053)  (0.00091)  (0.00061) 
 2  0.000146  0.004576 -0.001755  0.001179 
  (0.00057)  (0.00058)  (0.00085)  (0.00059) 
 3  0.000340  0.002744 -0.000708 -4.56E-05 
  (0.00044)  (0.00061)  (0.00080)  (0.00059) 
 4  0.000337  0.001719 -0.000289 -0.000691 
  (0.00033)  (0.00055)  (0.00067)  (0.00056) 
 5  0.000272  0.001148 -0.000131 -0.000992 
  (0.00026)  (0.00047)  (0.00053)  (0.00053) 
 6  0.000206  0.000825 -7.22E-05 -0.001097 
  (0.00021)  (0.00040)  (0.00043)  (0.00051) 
 7  0.000155  0.000635 -5.05E-05 -0.001099 
  (0.00018)  (0.00036)  (0.00037)  (0.00048) 
 8  0.000120  0.000516 -4.16E-05 -0.001051 
  (0.00016)  (0.00032)  (0.00033)  (0.00047) 
 9  9.64E-05  0.000437 -3.69E-05 -0.000980 
  (0.00015)  (0.00030)  (0.00029)  (0.00045) 
 10  8.01E-05  0.000380 -3.34E-05 -0.000901 
  (0.00013)  (0.00028)  (0.00027)  (0.00043) 
 11  6.85E-05  0.000336 -3.05E-05 -0.000823 
  (0.00012)  (0.00026)  (0.00024)  (0.00042) 
 12  5.98E-05  0.000299 -2.77E-05 -0.000748 
  (0.00011)  (0.00024)  (0.00022)  (0.00040) 
 13  5.29E-05  0.000269 -2.52E-05 -0.000679 
  (0.00010)  (0.00022)  (0.00020)  (0.00039) 
 14  4.72E-05  0.000242 -2.28E-05 -0.000615 
  (9.2E-05)  (0.00021)  (0.00018)  (0.00037) 
 15  4.24E-05  0.000218 -2.07E-05 -0.000557 
  (8.4E-05)  (0.00019)  (0.00016)  (0.00036) 
 16  3.82E-05  0.000197 -1.87E-05 -0.000504 
  (7.6E-05)  (0.00018)  (0.00015)  (0.00034) 
 17  3.44E-05  0.000178 -1.69E-05 -0.000456 
  (7.0E-05)  (0.00017)  (0.00013)  (0.00032) 
 18  3.11E-05  0.000161 -1.53E-05 -0.000412 
  (6.3E-05)  (0.00016)  (0.00012)  (0.00031) 
 19  2.81E-05  0.000145 -1.38E-05 -0.000373 
  (5.8E-05)  (0.00015)  (0.00011)  (0.00029) 
 20  2.54E-05  0.000131 -1.25E-05 -0.000337 
  (5.3E-05)  (0.00014)  (9.7E-05)  (0.00028) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table D9: Impulse responses to a positive world real oil price shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime   
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DIGPPP*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1 -0.010573  0.018357  0.063994  0.006046 
  (0.00814)  (0.00358)  (0.02886)  (0.00203) 
 2 -0.004208  0.011851 -0.006040  0.005649 
  (0.00407)  (0.00265)  (0.01359)  (0.00119) 
 3 -0.001340  0.008102 -0.008185  0.004240 
  (0.00334)  (0.00250)  (0.01104)  (0.00108) 
 4  9.84E-05  0.005541 -0.005798  0.003289 
  (0.00304)  (0.00249)  (0.00972)  (0.00105) 
 5  0.000986  0.003855 -0.004004  0.002655 
  (0.00282)  (0.00245)  (0.00879)  (0.00102) 
 6  0.001491  0.002753 -0.002825  0.002211 
  (0.00264)  (0.00239)  (0.00807)  (0.00099) 
 7  0.001746  0.002028 -0.002053  0.001889 
  (0.00247)  (0.00230)  (0.00746)  (0.00095) 
 8  0.001846  0.001545 -0.001542  0.001646 
  (0.00230)  (0.00219)  (0.00691)  (0.00091) 
 9  0.001852  0.001218 -0.001199  0.001456 
  (0.00215)  (0.00208)  (0.00639)  (0.00087) 
 10  0.001802  0.000991 -0.000963  0.001304 
  (0.00200)  (0.00196)  (0.00591)  (0.00083) 
 11  0.001722  0.000830 -0.000798  0.001177 
  (0.00186)  (0.00183)  (0.00547)  (0.00079) 
 12  0.001626  0.000712 -0.000678  0.001069 
  (0.00173)  (0.00171)  (0.00505)  (0.00075) 
 13  0.001523  0.000623 -0.000588  0.000976 
  (0.00160)  (0.00160)  (0.00466)  (0.00071) 
 14  0.001419  0.000552 -0.000519  0.000893 
  (0.00149)  (0.00149)  (0.00430)  (0.00067) 
 15  0.001318  0.000495 -0.000464  0.000819 
  (0.00138)  (0.00138)  (0.00396)  (0.00064) 
 16  0.001221  0.000448 -0.000418  0.000752 
  (0.00128)  (0.00128)  (0.00365)  (0.00060) 
 17  0.001129  0.000407 -0.000379  0.000692 
  (0.00119)  (0.00119)  (0.00337)  (0.00057) 
 18  0.001043  0.000372 -0.000346  0.000636 
  (0.00110)  (0.00110)  (0.00310)  (0.00054) 
 19  0.000963  0.000340 -0.000316  0.000586 
  (0.00103)  (0.00102)  (0.00286)  (0.00051) 
 20  0.000888  0.000312 -0.000290  0.000539 
  (0.00095)  (0.00094)  (0.00263)  (0.00048) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table D10: Impulse responses to a positive foreign real interest rate shock 
under a fixed exchange rate regime   
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DIGPPP*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1 -0.000355  0.000575  0.003786 -0.000683 
  (0.00064)  (0.00067)  (0.00087)  (0.00073) 
 2 -0.003475  0.000906 -0.001251 -0.001123 
  (0.00069)  (0.00077)  (0.00103)  (0.00080) 
 3 -0.000301  0.000291  0.000281  1.86E-06 
  (0.00042)  (0.00052)  (0.00067)  (0.00049) 
 4 -3.85E-05  0.000126  0.000155 -4.65E-05 
  (0.00026)  (0.00035)  (0.00041)  (0.00034) 
 5  8.40E-05  4.97E-05  0.000128 -6.45E-05 
  (0.00022)  (0.00022)  (0.00025)  (0.00025) 
 6  8.75E-05  2.38E-05  8.51E-05 -7.69E-05 
  (0.00018)  (0.00013)  (0.00015)  (0.00020) 
 7  7.59E-05  1.47E-05  5.95E-05 -7.29E-05 
  (0.00014)  (8.2E-05)  (0.00010)  (0.00016) 
 8  6.18E-05  1.14E-05  4.30E-05 -6.32E-05 
  (0.00011)  (5.2E-05)  (7.7E-05)  (0.00012) 
 9  4.98E-05  9.78E-06  3.23E-05 -5.26E-05 
  (9.2E-05)  (3.5E-05)  (5.9E-05)  (0.00010) 
 10  4.00E-05  8.56E-06  2.50E-05 -4.29E-05 
  (7.4E-05)  (2.7E-05)  (4.7E-05)  (8.0E-05) 
 11  3.22E-05  7.41E-06  1.96E-05 -3.47E-05 
  (6.0E-05)  (2.1E-05)  (3.8E-05)  (6.5E-05) 
 12  2.60E-05  6.33E-06  1.56E-05 -2.81E-05 
  (4.8E-05)  (1.7E-05)  (3.1E-05)  (5.2E-05) 
 13  2.10E-05  5.32E-06  1.25E-05 -2.27E-05 
  (3.9E-05)  (1.4E-05)  (2.5E-05)  (4.2E-05) 
 14  1.70E-05  4.43E-06  1.01E-05 -1.83E-05 
  (3.2E-05)  (1.2E-05)  (2.1E-05)  (3.5E-05) 
 15  1.38E-05  3.66E-06  8.17E-06 -1.48E-05 
  (2.6E-05)  (9.6E-06)  (1.7E-05)  (2.8E-05) 
 16  1.12E-05  3.01E-06  6.61E-06 -1.20E-05 
  (2.1E-05)  (7.9E-06)  (1.4E-05)  (2.3E-05) 
 17  9.09E-06  2.46E-06  5.36E-06 -9.75E-06 
  (1.7E-05)  (6.5E-06)  (1.1E-05)  (1.9E-05) 
 18  7.38E-06  2.01E-06  4.34E-06 -7.91E-06 
  (1.4E-05)  (5.3E-06)  (9.2E-06)  (1.5E-05) 
 19  5.99E-06  1.64E-06  3.52E-06 -6.42E-06 
  (1.1E-05)  (4.3E-06)  (7.5E-06)  (1.2E-05) 
 20  4.86E-06  1.33E-06  2.86E-06 -5.21E-06 
  (9.3E-06)  (3.5E-06)  (6.1E-06)  (1.0E-05) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table D11: Impulse responses to a positive foreign real interest rate shock 
under a flexible exchange rate regime 
 
 
 
    
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DIGPPP*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1  0.020587 -0.015628  0.036207  0.004329 
  (0.00812)  (0.00359)  (0.02886)  (0.00206) 
 2  0.001843  6.91E-05 -0.029528 -0.000652 
  (0.00849)  (0.00431)  (0.02963)  (0.00228) 
 3  0.000465 -0.001126  0.002193 -0.000440 
  (0.00178)  (0.00235)  (0.00461)  (0.00089) 
 4  0.000413 -0.000725  0.000782 -0.000261 
  (0.00099)  (0.00159)  (0.00212)  (0.00054) 
 5  0.000295 -0.000491  0.000612 -0.000166 
  (0.00066)  (0.00106)  (0.00137)  (0.00035) 
 6  0.000200 -0.000326  0.000404 -0.000108 
  (0.00044)  (0.00070)  (0.00091)  (0.00023) 
 7  0.000133 -0.000216  0.000268 -7.10E-05 
  (0.00029)  (0.00047)  (0.00060)  (0.00015) 
 8  8.83E-05 -0.000143  0.000177 -4.68E-05 
  (0.00020)  (0.00031)  (0.00040)  (0.00010) 
 9  5.84E-05 -9.43E-05  0.000117 -3.09E-05 
  (0.00013)  (0.00021)  (0.00027)  (6.8E-05) 
 10  3.86E-05 -6.23E-05  7.74E-05 -2.04E-05 
  (8.7E-05)  (0.00014)  (0.00018)  (4.6E-05) 
 11  2.55E-05 -4.12E-05  5.12E-05 -1.35E-05 
  (5.8E-05)  (9.2E-05)  (0.00012)  (3.1E-05) 
 12  1.69E-05 -2.72E-05  3.38E-05 -8.93E-06 
  (3.9E-05)  (6.2E-05)  (7.9E-05)  (2.0E-05) 
 13  1.11E-05 -1.80E-05  2.23E-05 -5.90E-06 
  (2.6E-05)  (4.1E-05)  (5.3E-05)  (1.4E-05) 
 14  7.36E-06 -1.19E-05  1.48E-05 -3.90E-06 
  (1.7E-05)  (2.8E-05)  (3.5E-05)  (9.2E-06) 
 15  4.87E-06 -7.85E-06  9.76E-06 -2.58E-06 
  (1.2E-05)  (1.9E-05)  (2.4E-05)  (6.2E-06) 
 16  3.22E-06 -5.19E-06  6.45E-06 -1.70E-06 
  (7.8E-06)  (1.3E-05)  (1.6E-05)  (4.1E-06) 
 17  2.13E-06 -3.43E-06  4.26E-06 -1.13E-06 
  (5.3E-06)  (8.4E-06)  (1.1E-05)  (2.8E-06) 
 18  1.40E-06 -2.27E-06  2.82E-06 -7.44E-07 
  (3.5E-06)  (5.7E-06)  (7.1E-06)  (1.9E-06) 
 19  9.28E-07 -1.50E-06  1.86E-06 -4.91E-07 
  (2.4E-06)  (3.8E-06)  (4.8E-06)  (1.3E-06) 
 20  6.13E-07 -9.90E-07  1.23E-06 -3.25E-07 
  (1.6E-06)  (2.6E-06)  (3.2E-06)  (8.5E-07) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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A negative foreign demand shock 
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A positive world real oil price shock  
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A positive foreign real interest rate shock  
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Figure D4: Robustness test with changing on restrictions  
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Foreign demand shock 
  
 
World real oil price shock 
  
 
Foreign real interest rate shock 
  
 
Figure D6: Responses of real GDP to negative and positive shocks for model 
of between-country income gap 
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APPENDIX E: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 6 
Table E1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign demand shock 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: W_OUTPUT DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DLINEQUALITY  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  900.1298 NA   5.88e-14 -16.27509  -16.15234* -16.22530 
1  950.1763  94.63337   3.73e-14*  -16.73048* -15.99398  -16.43175* 
2  969.4662  34.72177  4.15e-14 -16.62666 -15.27642 -16.07899 
3  993.1560  40.48802  4.28e-14 -16.60284 -14.63885 -15.80623 
4  1012.836  31.84660  4.78e-14 -16.50612 -13.92839 -15.46058 
5  1044.500   48.35939*  4.33e-14 -16.62728 -13.43580 -15.33280 
6  1067.148  32.53001  4.67e-14 -16.58451 -12.77928 -15.04109 
7  1092.718  34.40290  4.84e-14 -16.59486 -12.17590 -14.80251 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
 
Figure E1: Stability test with 1 lag - foreign demand shock 
 
Table E2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for world real oil price shock 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: LOILP DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DLINEQUALITY  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  293.6429 NA   3.62e-09 -5.248052 -5.125303 -5.198264 
1  616.1287  609.7915  1.62e-11 -10.65689  -9.920392*  -10.35816* 
2  630.0439  25.04723  1.99e-11 -10.45534 -9.105103 -9.907678 
3  654.3699  41.57543  2.03e-11 -10.44309 -8.479104 -9.646486 
4  681.9729  44.66665  1.96e-11 -10.49042 -7.912685 -9.444875 
5  711.3146  44.81271  1.85e-11 -10.56936 -7.377879 -9.274875 
6  733.5461  31.93260  2.01e-11 -10.51902 -6.713798 -8.975602 
7  780.0018   62.50404*   1.43e-11*  -10.90912* -6.490156 -9.116767 
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 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
1 lag 
 
7 lags 
 
 Figure E2: Stability test - world real oil price shock 
 
Table E3: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for foreign interest rate shock  
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: D_WORLIR DLREALGDP_NEW DLCPI DLREALER DLINEQUALITY  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1999 2017     
Included observations: 110    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  1444.068 NA   2.98e-18 -26.16487  -26.04212* -26.11508 
1  1489.960  86.77861  2.04e-18 -26.54473 -25.80824  -26.24601* 
2  1507.213  31.05431  2.36e-18 -26.40387 -25.05363 -25.85620 
3  1525.720  31.63132  2.67e-18 -26.28582 -24.32184 -25.48922 
4  1569.914  71.51364  1.91e-18 -26.63480 -24.05707 -25.58926 
5  1617.123  72.10081  1.30e-18 -27.03860 -23.84712 -25.74412 
6  1668.242  73.42515  8.37e-19 -27.51349 -23.70827 -25.97007 
7  1696.950   38.62540*   8.20e-19*  -27.58091* -23.16194 -25.78855 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
 
7 lags 
 
1 lag 
 
Figure E3: Stability test- foreign interest rate shock 
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Table E4: Impulse responses to a negative foreign demand shock under a 
fixed exchange rate regime   
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1 -0.003752 -0.005359  0.005650 -0.001385 
  (0.00073)  (0.00061)  (0.00088)  (0.00014) 
 2 -1.41E-05 -0.004033  0.003325 -0.000987 
  (0.00057)  (0.00060)  (0.00082)  (0.00014) 
 3  0.000166 -0.002536  0.001024 -0.000521 
  (0.00043)  (0.00060)  (0.00076)  (0.00012) 
 4 -0.000150 -0.001514 -4.08E-05 -0.000310 
  (0.00030)  (0.00055)  (0.00063)  (0.00011) 
 5 -0.000262 -0.000897 -0.000397 -0.000197 
  (0.00022)  (0.00047)  (0.00050)  (9.1E-05) 
 6 -0.000250 -0.000537 -0.000479 -0.000131 
  (0.00017)  (0.00040)  (0.00042)  (7.7E-05) 
 7 -0.000205 -0.000328 -0.000474 -9.06E-05 
  (0.00014)  (0.00034)  (0.00036)  (6.5E-05) 
 8 -0.000164 -0.000203 -0.000443 -6.48E-05 
  (0.00012)  (0.00029)  (0.00031)  (5.6E-05) 
 9 -0.000133 -0.000129 -0.000404 -4.81E-05 
  (0.00011)  (0.00025)  (0.00028)  (4.9E-05) 
 10 -0.000110 -8.40E-05 -0.000364 -3.69E-05 
  (9.6E-05)  (0.00021)  (0.00025)  (4.3E-05) 
 11 -9.28E-05 -5.62E-05 -0.000326 -2.92E-05 
  (8.5E-05)  (0.00019)  (0.00023)  (3.8E-05) 
 12 -7.92E-05 -3.90E-05 -0.000290 -2.38E-05 
  (7.6E-05)  (0.00016)  (0.00020)  (3.3E-05) 
 13 -6.82E-05 -2.81E-05 -0.000256 -1.98E-05 
  (6.7E-05)  (0.00014)  (0.00019)  (2.9E-05) 
 14 -5.91E-05 -2.10E-05 -0.000226 -1.67E-05 
  (6.0E-05)  (0.00013)  (0.00017)  (2.6E-05) 
 15 -5.14E-05 -1.62E-05 -0.000199 -1.43E-05 
  (5.4E-05)  (0.00011)  (0.00015)  (2.3E-05) 
 16 -4.48E-05 -1.30E-05 -0.000175 -1.23E-05 
  (4.8E-05)  (9.8E-05)  (0.00014)  (2.1E-05) 
 17 -3.92E-05 -1.06E-05 -0.000154 -1.06E-05 
  (4.3E-05)  (8.6E-05)  (0.00013)  (1.8E-05) 
 18 -3.43E-05 -8.84E-06 -0.000135 -9.25E-06 
  (3.9E-05)  (7.5E-05)  (0.00012)  (1.6E-05) 
 19 -3.00E-05 -7.49E-06 -0.000119 -8.07E-06 
  (3.4E-05)  (6.6E-05)  (0.00010)  (1.4E-05) 
 20 -2.63E-05 -6.41E-06 -0.000104 -7.05E-06 
  (3.1E-05)  (5.8E-05)  (9.5E-05)  (1.3E-05) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
 Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table E5: Impulse responses to a negative foreign demand shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime   
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1 -0.001272 -0.015518  0.030959 -0.002244 
  (0.00817)  (0.00371)  (0.02901)  (0.00052) 
 2  0.000375 -0.008993 -0.009444 -0.001412 
  (0.00717)  (0.00384)  (0.02490)  (0.00055) 
 3  0.000708 -0.005672 -0.004426 -0.000899 
  (0.00417)  (0.00347)  (0.01324)  (0.00051) 
 4  0.000794 -0.003677 -0.001057 -0.000574 
  (0.00255)  (0.00269)  (0.00680)  (0.00040) 
 5  0.000692 -0.002410  0.000192 -0.000368 
  (0.00160)  (0.00197)  (0.00379)  (0.00029) 
 6  0.000539 -0.001587  0.000525 -0.000237 
  (0.00102)  (0.00140)  (0.00229)  (0.00021) 
 7  0.000395 -0.001046  0.000523 -0.000153 
  (0.00066)  (0.00099)  (0.00146)  (0.00015) 
 8  0.000279 -0.000689  0.000424 -9.91E-05 
  (0.00043)  (0.00069)  (0.00095)  (0.00010) 
 9  0.000193 -0.000454  0.000315 -6.43E-05 
  (0.00029)  (0.00048)  (0.00063)  (7.0E-05) 
 10  0.000131 -0.000298  0.000223 -4.18E-05 
  (0.00020)  (0.00034)  (0.00042)  (4.8E-05) 
 11  8.80E-05 -0.000196  0.000154 -2.73E-05 
  (0.00013)  (0.00023)  (0.00028)  (3.3E-05) 
 12  5.88E-05 -0.000129  0.000105 -1.78E-05 
  (9.0E-05)  (0.00016)  (0.00019)  (2.3E-05) 
 13  3.90E-05 -8.45E-05  7.02E-05 -1.16E-05 
  (6.1E-05)  (0.00011)  (0.00013)  (1.6E-05) 
 14  2.58E-05 -5.54E-05  4.68E-05 -7.58E-06 
  (4.2E-05)  (7.7E-05)  (8.6E-05)  (1.1E-05) 
 15  1.70E-05 -3.63E-05  3.10E-05 -4.96E-06 
  (2.8E-05)  (5.3E-05)  (5.8E-05)  (7.5E-06) 
 16  1.12E-05 -2.38E-05  2.05E-05 -3.24E-06 
  (1.9E-05)  (3.6E-05)  (3.9E-05)  (5.1E-06) 
 17  7.36E-06 -1.56E-05  1.35E-05 -2.12E-06 
  (1.3E-05)  (2.5E-05)  (2.6E-05)  (3.5E-06) 
 18  4.83E-06 -1.02E-05  8.88E-06 -1.39E-06 
  (8.9E-06)  (1.7E-05)  (1.8E-05)  (2.4E-06) 
 19  3.17E-06 -6.68E-06  5.83E-06 -9.08E-07 
  (6.0E-06)  (1.2E-05)  (1.2E-05)  (1.7E-06) 
 20  2.08E-06 -4.38E-06  3.83E-06 -5.94E-07 
  (4.1E-06)  (8.0E-06)  (8.1E-06)  (1.1E-06) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table E6: Impulse responses to a positive world real oil price shock under a 
fixed exchange rate regime   
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1  0.000748  0.007598 -0.003293  0.001464 
  (0.00075)  (0.00053)  (0.00092)  (0.00014) 
 2  0.000619  0.004559 -0.001538  0.000842 
  (0.00057)  (0.00058)  (0.00086)  (0.00014) 
 3  0.000481  0.002844 -0.000844  0.000563 
  (0.00044)  (0.00061)  (0.00081)  (0.00012) 
 4  0.000295  0.001854 -0.000524  0.000393 
  (0.00030)  (0.00056)  (0.00067)  (0.00011) 
 5  0.000164  0.001269 -0.000349  0.000287 
  (0.00023)  (0.00049)  (0.00052)  (9.7E-05) 
 6  8.52E-05  0.000912 -0.000243  0.000219 
  (0.00018)  (0.00042)  (0.00042)  (8.5E-05) 
 7  4.14E-05  0.000689 -0.000176  0.000174 
  (0.00015)  (0.00037)  (0.00035)  (7.7E-05) 
 8  1.76E-05  0.000542 -0.000134  0.000143 
  (0.00013)  (0.00033)  (0.00030)  (7.0E-05) 
 9  4.90E-06  0.000443 -0.000105  0.000121 
  (0.00012)  (0.00030)  (0.00027)  (6.5E-05) 
 10 -1.75E-06  0.000371 -8.60E-05  0.000104 
  (0.00011)  (0.00027)  (0.00024)  (6.0E-05) 
 11 -5.04E-06  0.000317 -7.22E-05  9.00E-05 
  (9.4E-05)  (0.00025)  (0.00021)  (5.6E-05) 
 12 -6.48E-06  0.000275 -6.17E-05  7.89E-05 
  (8.3E-05)  (0.00023)  (0.00019)  (5.2E-05) 
 13 -6.91E-06  0.000241 -5.35E-05  6.95E-05 
  (7.4E-05)  (0.00021)  (0.00017)  (4.9E-05) 
 14 -6.80E-06  0.000212 -4.68E-05  6.15E-05 
  (6.6E-05)  (0.00019)  (0.00015)  (4.5E-05) 
 15 -6.43E-06  0.000187 -4.12E-05  5.46E-05 
  (5.9E-05)  (0.00017)  (0.00013)  (4.2E-05) 
 16 -5.94E-06  0.000166 -3.65E-05  4.85E-05 
  (5.3E-05)  (0.00016)  (0.00012)  (3.9E-05) 
 17 -5.41E-06  0.000147 -3.23E-05  4.31E-05 
  (4.7E-05)  (0.00015)  (0.00010)  (3.6E-05) 
 18 -4.89E-06  0.000131 -2.87E-05  3.83E-05 
  (4.2E-05)  (0.00013)  (9.3E-05)  (3.4E-05) 
 19 -4.39E-06  0.000117 -2.55E-05  3.41E-05 
  (3.7E-05)  (0.00012)  (8.3E-05)  (3.1E-05) 
 20 -3.94E-06  0.000104 -2.27E-05  3.04E-05 
  (3.3E-05)  (0.00011)  (7.4E-05)  (2.9E-05) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table E7: Impulse responses to a positive world real oil price shock under a 
flexible exchange rate regime 
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1 -0.010671  0.018081  0.064139  0.001538 
  (0.00813)  (0.00367)  (0.02890)  (0.00052) 
 2 -0.004267  0.011042 -0.005444  0.001432 
  (0.00410)  (0.00269)  (0.01352)  (0.00036) 
 3 -0.001006  0.006789 -0.006502  0.001273 
  (0.00327)  (0.00249)  (0.01077)  (0.00033) 
 4  0.000708  0.004412 -0.004456  0.001122 
  (0.00301)  (0.00245)  (0.00964)  (0.00033) 
 5  0.001517  0.003050 -0.003135  0.000992 
  (0.00283)  (0.00240)  (0.00885)  (0.00032) 
 6  0.001864  0.002238 -0.002354  0.000885 
  (0.00265)  (0.00234)  (0.00819)  (0.00032) 
 7  0.001974  0.001734 -0.001872  0.000796 
  (0.00248)  (0.00224)  (0.00758)  (0.00031) 
 8  0.001964  0.001407 -0.001557  0.000721 
  (0.00231)  (0.00213)  (0.00701)  (0.00030) 
 9  0.001893  0.001184 -0.001337  0.000656 
  (0.00215)  (0.00201)  (0.00648)  (0.00029) 
 10  0.001792  0.001024 -0.001175  0.000599 
  (0.00199)  (0.00189)  (0.00598)  (0.00028) 
 11  0.001679  0.000903 -0.001049  0.000549 
  (0.00185)  (0.00176)  (0.00551)  (0.00027) 
 12  0.001563  0.000808 -0.000946  0.000504 
  (0.00171)  (0.00164)  (0.00507)  (0.00026) 
 13  0.001449  0.000730 -0.000859  0.000463 
  (0.00158)  (0.00153)  (0.00467)  (0.00025) 
 14  0.001340  0.000663 -0.000784  0.000425 
  (0.00146)  (0.00142)  (0.00430)  (0.00024) 
 15  0.001238  0.000605 -0.000718  0.000391 
  (0.00136)  (0.00132)  (0.00396)  (0.00023) 
 16  0.001142  0.000554 -0.000658  0.000360 
  (0.00126)  (0.00122)  (0.00365)  (0.00022) 
 17  0.001053  0.000509 -0.000605  0.000331 
  (0.00116)  (0.00113)  (0.00336)  (0.00021) 
 18  0.000970  0.000467 -0.000556  0.000305 
  (0.00108)  (0.00105)  (0.00309)  (0.00020) 
 19  0.000894  0.000429 -0.000511  0.000281 
  (0.00100)  (0.00097)  (0.00284)  (0.00019) 
 20  0.000823  0.000395 -0.000470  0.000258 
  (0.00093)  (0.00090)  (0.00262)  (0.00018) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table E8: Impulse responses to a positive foreign real interest rate shock 
under a fixed exchange rate regime   
      
     Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=0) DLCPI*(ERR2=0) DLREALER*(ERR2=0) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=0) 
     
      1 -0.000550  0.000485  0.003314 -3.28E-05 
  (0.00064)  (0.00067)  (0.00087)  (0.00016) 
 2 -0.003932  0.000802 -0.001715 -0.000561 
  (0.00071)  (0.00078)  (0.00105)  (0.00018) 
 3 -0.000620  0.000346 -0.000300 -3.16E-05 
  (0.00048)  (0.00055)  (0.00073)  (0.00012) 
 4 -0.000211  0.000195 -0.000138 -1.26E-06 
  (0.00028)  (0.00037)  (0.00042)  (6.8E-05) 
 5 -4.95E-05  0.000110 -5.43E-05  9.44E-06 
  (0.00018)  (0.00024)  (0.00024)  (4.0E-05) 
 6 -6.11E-06  6.30E-05 -2.30E-05  8.46E-06 
  (0.00010)  (0.00015)  (0.00012)  (2.4E-05) 
 7  4.57E-06  3.64E-05 -1.00E-05  5.96E-06 
  (5.6E-05)  (9.0E-05)  (6.4E-05)  (1.5E-05) 
 8  5.65E-06  2.11E-05 -4.46E-06  3.83E-06 
  (2.9E-05)  (5.4E-05)  (3.3E-05)  (9.3E-06) 
 9  4.44E-06  1.22E-05 -2.02E-06  2.36E-06 
  (1.5E-05)  (3.2E-05)  (1.7E-05)  (5.7E-06) 
 10  3.05E-06  7.09E-06 -9.32E-07  1.43E-06 
  (8.5E-06)  (1.9E-05)  (8.7E-06)  (3.5E-06) 
 11  1.96E-06  4.11E-06 -4.35E-07  8.49E-07 
  (4.9E-06)  (1.1E-05)  (4.7E-06)  (2.1E-06) 
 12  1.22E-06  2.38E-06 -2.06E-07  5.02E-07 
  (3.0E-06)  (6.8E-06)  (2.6E-06)  (1.3E-06) 
 13  7.45E-07  1.38E-06 -9.85E-08  2.95E-07 
  (1.8E-06)  (4.0E-06)  (1.5E-06)  (7.9E-07) 
 14  4.48E-07  7.98E-07 -4.77E-08  1.72E-07 
  (1.1E-06)  (2.4E-06)  (8.5E-07)  (4.7E-07) 
 15  2.66E-07  4.62E-07 -2.34E-08  1.01E-07 
  (7.0E-07)  (1.4E-06)  (5.0E-07)  (2.8E-07) 
 16  1.57E-07  2.67E-07 -1.17E-08  5.85E-08 
  (4.3E-07)  (8.3E-07)  (2.9E-07)  (1.7E-07) 
 17  9.26E-08  1.55E-07 -5.89E-09  3.40E-08 
  (2.6E-07)  (5.0E-07)  (1.7E-07)  (1.0E-07) 
 18  5.42E-08  8.94E-08 -3.02E-09  1.98E-08 
  (1.5E-07)  (2.9E-07)  (1.0E-07)  (6.1E-08) 
 19  3.17E-08  5.17E-08 -1.57E-09  1.15E-08 
  (9.2E-08)  (1.8E-07)  (6.0E-08)  (3.6E-08) 
 20  1.84E-08  2.99E-08 -8.27E-10  6.64E-09 
  (5.5E-08)  (1.0E-07)  (3.5E-08)  (2.2E-08) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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Table E9: Impulse responses to a positive foreign real interest rate shock 
under a flexible exchange rate regime   
 
     
      Period DLREALGDP_NEW*(ERR2=1) DLCPI*(ERR2=1) DLREALER*(ERR2=1) DLINEQUALITY*(ERR2=1) 
     
      1  0.022403 -0.014499  0.037023  2.10E-05 
  (0.00808)  (0.00365)  (0.02888)  (0.00053) 
 2  0.002320  0.001403 -0.029518  0.000248 
  (0.00841)  (0.00433)  (0.02939)  (0.00062) 
 3  0.000188 -0.000149  0.001682  0.000102 
  (0.00194)  (0.00229)  (0.00464)  (0.00033) 
 4  0.000178  6.72E-05  7.16E-05  5.89E-05 
  (0.00093)  (0.00149)  (0.00184)  (0.00021) 
 5  5.44E-05  7.34E-05  8.32E-05  3.35E-05 
  (0.00054)  (0.00098)  (0.00103)  (0.00013) 
 6  1.04E-05  6.75E-05  5.14E-07  1.98E-05 
  (0.00033)  (0.00065)  (0.00065)  (8.7E-05) 
 7 -5.68E-06  5.32E-05 -1.95E-05  1.20E-05 
  (0.00021)  (0.00043)  (0.00042)  (5.7E-05) 
 8 -9.63E-06  3.94E-05 -2.28E-05  7.44E-06 
  (0.00014)  (0.00029)  (0.00028)  (3.8E-05) 
 9 -9.15E-06  2.81E-05 -1.97E-05  4.71E-06 
  (9.4E-05)  (0.00019)  (0.00018)  (2.5E-05) 
 10 -7.37E-06  1.96E-05 -1.53E-05  3.02E-06 
  (6.2E-05)  (0.00013)  (0.00012)  (1.7E-05) 
 11 -5.51E-06  1.34E-05 -1.12E-05  1.96E-06 
  (4.2E-05)  (8.7E-05)  (8.2E-05)  (1.1E-05) 
 12 -3.95E-06  9.15E-06 -7.90E-06  1.28E-06 
  (2.8E-05)  (5.8E-05)  (5.5E-05)  (7.5E-06) 
 13 -2.76E-06  6.19E-06 -5.48E-06  8.43E-07 
  (1.9E-05)  (3.9E-05)  (3.7E-05)  (5.0E-06) 
 14 -1.90E-06  4.17E-06 -3.76E-06  5.57E-07 
  (1.3E-05)  (2.6E-05)  (2.5E-05)  (3.3E-06) 
 15 -1.30E-06  2.80E-06 -2.55E-06  3.69E-07 
  (8.4E-06)  (1.7E-05)  (1.6E-05)  (2.2E-06) 
 16 -8.78E-07  1.88E-06 -1.73E-06  2.45E-07 
  (5.6E-06)  (1.2E-05)  (1.1E-05)  (1.5E-06) 
 17 -5.92E-07  1.26E-06 -1.16E-06  1.63E-07 
  (3.8E-06)  (7.8E-06)  (7.4E-06)  (1.0E-06) 
 18 -3.98E-07  8.40E-07 -7.79E-07  1.08E-07 
  (2.5E-06)  (5.2E-06)  (4.9E-06)  (6.7E-07) 
 19 -2.67E-07  5.61E-07 -5.22E-07  7.22E-08 
  (1.7E-06)  (3.5E-06)  (3.3E-06)  (4.5E-07) 
 20 -1.79E-07  3.75E-07 -3.50E-07  4.81E-08 
  (1.1E-06)  (2.3E-06)  (2.2E-06)  (3.0E-07) 
     
     Factorization: Structural 
Standard Errors: Analytic 
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A positive world real oil price shock  
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A positive foreign real interest rate shock  
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Foreign demand shock 
  
 
World real oil price shock 
  
 
Foreign real interest rate shock 
  
 
Figure E6: Responses of real GDP to negative and positive shocks for model 
of within-country income gap 
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